United States v. Montgomery, 2:11–cr–20044–JPM–1.

• Decision Date: 19 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2:11–cr–20044–JPM–1.,2:11–cr–20044–JPM–1.
• Citation: 10 F.Supp.3d 801
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Chastain MONTGOMERY, Sr., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

10 F.Supp.3d 801

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff

v.Chastain MONTGOMERY, Sr., Defendant.

No. 2:11–cr–20044–JPM–1.

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division.

Signed March 19, 2014.

Edward L. Stanton, III, Lorraine Craig, Stuart J. Canale, Tony R. Arvin, U.S. Attorney's Office, Memphis, TN, Michael Stephen Warbel, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Michael Edwin Scholl, The Scholl Law Firm, C. Anne Tipton, Memphis, TN, Susan Katherine Marcus, Law Office of Susan K. Marcus, New York, NY, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS THE “SPECIAL FINDINGS” FROM THE SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT, AND TO STRIKE THE NOTICE OF INTENT TO SEEK THE DEATH PENALTY BECAUSE IT FAILS TO ADEQUATELY NARROW DEFENDANT'S ELIGIBILITY FOR THE DEATH PENALTY, MEET HEIGHTENED STANDARDS OF RELIABILITY, IS VAGUE AND DUPLICATIVE AND OVERLY BROAD (ECF NO. 141);

DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE STATUTORY AGGRAVATORS (ECF NO. 142); DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE THE NON–STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS FOR FAILURE TO INCLUDE THEM IN THE INDICTMENT (ECF NO. 143); DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS/STRIKE NON–STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTOR CONCERNING VICTIM–IMPACT EVIDENCE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO LIMIT VICTIM–IMPACT TESTIMONY (ECF NO. 144);

DEFERRING RULING ON MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS REGARDING VICTIM IMPACT (ECF NO. 145); DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE/DISMISS NON–STATUTORY AGGRAVATOR CONCERNING STATUS OF VICTIMS (ECF NO. 146);

DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS/STRIKE NON–STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS CONCERNING IMPACT OF THE OFFENSE ON THE EMPLOYER AND COLLEAGUES OF THE VICTIM (ECF NO. 147);

DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS AS AN AGGRAVATOR (ECF NO. 148);

DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE LACK OF REMORSE AS AN AGGRAVATOR (ECF NO. 149);

AND DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR STRIKE ANY AGGRAVATOR WITH OPEN-ENDED PHRASING (ECF NO. 150)

JON P. McCALLA, District Judge.

Before the Court are the following Motions, filed by Defendant Chastain Montgomery, Sr. (“Defendant”), on May 6, 2013: (1) a Motion to Dismiss the “Special Findings” from the Superseding Indictment, and to Strike the Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty Because It Fails to Adequately Narrow Defendant's Eligibility for the Death Penalty, Meet Heightened Standards of Reliability, Is Vague and Duplicative and Overly Broad (ECF No. 141); (2) a Motion to Strike Statutory Aggravators (ECF No. 142); (3) a Motion to Strike the Non–Statutory Aggravating Factors for Failure to Include Them in the Indictment (ECF No. 143); (4) a Motion to Dismiss/Strike Non–Statutory Aggravating Factor Concerning Victim–Impact Evidence, or in the Alternative, to Limit Victim–Impact Testimony (ECF No. 144); (5) a Motion for a Bill of Particulars Regarding Victim Impact (ECF No. 145); (6) a Motion to Strike/Dismiss Non–Statutory Aggravator Concerning Status of Victims (ECF No. 146); (7) a Motion to Dismiss/Strike Non–Statutory Aggravating Factors Concerning Impact of the Offense on the Employer and Colleagues of the Victim (ECF No. 147); (8) a Motion to Strike Future Dangerousness as an Aggravator (ECF No. 148); (9) a Motion to Strike Lack of Remorse as an Aggravator (ECF No. 149); and (10) a Motion to Dismiss or Strike Any Aggravator with Open–Ended Phrasing (ECF No. 150). The United States of America (the “Government”) timely responded in opposition to each of the Motions on June 12, 2013.¹ (ECF Nos. 162–68, 170.)

For the reasons stated below, each of Defendant's Motions (ECF Nos. 141–44, 146–50) is DENIED except for his Motion for a Bill of Particulars Regarding Victim Impact (ECF No. 145), on which the Court DEFERS RULING.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 24, 2011, the Government filed a six-count Indictment against Defendant. (ECF No. 1.) On May 31, 2012, the Government filed a seven-count Superseding Indictment alleging the following facts and charges against Defendant. (ECF No. 49.)

The first six Counts allege crimes committed on October 18, 2010, and that Defendant was aided and abetted by his son, Chastain Montgomery, Jr., who is deceased. (Id. at 1–6.) Counts One and Two charge Defendant, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1114(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, with the murders of Paula Robinson and Judy Spray, employees of the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). (Id. at 1–2.)

