United States v. Morales-Roblero
| Decision Date | 14 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:19-mj-24442-AHG |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. FILADELFO MORALES-ROBLERO, Defendant. |
(1) DENYING FIRST MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 20];
(7) DENYING MOTION TO STAY [ECF NO. 40]
Before the Court are Defendant Filadelfo Morales-Roblero's consolidated motions to: (1) dismiss the complaint on multiple grounds; (2) preserve evidence and compel discovery; (3) suppress statements; (4) for leave to file further motions; (5) prevent civil arrest; (6) dismiss the complaint based on Village of Arlington Heights; and (7) stay the trial. ECF Nos. 20, 40. The Court took the matters raised in the Motion under submission after oral argument on September 1, 2020. ECF No. 42. Having considered the parties' papers and their argument, the Court enters the following Order:
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant is charged with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1), which provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny alien who (1) enters or attempts to enter the United States at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers . . . shall [be guilty of a misdemeanor]." See ECF No. 1. The Government alleges that on November 20, 2019, a United States Customs and Border Protection agent encountered Defendant standing next to a call box on the shoulder of State Route 94, approximately six and a half miles north of the United States/Mexico International Boundary and approximately eight miles east of the Otay Mesa, California Port of Entry. Id. at 2. The Government alleges that Defendant stated that he was a citizen of Mexico and had entered the United States illegally on November 18, 2019. Id.
Defendant's case proceeded under the "Streamline" process, which the Department of Justice uses to manage prosecution of misdemeanor charges brought under 8 U.S.C. § 1325. See United States v. Chavez-Diaz, No. 18MJ20098 AJB, 2018 WL 9543024, at *1-2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2018) (), rev'd on other grounds, No. 18-50391, 2020 WL 562292 (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 2020). On November 21, 2019, Defendant was brought to Court for his initial appearance. ECF No. 5. Defendant met with an attorney on the ground floor of the Federal Building that morning before his appearance. ECF No. 20-1 at 2. Defendant was shackled during that meeting. Id. At his initial appearance, the Court arraigned Defendant and appointed Federal Defenders to representhim. ECF No. 5. The Court denied the Government's motion to detain and issued an order setting conditions of pretrial release. Id. The Court granted Defendant's motion to modify the conditions of pretrial release on December 10, 2019, and Defendant was released from custody on January 15, 2020. ECF Nos. 13, 18.
On February 27, 2020, defendant filed the consolidated motion currently before the Court, seeking various forms of relief, including dismissal of the complaint. ECF No. 20. On August 18, 2020, defendant filed an additional consolidated motion. ECF No. 40. Defendant's second consolidation motion seeks an order preventing Defendant's civil arrest in the courtroom, and moves to dismiss on an additional constitutional ground. Id.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant's first motion to dismiss asserts five grounds for dismissal: (1) Congress violated the non-delegation doctrine when it enacted § 1325(a)(1); (2) Congress violated the Due Process Clause's prohibition on vague laws when it enacted § 1325(a)(1); (3) the prosecution of Defendant violates equal protection and due process; (4) § 1325 violates the due process clause; and (5) the Complaint fails to allege all the elements of the charged offense. ECF No. 20. The Court addresses each of Defendant's arguments below.
Defendant argues that the § 1325 charge against him should be dismissed under the non-delegation doctrine because Congress delegated its core legislative functions to the Executive Branch by allowing "immigration officers" to determine the times and places when an alien can lawfully enter the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (). The non-delegation doctrine generally forbids Congress from transferring "powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative" to other branches of government. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (citation omitted). Defendant claims that immigration officials have unfettered discretion to designate times and places for entry on an ad hoc basis, andthat the statute does not provide any intelligible principle to guide this discretion.
"In our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Court has understood that Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives." Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)) (internal alteration and quotations omitted). Therefore, as long as "Congress has supplied an intelligible principle to guide the delegee's use of discretion[,]" a statute does not run afoul of the non-delegation doctrine. In performing the analysis of whether such an "intelligible principle" is supplied, the Court must "constru[e] the challenged statute to figure out what task it delegates and what instructions it provides." Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123. Importantly, that task of construction does not require the Court to look only at the text of the statute "in isolation." Rather, the intelligibility of the standards that guide the delegee's discretion must be considered in light of "the purpose of the [statute at issue], its factual background, and the statutory context in which they appear." Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946).
Construing § 1325 in United States v. Nunez-Soberanis, 406 F. Supp. 3d 835 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (Dembin, J.), another court in this District rejected the same non-delegation argument Defendant presents here, reasoning as follows:
Defendant attempts to read into the statute a broader delegation than actually occurred by arguing that any individual immigration official can designate any piece of land as a place for entry. Not so. Congress requires that aliens seeking lawful entrance to the United States do so at a port of entry. See United States v. Corrales-Vasquez, 931 F.3d 944, 946 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Aldana, 878 F.3d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 2017). Ports of entry can only be designated or de-designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security subject to the Administrative Procedures Act. See 8 CFR § 100.4(a). Ports of entry also necessarily include facilities, staffed by immigration officials that are set up to accept applications for admission. Aldana, 878 F.3d at 882. To interpret Section 1325(a) to permit a border patrol agent to designate a portion of the border fence "on a whim" is in direct conflict with Congress's clear statutory scheme.
Id. at 839-40. This Court agrees. Contrary to Defendant's argument, when viewed in the proper context rather than viewing the statutory text in isolation, § 1325's delegation to immigration officers to designate time and place of lawful entry is not unfettered, but significantly constrained. Am. Power, 329 U.S. at 104; see also Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123-24 ().
Congress's delegation of the duty to designate the time and place for lawful entry of aliens also does not expand the scope of criminal liability under § 1325. Opening or closing ports of entry does not change or expand the conduct that leads to criminal liability under § 1325. Closing ports or restricting hours of operation may make it more cumbersome for aliens to enter legally, but it does not create new or different criminal liability.
Therefore, the Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that § 1325 violates the non-delegation doctrine.
Defendant argues the charge against him should be dismissed because 8 U.S.C. § 1325 is void for vagueness. A statute can be impermissibly vague in either of two circumstances: 1) the statute "fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits;" or 2) the statute "authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000). Defendant argues that § 1325 is impermissibly vague because it permits immigration officers unlimited discretion to decide what places to designate for lawful entry. As discussed above, this is not correct. Individual Border Patrol agents cannot designate ports of entry on a whim. Closing a port of entry temporarily is not synonymous with "de-designating" it as a port of entry. Section 1325 clearly delineates the conduct that it prescribes and is not impermissibly vague.
Therefore, the Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that § 1325 is impermissibly vague.
Defendant argues that the Government's use of the "Streamline" process to prosecute him, rather than through the Central Violations Bureau ("CVB"), violates the Equal Protection Clause. Defendants who are prosecuted for petty offenses through the CVB are generally cited and released, not taken into custody. ECF No....
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