United States v. Moore
| Decision Date | 04 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-4606,18-4606 |
| Citation | 952 F.3d 186 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Leroy MOORE, Jr., Defendant - Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Peter Marshall Wood, LAW OFFICE OF PETER WOOD, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kristine L. Fritz, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Diaz and Judge Floyd joined.
In July 2014, appellant Leroy Moore, Jr. was stopped at a routine traffic checkpoint operated by the Columbus County, North Carolina Sheriff’s Office ("CCSO"). During the stop, CCSO deputies discovered that Moore was in possession of a substantial quantity of illegal drugs. He was arrested and subsequently indicted by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina for possession with intent to distribute twenty-eight or more grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Prior to trial, Moore moved to suppress all evidence obtained by CCSO officers on the grounds that the traffic checkpoint at which he was stopped was conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion. Moore then pleaded guilty but reserved his right to file this appeal challenging the denial of his suppression motion. Because we hold that the CCSO checkpoint fully complied with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
In the early morning hours of July 1, 2014, several CCSO officers decided to set up a traffic checkpoint. Sergeant Adam Gore, the supervisor on duty, organized and personally oversaw operation of the checkpoint, which began at approximately 1:30 am on Tuesday morning at the intersection of a well-travelled county road. Four CCSO deputies manned the checkpoint alongside Sergeant Gore. Per CCSO policy, officers parked several marked squad cars on the side of the road and activated their blue emergency lights to alert motorists of the upcoming roadblock. They also placed traffic cones in the road to ensure that drivers would be aware that they were required to stop. All officers involved wore uniforms and reflective vests and hats.
According to CCSO Deputy Christopher Canady, who was on the scene that evening, the purpose of the checkpoint was "to make sure that ... drivers [were] in compliance with the entirety of Chapter 20," which is the portion of North Carolina’s code regulating the use of motor vehicles. J.A. 82. Sergeant Gore instructed deputies to stop each car that came through the checkpoint and ask the driver to present a license and vehicle registration.
Gore later testified that it was CCSO policy to stop every passing car at the traffic checkpoint. Deputies were trained to look specifically for violations of motor vehicle laws and to issue citations if those violations were discovered. They were permitted to detain motorists beyond the time needed to verify their license and registration only if the deputy became aware of other facts suggesting criminal activity.
At some point that morning, Moore was stopped at the CCSO checkpoint. As Moore pulled up to the roadblock, Deputy Canady observed that Moore’s vehicle appeared to have bullet holes in the driver’s side door. Canady approached Moore’s car and immediately noticed the odor of marijuana and saw smoke emitting from the passenger area. He requested that Moore provide his driver’s license, and Moore did so. Canady then questioned Moore regarding the smell, whereupon Moore candidly admitted that he had just extinguished a "blunt," which Canady took to mean a marijuana cigar. J.A. 71.
At this point, Deputy Canady ordered Moore to exit his vehicle and requested permission to search it. Moore complied and subsequently consented to a search of his car. Canady patted Moore down and discovered four bags containing an off-white, rock-like substance in his pants leg, approximately $100 in cash in one of his pockets, and a small bag containing two pills in another pocket. In the ensuing search of Moore’s vehicle, Canady found multiple off-white rock substances on the floorboards, an electronic scale and empty medication bottle covered in white residue, a half-burnt cigar filled with what appeared to be marijuana, an assault rifle, two loaded rifle magazines, and 37 rounds of ammunition. Moore was then placed under arrest, and Sergeant Gore put him into his squad car. The checkpoint terminated soon thereafter; Moore was the only person arrested during the operation.
The off-white substance that CCSO officers found on Moore’s person and in his vehicle was tested and found to be crack cocaine. Moore was subsequently indicted for possession with intent to distribute twenty-eight or more grams of crack in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Moore filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the searches of his person and vehicle at the CCSO checkpoint. The crux of his argument was that the checkpoint itself violated the Fourth Amendment because (1) its primary purpose was advancing a general interest in crime control, which the Supreme Court has held to be an impermissible objective for suspicionless checkpoints, and (2) it was conducted in an unreasonable manner because there were no formal policies or procedures in place to limit the discretionary authority of CCSO deputies manning the stop. Thus, according to Moore, his stop amounted to an unconstitutional seizure and all evidence discovered as a result of that stop must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
After a hearing, the magistrate judge issued a memorandum advising that Moore’s motion be denied. J.A. 143-59. The magistrate judge found that the checkpoint had not been operated to detect general criminal activity but rather with the constitutionally permissible purpose of enforcing state licensing and registration laws. With regards to Moore’s second argument, the magistrate judge concluded that because the CCSO deputies running the checkpoint were required to stop each passing car, their discretion was appropriately cabined and thus complied with the Fourth Amendment. The district court agreed with the magistrate’s recommendation and denied Moore’s motion. J.A. 167-77.
In light of the adverse result on his motion to suppress, Moore reached a plea deal with the government. In that agreement, he generally waived his appeal rights but specifically reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The district judge accepted his plea and sentenced Moore to 60 months in prison followed by five years of supervised release. This appeal followed.
As Moore’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument, the question presented by this appeal is a narrow one. Moore does not challenge the fact that Deputy Canady had reasonable suspicion to detain him after smelling marijuana coming from his vehicle. See Appellant’s Br. 10. Nor does he contest the constitutionality of the ensuing searches of his vehicle or person. Id. Instead, he asserts only that the initial stop of his vehicle at the CCSO traffic checkpoint was unconstitutional. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
We begin with a brief overview of the law governing police checkpoints. It is well established that when police stop an automobile, even if only for a limited purpose and for a brief period, they have seized the occupants of that vehicle within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Brugal , 209 F.3d 353, 356 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (plurality opinion). Thus, to pass constitutional muster, such seizures must be "reasonable." Id. Though a "seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing," City of Indianapolis v. Edmond , 531 U.S. 32, 37, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000), the Supreme Court has recognized "certain limited circumstances where suspicionless [vehicle] stops are permissible," United States v. Wilson , 205 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc). We apply a two-step analysis to determine whether a suspicionless police checkpoint like the one at issue here was constitutional. See United States v. Fraire , 575 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2009).
First, we must decide whether the checkpoint had a valid primary purpose. Edmond , 531 U.S. at 46-48, 121 S.Ct. 447. The Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional legitimacy of checkpoints designed to intercept illegal aliens, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976), apprehend drunk drivers, Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz , 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990), and solicit information from the public regarding criminal activity, Illinois v. Lidster , 540 U.S. 419, 124 S.Ct. 885, 157 L.Ed.2d 843 (2004). Of particular relevance here, the Supreme Court has suggested, and lower courts have concluded, that checkpoints conducted for the limited purpose of checking driver’s licenses and motor vehicle registrations are constitutionally permissible. See, e.g. , Edmond , 531 U.S. at 37-38, 121 S.Ct. 447 ; United States v. Davis , 270 F.3d 977, 979-80 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ; United States v. Galindo-Gonzales , 142 F.3d 1217, 1221 (10th Cir. 1998). On the other hand, if the checkpoint’s primary purpose is advancing a "general interest in crime control," it is invalid under the Fourth Amendment. Edmond , 531 U.S. at 48, 121 S.Ct. 447.
Second, if the checkpoint had a valid primary purpose, we then proceed to "judge its reasonableness, hence, its constitutionality, on the basis of the individual circumstances." Lidster , 540...
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