United States v. Morris

• Decision Date: 09 October 1903
• Citation: 125 F. 322
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. MORRIS et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

125 F. 322

UNITED STATES v. MORRIS et al.

United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Eastern Division.

October 9, 1903

W. G Whipple, U.S. Atty.

O. N Killough, Quarles & Moore, and L. C. Going, for defendants.

TRIEBER District Judge.

The defendants are indicted for a violation of the provisions of section 5508, Rev. St. U.S. (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3712); the specific charge being that they conspired to injure oppress, and intimidate certain citizens of the United States, of African descent, in the free exercise or enjoyment of certain rights secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States, on account of their being negroes. The right which it is charged the defendants sought to prevent the persons named in the indictment from exercising on account of their race and color, is the right to lease lands and cultivate them-- a right alleged to be guaranteed to them by the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of section 1 of the act of Congress entitled 'An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights and furnish means of their vindication,' enacted April 9, 1866 (chapter 31, 14 Stat. 27, digested in the United States Revised Statutes as section 1978; U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1262). The demurrer challenges the constitutionality of both statutes. The constitutionality of section 5508 is no longer open to controversy, its validity having been determined and upheld by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 4 Sup.Ct. 152, 28 L.Ed. 274; United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 5 Sup.Ct. 35, 28 L.Ed. 673; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 7 Sup.Ct. 656, 763, 32 L.Ed. 766; Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 291, 12 Sup.Ct. 617, 36 L.Ed. 429; Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 20 S.Ct. 993, 44 L.Ed. 1150.

The only question, therefore, left for determination, is the constitutionality of section 1 of the civil rights act of April 9, 1866. Nothing in the Constitution of the United States as originally adopted, or in any of the first twelve amendments to that instrument, adopted shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, would warrant the enactment of this act by Congress. Section 2 of article 4, guarantying to citizens of each state all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states, merely secures and protects the right of a citizen of one state of the United States to pass into any other state of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful business, to acquire and hold property, to maintain actions in the courts of that state, and to be exempt from taxes and excises not imposed by the state on its citizens, free from all discriminations-- such discriminations being made by the state in its capacity of a sovereign-- but does not apply to acts of individuals. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L.Ed. 357; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 20 L.Ed. 449; Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394; Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 19 Sup.Ct. 165, 43 L.Ed. 432.

If the power to enact the legislation involved in this proceeding exists at all, it must have been granted by some provision of the last three amendments to the Constitution-- the thirteenth, fourteenth, or fifteenth. As the acts contemplated by this statute are those of individuals, as well as of officers in the enforcement of the statutes of a state or in the discharge of official functions, neither the fourteenth nor fifteenth amendment can be relied upon as an authority for it, for it is now well settled that these two amendments have reference solely to actions of the state, and not to any action of private individuals, although it is immaterial whether the state acts by its legislative, executive, or judicial authority. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 23 L.Ed. 563; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 25 L.Ed. 667; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 25 L.Ed. 676; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 Sup.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835; United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 1 Sup.Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290; James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 23 Sup.Ct. 678, 47 L.Ed. 979.

The power of Congress to enact such legislation must, therefore, be found in the thirteenth amendment, else it does not exist. That Congress assumed that its power was derived from that amendment, and not from either of the later amendments, is conclusively shown by the fact that at the time this law was enacted, in 1866, neither the fourteenth nor fifteenth amendment had been ratified, or even submitted by Congress to the states. The fourteenth amendment was submitted for ratification by resolution of June 16, 1866, and declared a part of the Constitution on July 21, 1868, while the resolution to submit the fifteenth amendment to the states was only passed by Congress on February 27, 1869, and the amendment promulgated as a part of the Constitution on March 30, 1870. The language of the thirteenth amendment differs materially from that used in the two later ones. While the fourteenth amendment provides that 'no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge,' etc., and the fifteenth amendment declares that 'the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account,' etc., the thirteenth amendment declares, 'Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction. ' There is no limitation in that amendment confining the prohibition to the states, but it includes everybody within the jurisdiction of the national government. This distinction in the language of these amendments was fully recognized by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 Sup.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835. Mr. Justice Bradley, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:

'We must not forget that the province and scope of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments are different. The former simply abolished slavery. The latter prohibited the states from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States by depriving them of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and from denying to any the equal protection of the laws. The amendments are different, and the powers of Congress under them are different. What Congress has power to do under one, it may not have power to do under the other. Under the thirteenth amendment, it has only to do with slavery and its incidents. Under the fourteenth amendment, it has power to counteract and render nugatory all state laws and proceedings which have the effect of abridging any of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or to deprive them of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or to deny to any of them the equal protection of the laws. Under the thirteenth amendment, the legislation, so far as necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery and involuntary servitude, may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by state legislation or not. Under the fourteenth, as we have already shown, it must necessarily be and can only be corrective in its character, addressed to counteract and afford relief against state regulations or proceedings.' 109 U.S. 23, 3 Sup.Ct. 30, 27 L.Ed. 835.

Congress is, therefore, authorized by the provisions of the thirteenth amendment to legislate against acts of individuals, as well as of the states, in all matters necessary for the protection of the rights granted by that amendment.

Slavery and involuntary servitude being prohibited within any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and Congress being authorized by the second section of the amendment 'to enforce this article by appropriate legislation,' does that vest it with the power to protect those emancipated from slavery by this constitutional amendment in the enjoyment of such rights as it is charged in the indictment the defendants conspired to deprive them of, or is that power still solely reserved to the states, notwithstanding the adoption of this amendment?

The powers of Congress are limited to such matters as are expressly or by implication granted to it by the national Constitution, that being an enabling instrument, while the Constitutions of the states are limitations upon the power of the Legislatures of the respective states. There can be no doubt that the same power may exist at the same time in the nation as well as the states. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1, 235, 6 L.Ed. 23; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 540, 553, 561, 12 L.Ed. 702; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 627, 18 Sup.Ct. 488, 42 L.Ed. 878. The same act or series of acts may constitute an offense equally against the United States and the state, subjecting the guilty party to punishment under the laws of each government. Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 433, 12 L.Ed. 213; Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 19, 14 L.Ed. 306; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550, 23 L.Ed. 588; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 390, 25 L.Ed. 717; Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U.S. 131, 139, 10 Sup.Ct. 47, 33 L.Ed. 287. The citizens of the United States resident within any state are subject to two governments-- one state, and the other national. Every citizen owes allegiance to both of these governments, and, within their respective spheres, must be obedient to the laws of each. In return he is entitled to demand protection from each within its own jurisdiction. The thirteenth amendment is a great extension of the powers of the national government. In the language of Mr. Justice Swayne in United States v. Rhodes, 1 Abb....