United States v. Morrison

• Citation: 529 U.S. 848,146 L.Ed.2d 902,120 S.Ct. 1904
• Docket Number: 99-5739
• Decision Date: 22 May 2000
• Parties: JONES v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

529 U.S. 848

146 L.Ed.2d 902

120 S.Ct. 1904

JONES v. UNITED STATES

No. 99-5739

United States Supreme Court

Argued March 21, 2000

Decided May 22, 2000

Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 859. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Scalia, J.,joined, post, p. 860.

Donald M. Falk argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Robinson, Malcolm L. Stewart, and David S. Kris.^*

Justice Ginsburg, delivered the opinion of the Court.

It is a federal crime under 18 U.S. C. § 844(i) (1994 ed., Supp. IV) to damage or destroy, "by means of fire or an explosive, any . . . property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." This case presents the question whether arson of an owner-occupied private residence falls within § 844(i)'s compass. Construing the statute's text, we hold that an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or commerce-affecting activity; arson of such a dwelling, therefore, is not subject to federal prosecution under § 844(i). Our construction of § 844(i) is reinforced by the Court's opinion in United States v.Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and the interpretive rule that constitutionally doubtful constructions should be avoided where possible, see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).

I

On February 23, 1998, petitioner Dewey Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail through a window into a home in Fort Wayne, Indiana, owned and occupied by his cousin. No one was injured in the ensuing fire, but the blaze severely damaged the home. A federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging Jones with arson, 18 U.S. C. § 844(i) (1994 ed., Supp. IV); using a destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence (the arson), 18 U.S. C. § 924(c); and making an illegal destructive device, 26 U.S. C. § 5861(f). Jones was tried under that indictment in the Northern District of Indiana and convicted by a jury on all three counts.¹ The District Court sentenced him, pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, to a total prison term of 35 years, to be followed by five years of supervised release. The court also ordered Jones to pay $77,396.87 to the insurer of the damaged home as restitution for its loss. Jones appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 178 F.3d 479 (1999).

Jones unsuccessfully urged, both before the District Court and on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, that § 844(i), when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8,cl. 3. Courts of Appeals have divided both on the question whether § 844(i) applies to buildings not used for commercial purposes,² and on the constitutionality of such an application.³ We granted certiorari, 528 U.S. 1002 (1999), and framed as the question presented:

"Whether, in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and the interpretive rule that constitutionally doubtful constructions should be avoided, see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988), 18 U.S. C. § 844(i) applies to the arson of a private residence; and if so, whether its application to the private residence in the present case is constitutional." Satisfied that § 844(i) does not reach an owner-occupied residence that is not used for any commercial purpose, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment.

II

Congress enacted 18 U.S. C. § 844(i) as part of Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, § 1102, 84 Stat. 952, "because of the need `to curb the use, transportation, and possession of explosives.' " Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 860, n. 5 (1985) (citation omitted). The word "fire," which did not appear in § 844(i) as originally composed, was introduced by statutory amendment in 1982.⁴ As now worded, § 844(i) (1994 ed., Supp. IV) reads in relevant part:

"Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years, fined under this title, or both . . . ." We previously construed § 844(i) in Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985), and there held that § 844(i) applies to a building "used as rental property," ibid. The petitioner-defendant in Russell had unsuccessfully attempted to set fire to a two-unit apartment building he owned. He earned rental income from the property and "treated it as business property for tax purposes." Id., at 859. Our decision stated as the dispositive fact: "Petitioner was renting his apartment building to tenants at the time he attempted to destroy it by fire." Id., at 862. It followed from that fact, the Russell opinion concluded, that "[t]he property was . . . being used in an activity affecting commerce within the meaning of § 844(i)." Ibid.⁵

We now confront a question that was not before the Court in Russell: Does § 844(i) cover property occupied and used by its owner not for any commercial venture, but as a private residence. Is such a dwelling place, in the words of § 844(i), "used in . . . any activity affecting . . . commerce"?

In support of its argument that § 844(i) reaches the arson of an owner-occupied private residence, the Government relies principally on the breadth of the statutory term "affecting . . . commerce," see Brief for United States 10, 16-17, words that, when unqualified, signal Congress' intent to invoke its full authority under the Commerce Clause. But § 844(i) contains the qualifying words "used in" a commerce-affecting activity. The key word is "used." "Congress did not define the crime described in § 844(i) as the explosion of a building whose damage or destruction might affect interstate commerce . . . ." United States v. Mennuti, 639 F.2d 107, 110 (CA2 1981) (Friendly, J.).⁶ Congress "require[d] that the damaged or destroyed property must itself have been used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce." Ibid. The proper inquiry, we agree, "is into the function of the building itself, and then a determination of whether that function affects interstate commerce."

United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (CA8 1993) (Arnold, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).⁷

The Government urges that the Fort Wayne, Indiana, residence into which Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail was constantly "used" in at least three "activit[ies] affecting commerce." First, the homeowner "used" the dwelling as collateral to obtain and secure a mortgage from an Oklahoma lender; the lender, in turn, "used" the property as security for the home loan. Second, the homeowner "used" the residence to obtain a casualty insurance policy from a Wisconsin insurer. That policy, the Government points out, safeguarded the interests of the homeowner and the mortgagee. Third, the homeowner "used" the dwelling to receive natural gas from sources outside Indiana. See Brief for United States 19-23.

The Government correctly observes that § 844(i) excludes no particular type of building (it covers "any building"); the provision does, however, require that the building be "used" in an activity affecting commerce. That qualification is most sensibly read to mean active employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a passive, passing, or past connection to commerce. Although "variously defined," the word "use," in legislation as in conversation, ordinarily signifies "active employment." Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143, 145 (1995); see also Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) ("When terms used in a statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.").

It surely is not the common perception that a private, owner-occupied residence is "used" in the "activity" of receiving natural gas, a mortgage, or an insurance policy. Cf. Bailey, 516 U. S., at 145 (interpreting the word "use," as it appears in 18 U.S. C. § 924(c)(1), to mean active employment of a firearm and rejecting the Government's argument that a gun is "used" whenever its presence "protect[s] drugs" or "embolden[s]" a drug dealer). The Government does not allege that the Indiana residence involved in this case served as a home office or the locus of any commercial undertaking. The home's only "active employment," so far as the record reveals, was for the everyday living of Jones's cousin and his family.

Our decision in Russell does not warrant a less "use"-centered reading of § 844(i). In that case, which involved the arson of property rented out by its owner, see supra, at 853, the Court referred to the recognized distinction between legislation limited to activities "in commerce" and legislation invoking Congress' full power over activity substantially "affecting . . . commerce." 471 U.S., at 859- 860, and n. 4. The Russell opinion went on to observe, however, that "[b]y its terms," § 844(i) applies only to "property that is `used' in an `activity' that affects commerce." Id., at 862. "The rental of real estate," the Court then stated, "is unquestionably such an activity." Ibid.⁸ Here, as earlier emphasized, the owner used the property as his home, the center of his family life. He did not use the residence in any trade or business.

Were we to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation of § 844(i), hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain....