United States v. Miranda
| Decision Date | 20 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 13–3032,13–3036.,s. 13–3032 |
| Citation | 780 F.3d 1185 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee v. Luis Alberto Munoz MIRANDA, also known as David, also known as El Gordo, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
780 F.3d 1185
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
v.
Luis Alberto Munoz MIRANDA, also known as David, also known as El Gordo, Appellant.
Nos. 13–3032
13–3036.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Sept. 15, 2014.
Decided March 20, 2015.
Douglas J. Behr, appointed by the court, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Elita C. Amato, appointed by the court.
John–Alex Romano, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellee. David M. Lieberman, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, entered an appearance.
Before: SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judges.
Opinion
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.
SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge:
Luis Alberto Munoz Miranda and Francisco Jose Valderrama Carvajal, citizens of Colombia, pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). They contend on appeal that the MDLEA is unconstitutional as applied to their conduct, that the MDLEA fails to reach extraterritorially to encompass their conduct in Colombia, and that the facts in the record fail to support acceptance of their guilty pleas. We reject their challenges and affirm their convictions.
Appellants waived all but one of the arguments they now raise when they entered pleas of guilty without reserving any right to appeal their convictions. With respect to their remaining claim, concerning whether vessels used by the drug conspiracy were “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” within the meaning of the MDLEA, that issue implicates the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction and thus could not be waived by appellants' guilty pleas. On the merits of the issue, however, appellants' statements of stipulated facts fully support the district court's conclusion that the relevant vessels were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
I.
On April 23, 2010, a federal grand jury indicted Munoz Miranda and Valderrama
Carvajal, along with others not before us on appeal, for participating in an international drug smuggling conspiracy in violation of the MDLEA, 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501 et seq. The indictment charged appellants with conspiring to distribute a controlled substance on board “vessel[s] subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. § 70503(a)(1). The drug smuggling operation used “go-fast” boats (small boats capable of traveling undetected and at high speeds) to move drugs from Colombia to various Central American countries. From 2006 to 2010, the smuggling organization transported large quantities of drugs in numerous shipments.
Neither Munoz Miranda nor Valderrama Carvajal planned to, or did, leave Colombia in furtherance of the conspiracy. Valderrama Carvajal served as an organizer of the smuggling operations, and Munoz Miranda provided logistical support. In 2011, Colombian officials arrested Munoz Miranda and Valderrama Carvajal. They were extradited to the United States shortly thereafter.
In the district court, Munoz Miranda and Valderrama Carvajal moved to dismiss their indictments on a number of grounds. They claimed that the ships used by the conspiracy did not satisfy the statutory definition of vessels “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c), because the ships were in Colombian waters at the time of capture. Appellants further contended that, because their conspiratorial acts did not take place on board any vessel, the MDLEA does not reach their conduct. They also challenged the constitutionality of the MDLEA on two grounds, claiming (i) that Congress lacks Article I authority to criminalize their extraterritorial conduct, and (ii) that applying the statute against them without demonstrating a nexus to the United States violates their due process rights. On October 11, 2012, the district court orally denied appellants' motions to dismiss.
The next day, appellants moved to enter guilty pleas under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Each appellant executed an unconditional guilty plea agreement that did not “reserve[ ] in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). Appellants entered joint statements of stipulated facts in support of their respective guilty pleas. They both stipulated that, from 2006–2010, they were “co-conspirator[s] in a drug trafficking organization which ... transported narcotics from Colombia on stateless go-fast vessels through international waters.” J.A. 93, 128.
Appellants' statements of stipulated facts also differed in certain respects. Munoz Miranda identified one particular shipment as an example of the conspiracy's use of stateless vessels to transport drugs: a shipment intended to travel from Colombia to Honduras “on board a go-fast boat” that was “not registered in Colombia and did not fly a Colombian flag.” J.A. 94. That shipment never left Colombia because it was stolen before it could be moved. Valderrama Carvajal identified the same shipment as an example of the conspiracy's actions, and also described a second shipment as an additional example. The latter shipment departed Colombia on board a go-fast boat that “was not registered in Colombia or any other nation, and contained no registration identification.” J.A. 129. Colombian authorities intercepted that vessel when it ran aground on Roncador Island, a remote Colombian island in the Caribbean Sea.
At their plea hearing, appellants confirmed that they knowingly and voluntarily entered pleas of guilty and waived any right to appeal. On October 12, 2012, the district court accepted both guilty pleas
based on appellants' joint statements of stipulated facts. But before their sentencing could take place, appellants filed a joint motion for reconsideration of their original motions to dismiss.
On February 20, 2013, the district court issued an opinion denying reconsideration and memorializing the reasons for its oral denial of the original motions to dismiss. The court first explained that, as established by appellants' factual stipulations, the two vessels identified as examples of the conspiracy's use of stateless boats—the vessel intercepted off of Roncador Island and the vessel intended to transport the stolen shipment—were both “without nationality” under the MDLEA's definition and thus were “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1), (d). With respect to the extraterritorial reach of the statute, the court held that the MDLEA's conspiracy provision applies extraterritorially to encompass appellants' conduct. Finally, the court determined that the MDLEA, as applied to appellants, was a valid exercise of Congress's authority to define and punish “Felonies committed on the high Seas,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, and that the MDLEA's extraterritorial application worked no infringement of appellants' due process rights.
II.
Munoz Miranda and Valderrama Carvajal appeal the district court's denial of their motions to dismiss and their related joint motion for reconsideration, as well as their judgments of conviction. Appellants raise both constitutional and statutory claims.
For each of appellants' arguments, we must first determine whether appellants' unconditional guilty pleas waived their right to appeal the issue. “It is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant who pleads guilty can do so conditionally, reserving the ability to raise particular challenges on appeal. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). Here, though, appellants entered unconditional guilty pleas, thereby waiving all challenges amenable to waiver. See United States v. Delgado–Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1341 (D.C.Cir.2004). Appellants therefore make no claim that their guilty pleas reserved their ability to press the arguments they now present.
Appellants instead contend that their arguments are immune from waiver. “There are two recognized exceptions” to the rule that an unconditional guilty plea waives a “defendant['s] claims of error on appeal.” Id. First, a challenge to the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction—to the court's power to hear a given case—can never be waived or forfeited.See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) ; United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) ; Delgado–Garcia, 374 F.3d at 1341. Second, certain constitutional challenges asserting a “right not to be haled into court at all” cannot be waived through a guilty plea. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 31, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974) ; see also Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) (per curiam); Delgado–Garcia, 374 F.3d at 1341.
Appellants contend that either the subject-matter jurisdiction exception or the so-called Blackledge/Menna exception insulates each of their arguments from waiver
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