Count Three charges Defendant with the robbery of Paula Robinson and Judy Spray of the United States' money while using a dangerous weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Id. at 3.) Count Four charges Defendant with the use of a firearm while perpetrating the crime of violence alleged in Count Three in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Id. at 4.) Counts Five and Six charge Defendant with the murder of Paula Robinson and Judy Spray while committing the crime alleged in Count Four in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Id. at 5–6.)

Count Seven charges Defendant with conspiring from August 30, 2010, to February 14, 2011, with his son to rob USPS employees having custody of money and property of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) and to rob banks and credit unions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). (Id. at 7.) This conspiracy is charged as a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. (Id. at 10.)

In support of Count Seven, the following facts are alleged in the Superseding Indictment. On August 30, 2010, Defendant purchased a Smith & Wesson .40 caliber semiautomatic pistol in Nashville, Tennessee, and, on October 15, 2010, Defendant purchased a Ruger 9mm semiautomatic pistol in Nashville, Tennessee. (Id. at 7.) Defendant provided his son with the Ruger 9mm pistol. (Id. at 8.)

On October 18, 2010, Defendant and his son robbed the United States Post Office in Henning, Tennessee. (Id. ) “[U]sing the Smith & Wesson .40 caliber pistol,” Defendant “shot and killed United States Postal employee Paula Robinson inside the United States Post Office in Henning, Tennessee.” (Id. ) “[U]sing the Ruger 9mm pistol provided to him by [Defendant],” Defendant's son “shot and killed United States Postal Service employee Judy Spray inside the United States Post Office in Henning, Tennessee.” (Id. )

On October 26, 2010, Defendant and his son stole a Nissan Frontier pickup truck in Smyrna, Tennessee. (Id. at 9.) On October 29, 2010, Defendant and his son “robbed at gunpoint the Southeast Financial Credit Union in Lavergne [sic], Tennessee,” and used the stolen Nissan Frontier pickup truck as a getaway vehicle. (Id. )

On November 29, 2010, Defendant and his son stole a Chevrolet Venture minivan in La Vergne, Tennessee. (Id. ) On November 29, 2010, Defendant and his son “robbed at gunpoint the Mid–South Bank, Smyrna, Tennessee,” and used the stolen Chevrolet Venture minivan as the getaway vehicle. (Id. )

On February 11, 2011, Defendant sent a text message to his son stating, “We need to discuss an escape route.” (Id. ) On February 14, 2011, Defendant's son “stole at gunpoint a Chevrolet pickup truck from a person in Nashville, Tennessee” (id.) and “drove in the stolen Chevrolet pickup truck from Nashville, Tennessee[,] to Mason, Tennessee” (id. at 9–10). “On February 14, 2011, [Defendant's son] fired shots at police officers in Mason, Tennessee.” (Id. at 10.) Defendant's son was shot and killed by police. (Tr. Dec. 12, 2012, ECF No. 117, at 22:17–23:16.)

The Superseding Indictment also provides a Notice of Special Findings that, as to Counts One, Two, Five, and Six, Defendant:

(1) was more than 18 years of age at the time of the offense (Title 18, United States Code, Section 3591(a) );

(2) intentionally killed the victim (Title 18, United States Code, Section 3591(a)(2)(A) );

(3) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury that resulted in the death of the victim (Title 18, United States Code, Section 3591(a)(2)(B) );

(4) intentionally participated in an act, contemplating that the life of a person would be taken or intending that lethal force would be used in connection with a person, other than one of the participants in the offense, and the victim died as a direct result of the act (Title 18, United States Code, Section 3591(a)(2)(C) );

(5) intentionally and specifically engaged in an act of violence, knowing that the act created a grave risk of death to a person, other than one of the participants in the offense, such that participation in the act constituted a reckless disregard for human life and the victim died as a direct result of the act (Title 18, United States Code, Section 3591(a)(2)(D) );

(6) in the commission of the offense knowingly created a grave risk of death to 1 or more persons in addition to the victim of the offense (Title 18, United States Code, Section 3592(c)(5) );

(7) committed the offense in the expectation of receipt of anything of pecuniary value (Title 18, United States Code, Section 3592(c)(8) );

(8) committed the offense after substantial planning and premeditation to cause the death of a person (Title 18, United States Code, Section 3592(c)(9) );

(9) intentionally killed more than one person in a single criminal episode (Title 18, United States Code, Section 3592(c)(16) ).

(ECF No. 49 at 11–12.)

On March 15, 2013, the Government filed a Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty (the “Notice”). (ECF No. 133.) The Government's Notice indicates that the Government

will seek to prove the following statutory aggravating factors as the basis for the imposition of the death penalty in relation to Counts One and Two of the Indictment:

1. Pecuniary Gain. The [D]efendant, Chastain Montgomery, Sr., committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value. (18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(8) ).

2. Multiple killings or attempted killings. The [D]efendant, Chastain Montgomery, Sr., intentionally killed or attempted to kill more than one person in a single criminal episode. (18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(16) ).

(Id. at 3.)

The Government's Notice further indicates that the Government will seek to prove multiple “non-statutory aggravating factors as the basis for the...