United States v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
• Citation: United States v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 213 F. 169 (8th Cir. 1914)
• Decision Date: 21 March 1914
• Docket Number: 4013.
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. MISSOURI PAC. RY. CO.

213 F. 169

UNITED STATES v. MISSOURI PAC. RY. CO.

No. 4013.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

March 21, 1914

Syllabus by the Court.

The proviso of section 3 of the 'Act to promote the safety of employes and travelers upon railroads by limiting the hours of service of employes thereon, ' of March 4, 1907 (Act March 4, 1907, c. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1321)), commonly known as the hours of service act exempts a common carrier from liability for the penalty specified therein when, in a case of casualty, unavoidable accident, or the act of God, it necessarily requires or permits a telegraph operator, train dispatcher, or other employe of their class to serve longer than the time limited for his service by section 2 of that act.

An operator at a day office was in service at a station where the general limit of his service expired at 10 p.m. December 11th, and the limit of his four hours excess service in case of emergency at 2 a.m. December 12th. An unavoidable accident caused a wreck before 10 p.m. December 11th, and necessitated the continuous service of the operator until the wreck could be cleared. A relief operator could have been procured at the time of the accident, but the company expected to clear the wreck by 11 p.m. December 11th. Every effort to clear it at once was made, but unforeseen and unavoidable difficulties delayed the clearance until 5 a.m., and necessitated the operator's continued service until 6:35 a.m. December 12th. As soon as the delay was known, defendant attempted to procure a relief operator, but none could be found.

A demurrer to an answer, in which the defendant alleged 'that through no fault or negligence of the defendant company, or its agents or servants, a derailment occurred on the line of the defendant,' admits that, however high the degree of foresight and diligence required in relation to the derailment, the defendant exercised that degree, for so only could it be without fault or negligence.

The apparent and natural meaning of the terms of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious hidden signification deduced by the reflection and ingenuity of acute and powerful intellects. Where the language of a statute is unambiguous and its meaning plain, no room is left for construction.

Where the legislative body makes no exception to a general and clear enactment, the conclusive presumption is that it intended to make none, and it is not the province of the courts to do so.

A rational practical interpretation of a statute, one which tends to promote the accomplishment of the purpose of the law, should be preferred to one which is unreasonable or impracticable, or that would hinder the accomplishment of that purpose.

A penal statute which creates a new crime and prescribes a punishment for it must clearly state the persons or acts denounced. A person who, or an act which, is not by the expressed terms or plain meaning of the law clearly within the class of persons or within the class of acts it denounces will not sustain a conviction.

Philip J. Doherty, of Washington, D.C. (Mr. Fred Robertson, of Atwood, Kan., on the brief), for the United States.

W. P Waggener and James M. Challiss, both of Atchison, Kan., for defendant in error.

Before SANBORN and HOOK, Circuit Judges, and POPE, District Judge.

SANBORN Circuit Judge.

