United States v. Moore
| Decision Date | 28 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Action No. 01-238 (BAH) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CURTIS ALLEN MOORE, JR., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The defendant Curtis Allen Moore, Jr., proceeding pro se, is approaching the seventh year of the eight years of supervised release to which he was re-sentenced in February 2013 2002, as part of his 159 month sentence on his plea of guilty to one count of distribution of 50 grams or more of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of an elementary school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. S§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 860(a)(1). See Judgment on Resentencing ("Resentencing J.") at 1-2, ECF No. 50.1 With the support of the U.S. Probation Office, see Probation Pet. (Jan. 16, 2020) ("2020 Probation Recommendation"), at 2, ECF No. 54, the defendant now seeks early termination of his supervised release, Def.'s Mot. for Early Term. of Supervised Release ("Def.'s Mot."), at 1, ECF No. 52. The government objects to this motion "[g]iven the absence of any unusual or extraordinary basis for early termination."Gov't's Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Early Termination of Supervised Release ("Gov't's Opp'n") at 6, ECF No. 55.2
The Court concludes that early termination of the defendant's supervised release term is warranted since, as the government succinctly points out, he "has served his term of supervised release without infraction, has abstained from drug use and has maintained long-term employment and a s[t]able residence," id., and in the view of the Probation Officer, who has closely supervised the defendant, he "has no further need for the services provided by the Probation Office, and those resources would be better spent on other supervisees," id.
The defendant was arrested following his sale of cocaine base to an undercover police officer on four occasions, between May 11 and June 14, 2001, and after a search of his residence and vehicle revealed additional cocaine base, a loaded revolver and drug paraphernalia. Mem. Op. and Order, (Aug. 8, 2012) ("2012 Order"), at 2, ECF No. 36 (citing Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), ¶¶ 6-9, 11, 12, 14, 15); Probation Mem. for Re-Sentencing, (Feb. 8, 2013) ("2013 PO Mem.") at 1, ECF No. 49. "The weight of all the crack totaled 267.3 grams." 2012 Order at 2. Under the then-applicable statutory and guideline sentencing regime, the defendant's plea of guilty, in 2001, to unlawful distribution of 50 grams or more of cocaine base within 1000 feet of a school, subjected him to a mandatory minimum of 10-years to up to life imprisonment, under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 860(a)(1), and because he was classified as a career offender, he had "an enhanced offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of VI," under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. 2012 Order at 2.After application of a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the total offense level was 34, yielding a mandatory sentencing range of 262 to 327 months in prison. Id. at 3. A 10-year term of supervised release was statutorily required. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). The defendant was sentenced to the minimum of the guideline range at 262 months, to be followed by a 10-year term of supervised release. See 2012 Order at 3; Judgment and Commitment (June 17, 2002), ECF No. 19.
By the time of the defendant's re-sentencing in 2013, the penalties for cocaine base offenses had been reduced by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, and the guideline range applicable to his re-sentencing was determined pursuant to those new penalties. See Statement of Reasons ("SOR") ¶ I.B.3, ECF No. 51 (). On re-sentencing, the Court departed downward to a Criminal History Category V and found a variance was warranted to impose a sentence of 159 months' imprisonment. Id. The statutorily required term of 8 years of supervised release was also imposed. See Resentencing J. at 23; 2013 PO Mem. at 4 (citing 21 USC §§ 860(a) and 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)).
After serving about thirteen years in prison, the defendant's supervision began on February 22, 2013 and is due to expire on February 21, 2021.
The defendant seeks early termination of his eight-year term of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), which authorizes termination of a term of supervised release "at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release," so long as certain factors set out in § 3553(a) are considered and the release "is warranted by the conduct of thedefendant [on supervision] and the interest of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). The parties do not dispute that this Court has the discretion to modify the defendant's term of supervised release even though he is subject to a statutorily mandated eight-year term. See Gov't's Opp'n at 6; Def.'s Mot. at 2-3; see also United States v. Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d 137, 142-43 (D.D.C. 2017) (BAH) () (collecting cases); see also United States v. King, Crim. Case No. 03-cr-249 (BAH), 2019 WL 415818, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2019) (same); United States v. Wesley, 311 F. Supp. 3d 77, 79 n.1 (D.D.C. 2018) (CKK) (same).
The D.C. Circuit has instructed, at least in the context of a denial of a motion for early termination of supervised release, that the district court explain its consideration of the relevant factors, unless "the reasons for denying the motion are apparent from the record." United States v. Mathis-Gardner, 783 F.3d 1286, 1289-90 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The reasoning of the D.C. Circuit applies equally to a decision to grant such a motion. Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 143. Accordingly, the relevant factors under § 3553(a) are addressed first before turning to consideration of whether the defendant's post-incarceration conduct and the interest of justice warrant early termination of supervised release.
In evaluating a motion for early termination of supervised release, the Court must consider the following seven factors from § 3553(a): (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the defendant's history and characteristics; (2) deterrence of criminal conduct; (3) protection of the public from further crimes of the defendant; (4) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctionaltreatment; (5) the applicable sentencing guideline range for the offense and pertinent policy statements issued by the U.S. Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (). Thus, among the §3553(a) factors not to be considered in determining whether to modify the term of supervision, id., is "the need...to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A); see U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO SUPERVISED RELEASE (July 2010) ("Supervised Release Report") at 9 ().
The sixth and seventh factors have limited relevance to the defendant here because the "factor of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities . . . would generally undermine the case specific inquiry required in evaluating a motion for early termination of supervised release," Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 145, and because this defendant has no restitution obligations.
In considering the remaining, relevant factors, the Court is cognizant that supervised release "serves an entirely different purpose than the sentence imposed under § 3553(a)." Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 502 n.15 (2011). "Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration." United States v. Johnson ("Johnson I"), 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000); see also Johnson v. United States ("Johnson II"), 529U.S. 694, 708-09 (2000) (). In addition, the Supreme Court has noted the congressional "aim[] . . . to use the district courts' discretionary judgment to allocate supervision to those release[d] who need[] it most," Johnson II, 529 U.S. at 709. "The relevant factors under § 3553(a) are, consequently, evaluated mindful of the Supreme Court's clear articulation of the purpose of supervised release and the district court's discretion to limit terms of supervised release to those who need it." Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 145 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Consideration of the first factor—the nature and circumstances of the offense—confirms the seriousness of the defendant's offense conduct. The defendant was involved in four sales of cocaine base to an undercover officer during a month-long period and an ensuing search recovered additional cocaine base and a firearm, with a total amount of cocaine base involved in his offense conduct of 267.3 grams of cocaine base. See 2013 Order at 2. The government contends that the seriousness of the defendant's offense conduct—being ...
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