United States v. Mitchell, Civ. A. No. 13467.
Decision Date | 27 January 1971 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 13467. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Raymond C. MITCHELL, d/b/a Ray Mitchell Realty Company. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
John N. Mitchell, Atty. Gen., Jerris Leonard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frank E. Schwelb and Thomas M. Keeling, Attys., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
Hansell, Post, Brandon & Dorsey, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant.
This is a "blockbusting" case brought by the Attorney General pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613 alleging Defendant Ray Mitchell Realty Company has violated the provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(e) and seeking an injunction to prohibit further violations. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the following grounds:
Defendants' primary contention on their motion for summary judgment is based on both the statutory limits on the Attorney General's right to initiate an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613 and on the definition of prohibited acts in 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(e). First, defendants contend that most of the representations alleged by plaintiff do not constitute prohibited representations under § 3604(e) which provides:
Secondly, defendants argue that even if the alleged acts were violations of the Act, the Attorney General may not proceed under the so-called "first alternative" of 42 U.S.C.A. § 36131 because the acts are not sufficient in number to constitute the "pattern or practice" of resistance that is a requisite to the Attorney General bringing an action under the "first alternative." Defendants contend the Attorney General may not proceed under the so-called "second alternative" of 42 U.S.C.A. § 36132 because the plaintiff has not alleged acts which deny to groups of persons rights guaranteed by the Act. Because material issues of fact remain concerning all of these issues, summary judgment is denied.
Concerning defendants' first contention that the alleged statements of their salesmen do not constitute violations of the Act, the court must first set out the statements attributed to defendants' salesmen. In response to defendants' first interrogatories, plaintiff has answered that the following allegedly prohibited representations were made by defendants' agents:
Defendants argue that the representations above should be scrutinized pursuant to the definition of "blockbusting" in a pamphlet published by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development entitled "Fair Housing: What it Means to You." This pamphlet, designed as a guide for laymen, defines blockbusting as "persuading someone to sell housing by telling him minority groups are moving into the area." Defendants argue that upon applying the test set forth in the pamphlet it becomes apparent that some of the salesmen's statements are not prohibited representations.
Our first step is to reject the publication of the Department of Housing and Urban Development as setting forth an authoritative interpretation of 42 U.S. C.A. § 3604(e). The legislature enacts laws; and the courts, not the executive agencies, must ultimately interpret these laws. The pamphlet referred to by defendants was published as a guide for laymen. The writers of the pamphlet were concerned with publishing, in clear, concise terms the basic thrust of the Act. By necessity, their task called for some oversimplification; ours does not.
In delineating what Congress means by "representations" in § 3604(e) the court must keep in mind the basic purpose of the sections: to prevent persons from preying on the fears of property owners and inducing panic selling resulting in monetary loss to the sellers and instability in the neighborhoods involved. In furthering this purpose, Congress surely did not intend that in order to violate the Act a salesman must say, "For my own profit, I would like to induce you to sell your house by telling you that Negroes are moving into your neighborhood." On the other hand Congress did not intend for a man to be deemed a blockbuster merely by driving through a transitional neighborhood with a sign "XYZ Realty Co." lettered on his car door. To avoid both extremes, it would seem necessary to ask: How would a reasonable man interpret the acts and words of the salesman under the circumstances in which these acts were done and these words were said. This standard would seem to accommodate the realities of real estate selling and avoid an easy circumvention of the statute by the narrow interpretation requested by defendants. However, the "reasonable man" standard protects the salesman from the paranoid who interprets a real estate salesman's "good morning" as part of a sinister scheme to undermine the value of his house. A § 3604(e) "representation", then, would be any acts or words that would be likely to convey to a reasonable man, under the circumstances, the idea that members of a particular race, color, religion or national origin are or may be entering his neighborhood. Of course to fall within § 3604(e), the representation must also be made for profit and it must be made to induce the sale of the person's property.
Viewed in the manner discussed above, some of the statements allegedly made were clearly prohibited representations. For example, Mrs. Rick's alleged statements to Mrs. Jack Walker and Mrs. Marian Burzywski are outright violations of the Act. However, issues of fact remain as to whether these statements were made. The affidavits of Mrs. Walker and Mrs. Burzywski support the government's contentions that the statements were made. The affidavit of Mrs. Rick, offered by Defendant Mitchell, directly contradicts the substantive portions of the Walker and Burzywski affidavits. Concerning the representation made to Mrs. Boggs, there is an issue of fact as to whether the salesman actually worked for defendant; there is little question that the representation does constitute a violation of the Act. Some of the other actions and statements may not be a violation of § 3604(e) when taken out of context. However, as indicated above, the statements should be viewed in light of the circumstances in which they were made. Concerning these circumstances, there...
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