The United States complains that the court below overruled a demurrer to the answer of the defendant and rendered judgment in the defendant's favor in an action against it for an alleged violation of the hours of service act. The plaintiff alleged in its complaint that the defendant required and permitted its telegraph operator at Meneger Junction, Kan., an office and station operated only during the daytime, to remain on duty during the 24 hours, commencing at 7 o'clock a.m. December 11, 1911, more than 13 hours, in violation of 'An act to promote the safety of employes and travelers upon railroads by limiting the hours of service of employes thereon,' approved March 4, 1907, 34 Stat. 1415. The defendant answered that its operator at that station was on duty on December 11, 1911, from 7 a.m. until 12 noon and from 1 p.m. until 6 p.m. and from 7 p.m. on that day until 6:35 a.m. on December 12, 1911; that his hours of service in excess of 13 hours were due to this casualty and unavoidable accident; that through no fault or negligence of the defendant, its agents or servants, a derailment occurred on the main line of its railroad at Nearman, Kan., which made it necessary to detour its trains from Leavenworth to Kansas City over the defendant's branch line through Meneger Junction; that the defendant used every effort to clear its track, and expected to have it cleared by 11 p.m. on December 11th at the latest, but unavoidable difficulties delayed its clearing until 5 a.m. December 12th; that there was no telegrapher on its branch line, on its main line, or on its Omaha Division that could be sent to relieve the operator at Meneger Junction at that time; that after the unavoidable delay an attempt was made to secure a relief operator, but none could be found; that at the time the wreck occurred it might have been possible to secure such an operator, but that the defendant did not know at that time that it would require so long to clear the main line. The plaintiff demurred to this answer, and counsel for the United States contend that the decision overruling that demurrer was erroneous: (1) Because the proviso of section 3 of the hours of service law is inapplicable to telegraphers, train dispatchers, and others of their class who fall under the terms of section 2 of the act; (2) because the failure of the defendant, under the circumstances pleaded in the answer to secure a relief operator, constituted no excuse for keeping the regular operator on duty after the expiration of the 13 hours of service specified for him in section 2 of the act; and (3) because the derailment pleaded in the answer was not such a casualty or unavoidable accident as justified the defendant in keeping the operator on duty beyond the 13 hours of service specified in the act.

The parts of the act material to the determination of these questions read in this way:

'Sec. 2. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier, its officers or agents, subject to this act to require or permit any employe subject to this act to be or remain on duty for a longer period than sixteen consecutive hours, * * * and no such employe who has been on duty sixteen hours in the aggregate in any twenty-four-hour period shall be required or permitted to continue or again go on duty without having had at least eight consecutive hours off duty: Provided, that no operator, train dispatcher or other employe who by the use of the telegraph or telephone dispatches, reports, transmits, receives, or delivers orders pertaining to or affecting train movements shall be required or permitted to be or remain on duty for a longer period than nine hours in any twenty-four-hour period in all towers, offices, places, and stations continuously operated night and day, nor for a longer period than thirteen hours in all towers, offices, places, and stations operated only in the daytime, except in case of emergency, when the employes named in this proviso may be permitted to be and remain on duty for four additional hours in a twenty-four-hour period. * * *

'Sec. 3. That any such common carrier, or any officer or agent thereof, requiring or permitting any employe to go, be, or remain on duty in violation of the second section hereof, shall be liable to a penalty of not to exceed five hundred dollars for each and every violation. * * * Provided, that the provisions of this act shall not apply in any case of casualty or unavoidable accident or the act of God; nor where the delay was the result of a cause not known to the carrier or its officer or agent in charge of such employe at the time said employe left a terminal, and which could not have been foreseen. * * * '

Are the provisions of section 2 which relate to telegraph operators train dispatchers, and other employes of their class excepted from the declaration of the proviso of section 3, 'that the provisions of this act shall not apply in any case of casualty or unavoidable accident, or the act of God? ' Counsel for the United States contend that this question should be answered in the affirmative because section 2 provides that telegraph operators and train dispatchers may serve 'in case of any emergency' four hours longer than the time generally fixed for their services when there is no emergency, and they argue that this provision for four hours excess service limits all excess service by them, whether demanded by an emergency, a casualty, an unavoidable accident, or an act of God; that casualties, accidents, and grave catastrophes resulting from landslides, floods, and other external incidents bear more heavily upon other employes than upon telegraphers, and that the four-hour limitation in case of an emergency would become ineffective if any casualty, unavoidable accident, or act of God would relieve telegraphers from all limitation, of the hours of service. But there are many emergencies in the operation of railroads which are neither caused by nor are they casualties, unavoidable accidents, or acts of God, and the application of the four-hour limitation of excessive service to such emergencies would give it ample scope and effect. Moreover, even if the meaning of the word emergencies' were identical with the aggregate meanings of the words 'casualties, unavoidable accidents and acts of God,' neither of the two provisions under consideration would be ineffective and they would be only cumulative. Each would have...