United States v. Moore, No. 17-14370

Decision Date31 March 2020
Docket NumberNo. 17-14370
Parties UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Bernard MOORE, Derrick Miller, Defendants - Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Marty Fulgueira Elfenbein, Nicole D. Mariani, Andrea G. Hoffman, Tonya R. Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney Service-Southern District of Florida, U.S. Attorney Service-SFL, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Sheryl Joyce Lowenthal, Law Offices of Sheryl Lowenthal, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant Bernard Moore.

Thomas Damian Sclafani, Sclafani & Associates, PA, Robert William Stickney, Robert W. Stickney, PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant-Appellant Derrick N. Miller.

Before ROSENBAUM and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges, and PAULEY.*

PAULEY, District Judge:

Appellants Bernard Moore and Derrick Miller (together, "Appellants") appeal their convictions for narcotics trafficking and firearms possession. Appellants argue, among other things, that: (1) the district court erred in allowing them to be shackled during trial; (2) the district court mishandled a jury note; and (3) their 18 U.S.C § 922(g) convictions should be vacated under Rehaif v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 204 L.Ed.2d 594 (2019). After careful review of the record and briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm Appellants’ convictions and sentences.1

I. BACKGROUND

The Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") and Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") investigated Michael Fonseca and Michael Lewis for suspected narcotics trafficking in an effort to identify their supplier. The investigation focused on an apartment in Miami, Florida that law enforcement believed was a stash house (the "Stash House.") On December 2, 2015, a confidential informant conducted a controlled buy. The confidential informant met Fonseca in his car. After telling the confidential informant that he would retrieve the heroin "from my dog," Fonseca went to the Stash House, where he met Miller, and both went inside. When they emerged from the Stash House, Fonseca returned to the confidential informant’s car and handed him a heroin sample. Law enforcement recorded the conversations between Fonseca and the confidential informant, and, using surveillance footage later recovered from the Stash House, was able to determine that Fonseca had subsequently walked to the Stash House before returning to the confidential informant’s car to conduct the transaction.

On January 8, 2016, DEA agents observed Moore escorting Lewis into the Stash House and then saw Lewis leave holding what appeared to be a bag. When DEA agents stopped and searched Lewis’s vehicle, they recovered heroin from two bags on the vehicle’s floor.

On January 10, 2016, DEA agents executed a search warrant on the Stash House. Once inside, DEA agents discovered a security camera system recording Appellants’ comings and goings. Fortuitously for law enforcement, Appellants preserved the surveillance footage depicting them entering and leaving the Stash House, locking and unlocking the door, carrying firearms, and patrolling the perimeter. The surveillance footage showed Appellants inside the Stash House the day before the search. Law enforcement recovered large amounts of narcotics, including marijuana, hydrocodone, ethylone, heroin, powder cocaine, and crack cocaine, as well as narcotics paraphernalia. During the search, DEA agents also seized Miller’s identification cards and a loaded .357 caliber pistol with Moore’s DNA on the trigger. Additionally, DEA agents recovered two firearms from vehicles parked outside the Stash House: a .45 caliber pistol similar to one depicted on surveillance footage of Miller on January 6, 2016 and a 9mm pistol with Miller’s fingerprints on its magazine.

On November 2, 2016, Appellants were arrested. Law enforcement searched Miller’s residence and discovered narcotics, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm.

The government charged Appellants with conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance from December 2, 2015 through January 10, 2016 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1); possession with the intent to distribute a controlled substance on January 10, 2016 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 3); being felons in possession of firearms on January 10, 2016 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Count 4); and possession of firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking on January 10, 2016 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 5). The government also charged Moore with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance on November 2, 2016 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 8). Finally, the government charged Miller with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance on December 2, 2015 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 2); possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance on November 2, 2016 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 6); and being a felon in possession of a firearm on November 2, 2016 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Count 7).

