United States v. Montanez

Decision Date05 May 2020
Docket NumberCase # 15-CR-122-FPG
Citation458 F.Supp.3d 146
Parties UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Luis MONTANEZ, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of New York

Meghan A. Tokash, Joseph M. Tripi, U.S. Attorney's Office, Buffalo, NY, for Plaintiff.

DECISION AND ORDER

FRANK P. GERACI, JR., Chief Judge

INTRODUCTION

On April 15, 2020, Defendant Luis Montanez filed a Motion for Reduction in Sentence. ECF No. 176. Defendant requests that the Court reduce his sentence to either time served or alter his sentence to home confinement because of the ongoing Coronavirus Disease 2019 ("COVID-19") pandemic. ECF Nos. 176, 179, 180. The Government opposes the Motion. ECF No. 178. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion is DENIED without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

On October 2, 2017, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and distribution of, 100 grams or more of heroin pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 846, a charge that carries a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of five years and a maximum term of forty years. ECF Nos. 1, 105, 106, 108; 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). Defendant was sentenced on August 16, 2018 to 151 months in the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") and four years’ supervised release. ECF Nos. 138, 139.

Defendant is currently incarcerated in the Elkton Federal Correctional Institute ("FCI Elkton"). ECF No. 176 at 3. FCI Elkton has been particularly hard hit by COVID-19. Ninety-nine inmates and forty-nine staff members have contracted the virus. COVID-19 Coronavirus , FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS , http://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last visited May 5, 2020). Seven inmates have died. Id. The Attorney General has specifically identified FCI Elkton as a facility facing "significant levels of infection" and has directed the BOP to increase the use of home confinement for prisoners housed at FCI Elkton and other similarly situated facilities. ECF No. 178-1 at Ex. B.

Defendant appears to suffer from asthma

, hypertension, carpal tunnel syndrome, anxiety, and depression. ECF No. 176 at 2; ECF No. 128 ¶¶ 96–100. He is currently forty-one years old and has been described as "moderately obese." ECF No. 176 at 2; ECF No. 128 at 2 & ¶ 97. Defendant argues that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") and the World Health Organization ("WHO") have stated that certain preexisting conditions can increase the risk posed by COVID-19, including asthma

and hypertension. ECF No. 176 at 3. Defendant claims that he "is locked in a small area with people coughing and suffering from fevers" and that he has experienced high blood pressure and aggravated asthma symptoms. Id. at 4.

Defendant claims that he attempted to apply for compassionate release by requesting the relevant forms from his counselor on April 1, 2020. Id. He claims, however, that his counselor told him requesting release would be a waste of "time because the warden did not believe in compassionate release and would not be granting any such requests." Id. Although the Government claims that it has no record of any request under the relevant statute ( 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) ), ECF No. 178 at 6, Defendant's counsel represented that, on April 13, 2020, he mailed a letter to the warden of FCI Elkton requesting that Defendant "be considered for compassionate release," ECF No. 176 at 23.

LEGAL STANDARD

"A court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except pursuant to statute." United States v. Gotti , No. 02-CR-743, 2020 WL 497987, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2020). Due to its amendment by the First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (" Section 3582(c)(1)(A)") provides criminal defendants the opportunity to move courts to reduce previously imposed terms of imprisonment. Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018). Prior to the amendment, only the BOP could bring such a motion. Id. ; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Although the BOP remains free to bring such a motion at will, Defendants may only bring motions under Section 3582(c)(1)(A) if they either (1) have "fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf" (the "exhaustion requirement") or (2) thirty days have elapsed since the warden of the defendant's facility received such a request (the "thirty-day backstop;" the Court refers to the exhaustion requirement and the thirty-day backstop collectively as "prerequisites").1 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

If a defendant meets these prerequisites (or the BOP has brought the motion), the Court may grant relief if it finds that (1) "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant [the] reduction" and (2) the "reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Id. If these elements are satisfied, the Court is to consider the factors set forth in Section 3553(a), which describes the factors courts are to consider in imposing sentences. Id. §§ 3553(a), 3582(c)(1)(A). In analyzing these elements and factors, "[d]istrict courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a sentence reduction." United States v. Tagliaferri , No. 13-CR-115, 2019 WL 6307494, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2019). If the Court grants such a motion, it may reduce the term of imprisonment and may correspondingly impose a term of probation or supervised release, with or without conditions, provided that such a term does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

DISCUSSION
I. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s Prerequisites

Defendant does not argue that he has satisfied Section 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s exhaustion requirement or that he may take advantage of the thirty-day backstop.2 Instead, Defendant argues that the Court can and should waive compliance with these prerequisites based on equitable considerations. ECF No. 176 at 19–24. Defendant specifically argues that waiver is appropriate because he is facing irreparable harm, because exhaustion would be futile, and because equitable estoppel excuses compliance. The Court must first examine whether there are any exceptions to Section 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s prerequisites.

