United States v. Mims
| Decision Date | 07 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:19-cr-00527 (BRM) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. GREGORY MIMS, Defendant, |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Before this Court is a Motion for Compassionate Release filed by Defendant Gregory Mims (“Mims”) under the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (ECF No. 106.) Plaintiff, the United States of America (the “Government”), opposed the motion. (ECF No. 107.) Mims filed a Reply (ECF No. 108) and a Letter (ECF No. 110) in support of its motion. Having reviewed the parties' submissions filed in connection with the motion and having heard oral argument on November 19, 2020 (ECF No. 109), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause having been shown, Mims's Motion for Compassionate Release is DENIED.
On July 25, 2019, Mims pleaded guilty to an information charging him with conspiracy to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin contrary to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), and in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, for his conducts occurring between December 2017 and May 2018. (ECF No. 89.) Mims was involved in his older brother Andre Mims's drug trafficking conspiracy. (ECF No. 106 at 2.)
At sentencing, Mims faced a guideline range of 60 months based on the statutory mandatory minimum term of five years under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b). (Id. at 3.) Without the minimum, Mims would have faced a guideline range of 46 to 57 months, based on a total offense level of 21, and a criminal history category of III. (Id.) At sentencing, Mims was 44 years old, and had four criminal history points: (1) one point for wandering in a public place for the purpose of CDS (offense committed in 1996), for which he received a $100 fine; (2) two points for possession of cocaine and with intent to distribute (offense committed in 2005) for which he was sentenced to two years of probation; and (3) one point for possession of cocaine (offense committed in 2010) for which he was sentenced to three years of probation. (Id. at 3 n.1.)
On November 25, 2019, Mims was sentenced to 60 months' imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release, with special conditions requiring drug testing and treatment, mental health treatment, life skills/education, motor vehicle compliance, and supporting dependents. (ECF No. 92 at 2-3.) Mims reported to the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) on January 7, 2020. (ECF No. 106 at 3.) His projected release date is March 28, 2024. (Id.) By the time of his Motion, Mims had served 19.5% of his sentence, with 41 months more to serve. (Id.) Mims is currently housed at FCI Danbury. (Id.)
On July 2, 2020, Mims filed a request for compassionate release and release to home confinement with the warden at FCI Danbury. (Id. at 5.) On July 6, 2020, a BOP warden denied that request. (Id.) A second request for release to home confinement, pursuant to a class-action habeas corpus suit with FCI Danbury, was denied on October 6, 2020. (Id.) On October 28, 2020, Mims filed this Motion for Compassionate Release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (ECF No. 106.) Mims claims the current novel coronavirus (“COVID-19”) pandemic, the grave risk that imprisoned people will contract it and suffer worse consequences as a result of their imprisoned status, combined with Mims' illnesses-morbid obesity, hypertension, asthma, and undiagnosed diabetes-constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for his compassionate release. (Id. at 2.) On November 9, 2020, the Government opposed the motion. (ECF No. 107.) On November 16, 2020, Mims filed a Reply to the Government's opposition. (ECF No. 108.) On December 23, 2020, Mims filed a Letter informing the Court of the current situation at FCI Danbury. (ECF No. 110.)
“18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) governs modification of sentences in the case that a sentencing guideline has been changed.” United States v. Ortiz-Vega, 744 F.3d 869, 871 (3d Cir. 2014). “It provides an exception to the normal rule, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), that a court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” Id. Relevant here is 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which allows a motion for compassionate release to be brought by either the Director of the BOP or the defendant, after the defendant has exhausted the administrative remedies. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). A court may reduce the defendant's sentence, if the court finds: (1) there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” which warrant a reduction; (2) the reduction would be “consistent with any applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission;” and (3) the applicable sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) indicate that reducing the defendant's sentence would be appropriate. Id.
“[T]he statute itself does not define the key terms ‘extraordinary and compelling,' apparently providing courts with some flexibility and discretion to consider the unique circumstances of a motion for compassionate release.” United States v. Farlow, Crim. No. 18-044, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61502, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2021). “Where the Sentencing Commission has published an applicable policy statement, courts will consult the statement as ‘helpful guidance' on the circumstances which rise to reasons warranting relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” Id. at *4-5 (citations omitted). But the policy statement “does not constrain [a court's] independent assessment of whether ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons' warrant a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States v. McNair, 481 F.Supp.3d 362, 369 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 451 F.Supp.3d 392, 397 (E.D. Pa. 2020)).
Under the policy statement, certain medical conditions may qualify as “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(a)(i) and (ii). They include a terminal illness, such as “metastatic solid-tumor cancer, ” and “a serious physical or medication condition . . . that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.” Id.
In seeking a compassionate release, the defendant “bears the burden” of proving “compelling and extraordinary reasons exist to justify compassionate release.” United States v. Sellers, Crim. A. No. 10-434, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72991, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2020) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). The defendant “bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Evans, Crim. A. No. 13-173, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193430, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2020) (citations omitted).
As a threshold matter, the parties agreed in the oral argument that this Court had the authority to hear this matter and grant the relief Mims is seeking, and that Mims satisfied the statutory exhaustion requirement. Draft Tr. Nov. 19, 2020, Oral Arg. With this agreement, the Court turns to the substance of Mims's motion.
“The ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons' inquiry logically has two components: (a) identification of a medical condition that renders the defendant particularly vulnerable to serious consequences if infected with COVID-19; and (b) the likelihood of COVID-19 infection, with particular reference to conditions in the institution in which the defendant is incarcerated.” United States v. Moore, Crim. A. No. 19-101, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132220, at *7 (D.N.J. July 27, 2020). As illustrated below, the analysis of the two components does not reveal extraordinary and compelling reasons for granting Mims's compassionate release.
The Government maintains Mims's obesity does not support a sentence reduction. (ECF No. 107 at 7.) Mims claims his illnesses constitute a compelling and extraordinary threat to his health and safety during the COVID-19 pandemic. (ECF No. 106 at 10.) The Court disagrees.
For the first component, an inmate seeking a compassionate release “typically must show that he has a medical condition that puts him at increased risk for severe illness or complications from COVID-19.” United States v. Adams, Crim. A. No. 00-697, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190133, at *14 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 2020) (citations omitted). Courts generally defer to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (“CDC”) list of underlying medical conditions that place “people at increased risk of severe illness from COVID-19, ” to “determin[e] whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist in COVID-19 compassionate release cases.” United States v. Henderson, Crim. A. No. 15-0329, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156060, at *8-9 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2020).
Upon filing this motion, Mims was less than fifty years old, not at an advanced age with the greatest risk for severe illness from COVID-19.[1] Mims tested negative twice for COVID-19 on May 27, 2020, and August 6, 2020, at FCI Danbury. (ECF No 107 at 5.) Also, in the oral argument, the parties agreed: (1) Mims suffered from morbid obesity, hypertension, asthma, and bordered on, though not diagnosed with, diabetes; and (2) the CDC recognized obesity, but not other illnesses of Mims, as a comorbidity factor for COVID-19. Draft Tr. Nov. 19, 2020, Oral Arg. Because obesity is the only risk factor that Mims can assert, Mims' medical conditions do not give rise to an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. United States v. Warrington, Crim. A. No. 18-179, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40603, at *11 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2021) (citations omitted) (“[O]besity, on its own, has been regularly rejected as an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying compassionate release.”); see also United States v. Dunich-Kolb, Crim. A. No. 14-150, 2020 U.S....
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