Prior to trial, Appellants stipulated that they had prior felony convictions. During trial, Appellants were shackled. The trial record is bereft of any explanation for this security measure. In fact, the only reference to shackling at trial occurred when Miller asked permission to examine a witness himself and, outside the jury’s presence, the district court acknowledged a logistical issue because he was shackled. The district court resolved the matter by permitting Miller to question the witness while seated at counsel table with the assistance of his attorney.

During their deliberations, the jury sent a number of notes seeking guidance from the district court. Jury Note No. 6 on the second day of deliberations posed the following request:

Honorable J. Huck,
Various members of the jury would like to speak with you directly about their safety upon the conclusion of the trial. Can we have a couple of minutes to discuss this with you?

In response to that jury note, Miller’s counsel moved for a mistrial, which the district court denied. The government proposed that the district court advise the jurors that there was no danger and that they should resume their deliberations. Appellantscounsel requested that the district court interview each juror who expressed safety concerns.

After conferring with counsel, the district court spoke with the jury foreperson:

THE COURT: I got your note. I’ve conferred with counsel. I would be more than happy to discuss this issue with any juror who feels that it would be appropriate to discuss it with me on a one-on-one basis. Bring them into the courtroom, and we will discuss it with them. And then we will proceed accordingly and see what comes out.
So if I can have those people—just go back and say, whoever wants to come out and have that discussion, it will be just the judge and the court reporter, and the court security officer of course.
A JUROR: Thank you, Your Honor.

Thereafter, the district court engaged in the following colloquy with a juror in camera :

THE COURT: All right. You indicated that you wanted to speak to the Judge?
A JUROR: Yes.
THE COURT: What do you want to speak to me about?
A JUROR: Because I am afraid. I don’t know if I have to put my name on some paper or something like that if I—no? If the decision is not guilty—
THE COURT: I’m sorry?
A JUROR: —I’m afraid of that. I mean guilty, sorry.
THE COURT: Okay. So have you—is there any incident or has anybody said anything to you or is there anything that’s happened outside of this courtroom that gives you—
A JUROR: No, no, I’m afraid because if the decision is guilty, I don’t know if the family of the—
THE COURT: Okay. I understand. I think I understand your concern. But has there been any threat or any indication by some sign or some gesture or anything of that nature or anything outside of this courtroom that was said to you or you did that would suggest that you have these feelings or cause you to have these feelings?
A JUROR: No, no, no, no, no. I just want to know if I don’t have to put my name on anything.
THE COURT: No.

The district court thanked the juror and asked the court security officer to inquire whether any other juror wished to speak with the court. A second juror came forward and the following in camera colloquy ensued:

THE COURT: And your foreperson has indicated that you want to talk to the Court, to the Judge.
A JUROR: Yeah, just was—
THE COURT: Sit down, relax, just take it easy.
A PROSPECTIVE2 JUROR: Just was concerned how the process goes when we would leave the courthouse. Are we leaving at the same time as family members are leaving? Are our names documented on the transcripts where someone could obtain them?
THE COURT: You are concerned about after the case is finished?
A JUROR: Yeah.
THE COURT: We can help you with that. That shouldn’t be an issue. That’s your concern?
THE COURT: Has there been anything specific that was said to you or any threat made to you or any gesture made to you or anything done in this courtroom that caused your specific concern?
A JUROR: No.
THE COURT: And have you done anything outside this courtroom that caused you any specific concern?
A JUROR: No, but just how my mind works is a little bit—
THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough.
A PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I’m my own enemy.
THE COURT: We are all that way.
A JUROR: I confuse myself. You know, things are just crazy in this world and you don’t know.
THE COURT: That concern about leaving at the same time, we can certainly take care of that very easily.
A JUROR: That’s what everyone else said, so I think we will be fine after that. Thank you so much.
THE COURT: Will you see if there’s anybody else in there.
A JUROR: No, I spoke for everyone.
THE COURT: Just ask them. If there is anybody else who wants to speak to me, I will be glad to do so.
A PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Thank you.

No other jurors came forward to speak with the district court. The district court then summarized the two in camera juror interviews for counse...

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