Given the ongoing pandemic and the understandable desire of inmates to avoid exposure to COVID-19 while incarcerated, there has been a cavalcade of similar motions filed by defendants across the country. Correspondingly, over the last month, numerous courts have weighed in on whether and when the statutory prerequisites may be waived. There is a growing split amongst district judges in the Second Circuit regarding this question. See United States v. Bin Wen , No. 17-CR-6173, 454 F.Supp.3d 187, 192–93 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020) (collecting cases).

Courts waiving the prerequisites generally rely on one of three theories: (1) that exhaustion requirements are typically subject to non-statutory exceptions, e.g. , United States v. Perez , No. 17-CR-513, 451 F.Supp.3d 288, 291–93 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2020) ; (2) that Congress intended to grant courts the right to accelerate judicial review, e.g. , United States v. Haney , No. 19-CR-541, 454 F.Supp.3d 316, 320–21 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020) ; and (3) that the thirty-day backstop is analogous to timeliness claim-processing rules, which are generally subject to equitable estoppel, e.g. , United States v. Russo , No. 16-CR-441, 454 F.Supp.3d 270, 275–77 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020). This Court does not find any of these approaches persuasive. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s language is clear: the only exception to the exhaustion requirement is the thirty-day backstop.

A. Although the Exhaustion Requirement is Nonjurisdictional, it is Statutory and not Subject to Judge-Made Exceptions

The first question that the Court must answer is whether Section 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s prerequisites are jurisdictional. The Supreme Court has explained that "truly jurisdictional rules ... govern a court's adjudicatory authority[ ] and nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules[ ] ... do not." Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 141, 132 S.Ct. 641, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, if the prerequisites are jurisdictional, the Court has no authority to hear Defendant's motion. See Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) ("[T]his Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.")

"A rule is jurisdictional if the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdictional. But if Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional." Gonzalez , 565 U.S. at 141–42, 132 S.Ct. 641 (alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Mandatory language alone is insufficient to convert a claim-processing rule into a jurisdictional mandate.

Id. at 146, 132 S.Ct. 641 ; see also United States v. Kwai Fun Wong , 575 U.S. 402, 410, 135 S.Ct. 1625, 191 L.Ed.2d 533 (2015) ("[W]e have made plain that most [statutory] time bars are nonjurisdictional."). "[T]raditional tools of statutory construction must plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences." Kwai Fun Wong , 575 U.S. at 410, 135 S.Ct. 1625.

Although Section 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s prerequisites are clearly mandatory, there is no language suggesting that the prerequisites were intended to function as jurisdictional mandates. Section 3582(c) does not refer to a court's capacity to hear claims, cf. Gonzalez , 565 U.S. at 142, 132 S.Ct. 641 (finding that statute was jurisdictional where it mandated that, "[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals"), but instead it refers to what parties may bring a sentence reduction motion. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Further, "the language of Section 3582(c) makes no mention of jurisdictional elements and the section is not...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • United States v. Baye
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
    • June 2, 2020
    ...excuse for "deviating from [§] 3582(c)(1)(A)'s express statutory exhaustion requirement." United States v. Montanez , No. 15-CR-122-FPG, 458 F.Supp.3d 146, 154–55 (W.D.N.Y. May 5, 2020). Defendant next points to the Social Security Act, which is an equally unavailing comparison. Under this ......
  • Taylor v. City of Rochester
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of New York
    • May 6, 2020
    ... ... 16-CV-6606L United States District Court, W.D. New York. Signed May 6, 2020 458 F.Supp.3d 137 Alexander Norman ... ...
  • United States v. Stewart
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of New York
    • January 26, 2021
    ...2020 WL 1969303, at *3-8; United States v. Schultz, 454 F. Supp. 3d 217, 220-223 (W.D.N.Y. 2020); accord United States v. Montanez, 458 F. Supp. 3d 146, 149-160 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding § 3582 (c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement mandatory). Here, Stewart submitted his request for compassiona......
  • United States v. Stevens
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of New York
    • May 12, 2020
    ...United States v. Schultz, 17-CR-193S, 454 F.Supp.3d 217, 220–23 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2020) ; see also United States v. Montanez, 15-CR-122-FPG, 458 F.Supp.3d 146, 149–61 (W.D.N.Y. May 5, 2020) (finding § 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s exhaustion requirement mandatory). Section 3582(c)(1)(A) unambiguously c......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT