United States v. Mitchell
| Decision Date | 07 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11–2420.,11–2420. |
| Citation | 57 V.I. 856 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Ricardo MITCHELL, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Yohana M. Manning, Esq. (Argued), Christiansted, St. Croix, VI, Darren John–Baptiste, Esq., St. Thomas, VI, for Appellant.
Ishmael A. Meyers, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney (Argued), Office of the United States Attorney, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, VI, for Appellee.
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
Ricardo Mitchell appeals his conviction on charges related to his possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. We consider whether the “close cousin” of the prosecutor and an employee of the police department who worked with Government witnesses should have been disqualified as jurors in Mitchell's trial pursuant to the doctrine of implied bias. The law, we conclude, presumes bias in jurors who are close relatives of the parties in a case. Because the District Court did not elicit sufficient information on the nature of the relationship between the prosecutor and Juror 28, his cousin, we will remand for additional factfinding. However, we will affirm the District Court's denial of Mitchell's motion to strike Juror 97, the police department employee, because the law does not categorically impute bias to coworkers of key witnesses in a trial.
Mitchell was arrested on September 27, 2010 after an encounter with police officers. While on patrol that evening, Officers Joseph Brown and Bruce Taylor detected the smell of marijuana near where Mitchell was leaning into a car window. Planning to conduct a field interview, Officer Brown exited his squad car and approached Mitchell, who started to backpedal and fumble for something in his waistband. Worried that it was a gun, Officer Brown ran and tackled him. An object clattered to the ground as the men fell to the street. After Officer Brown handcuffed Mitchell, he discovered a loaded magazine underneath Mitchell's body and a loaded semiautomatic handgun nearby. The serial number on the gun had been filed down and was undecipherable. In response to questioning by Officer Taylor, Mitchell later admitted that he did not have a license to possess a weapon.
The grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging Mitchell with possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (Count 1) and V.I.Code Ann. tit. 23, § 481(a) and (b) (Count 3), and possession of an unlicensed firearm, in violation of V.I.Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a) (Count 2). The District Court held a two-day trial. During voir dire, the District Judge asked the jury venire if anyone was related by blood, business, or marriage to the prosecutor. Juror 28 raised her hand, leading to the following colloquy:
Juror 28: He's my blood relative.
The Court: How is he related to you?
Juror 28: By father side.
The Court: What is his relation to you?
Juror 28: Cousin.
The Court: All right. Is there anything in that relationship that would—are you a close cousin or a distant cousin?
Juror 28: Close. But I don't think that have anything to do with it.
The Court: All right. Is there anything in that relationship that would prevent you from following my instructions on the law?
Juror 28: No, Your Honor.
The Court: Is there anything in that relationship that would prevent you from listening to the evidence in this case fairly and impartially?
Juror 28: No, Your Honor.
The Court: All right. Thank you.
Appendix (“App.”) 20–21. Neither party sought to ask Juror 28 additional questions, and neither party challenged her for cause or used a peremptory strike on her.
Subsequently, the District Judge read the parties' witness lists and asked if any venireperson had a relationship by blood, marriage, or business to those individuals. Juror 97 responded affirmatively:
Juror 97: I work for the V.I. Police Department, so I'm familiar with Officer Lans and Officer Taylor. I'm their coworker.
The Court: All right. Do you work with them daily?
Juror 97: I work in the fiscal and property, so I issue supplies and stuff, uniform.
The Court: All right. You not in the field or anything with these—
The Court: All right. Is there anything in your relationship with these two individuals that would prevent you from following my instructions on the law?
The Court: Is there anything in your relationship with those individuals that would prevent you from listening to the evidence in this case fairly and impartially?
App. 24–25. Again, neither party posed additional questions to Juror 97, challenged her for cause, or used a peremptory strike on her.
Jurors 28 and 97 were seated as members of the jury. Later that evening, Mitchell filed a motion to strike Juror 97 for cause. He argued that she could not remain impartial because she was a coworker of key witnesses in the case and would feel pressured to vote in the interests of her employer, the police department. The District Court denied the motion. The jury found Mitchell guilty on all counts, and the District Court sentenced him to a 15–year term of imprisonment on Count 3 and one-year terms of imprisonment on both Counts 1 and 2, to be served concurrently with Count 3. Mitchell filed this timely appeal to challenge the presence of Jurors 28 and 97 on his jury.1
The Sixth Amendment guarantees every criminal defendant “the right to a ... trial[ ] by an impartial jury.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Complementing this right are the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause, which have “long demanded that, if a jury is to be provided the defendant, regardless of whether the Sixth Amendment requires it, the jury must stand impartial and indifferent to the extent commanded by the Sixth Amendment.” Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). Voir dire examination serves to protect the right to an impartial jury by providing the parties a means of uncovering juror bias. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143–44, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994); Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729–30, 112 S.Ct. 2222;Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991). Bias that emerges in response to voir dire questioning can lead to excusal of a juror for cause or may facilitate the parties' intelligent exercise of peremptory strikes. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984).
Traditionally, courts have distinguished between two types of challenges for cause: those based on actual bias, and those based on implied bias. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 167–68, 70 S.Ct. 519, 94 L.Ed. 734 (1950); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133, 57 S.Ct. 177, 81 L.Ed. 78 (1936); United States v. Mitchell, 568 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir.2009); United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir.1997). Actual bias, also known as bias in fact, is “the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality.” Torres, 128 F.3d at 43. All members of the venire are subject to examination for actual bias, which may become apparent when a venireperson admits partiality or may be inferred from responses to voir dire questioning. Wood, 299 U.S. at 133–34, 57 S.Ct. 177;Torres, 128 F.3d at 43. District courts possess broad discretion in excusing prospective jurors for cause on the basis of actual bias. Dennis, 339 U.S. at 168, 70 S.Ct. 519. We defer to rulings of the district court on actual bias because it possesses a superior capacity to observe the demeanor of prospective jurors and to assess their credibility. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Torres, 128 F.3d at 44.
Implied bias, by contrast, is “bias conclusively presumed as [a] matter of law,” or, put another way, “bias attributable in law to the prospective juror regardless of actual partiality.” Wood, 299 U.S. at 133, 134, 57 S.Ct. 177. This doctrine is rooted in the recognition that certain narrowly-drawn classes of jurors are highly unlikely, on average, to be able to render impartial jury service despite their assurances to the contrary. E.g., Dennis, 339 U.S. at 175, 70 S.Ct. 519 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir.1988).2 For example, the victim of a crime might insist that she can serve as an impartial juror in her assailant's trial. But, understanding that the average person in her situation likely would harbor prejudice, consciously or unconsciously, the law imputes bias to her categorically and mandates her excusal for cause. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring); United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 172 (2d Cir.2002).
Because implied bias deals in categories prescribed by law, the question whether a juror's bias may be implied is a legal question, not a matter of discretion for the trial court. Smith, 455 U.S. at 222 n. *, 102 S.Ct. 940 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150, 1158–59 (10th Cir.1991). The test focuses on “whether an average person in the position of the juror in controversy would be prejudiced.” Torres, 128 F.3d at 45;accord Mitchell, 568 F.3d at 1151;United States v. Cerrato–Reyes, 176 F.3d 1253, 1260–61 (10th Cir.1999), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Duncan, 242 F.3d 940 (10th Cir.2001). Courts look to the facts underlying the alleged bias to determine if they would create in a juror an inherent risk of substantial emotional involvement. United States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 641–42 (6th Cir.2010); Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 399 (5th Cir.2003). A prospective juror's assessment of her own ability to remain impartial is irrelevant for the purposes of the test. Torres, 128 F.3d at 45. Because the right to an impartial jury is constitutive of the right...
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