United States v. Mortell

Decision Date10 November 1965
Docket NumberNo. 63 C 29.,63 C 29.
Citation248 F. Supp. 706
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Charles H. MORTELL, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Edward V. Hanrahan, U. S. Atty., Thomas J. Curoe, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for the United States.

Dale F. Conde, Rockford, Ill., for defendant.

WILL, District Judge.

This is an action by the United States for the collection of taxes withheld by the defendant as an employer under the laws relating to the withholding of income taxes of employees, the Federal Contribution Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. The government seeks entry of partial summary judgment in its favor, respecting the amounts claimed to be due and owing from the third quarter, 1951, and the first and second quarters of 1953.

Defendant admits that he is an employer under the relevant statutory provisions and agrees that the government's computation of the amount due for the period in question, $6,138.73, is correct. The instant motion is opposed on the theory that this action is barred by the statute of limitations notwithstanding the fact that the defendant purportedly agreed to waive the benefit of the statute when submitting offers in compromise to the Internal Revenue Service.

Absent any agreed suspension of the statute, an action to collect the amounts due from 1951 could not have been filed after June 6, 1958. However, on December 14, 1956, the defendant submitted an offer in compromise, agreeing to suspend the running of the statute "while the offer is pending and for one year thereafter". The offer was orally rejected on September 22, 1959, 2 years, 9 months and 8 days after it was made. Adding the additional year specified in the agreement, the original expiration date was thus extended to March 14, 1962. A second offer, containing similar language, was submitted on December 19, 1960 and rejected 3 months and 10 days later, extending the statutory period to June 24, 1963. This suit was filed on June 19, 1963.

Defendant contends that an "unlimited waiver", such as contained in his offers in compromise, is effective only for a "reasonable time" and that the 2 years, 9 months and 8 days which elapsed between submission of the first offer and its rejection is patently unreasonable. He further contends that agents of the Internal Revenue Service advised him that his offer would be accepted or rejected within three months. While unlimited waivers are subject to withdrawal after a reasonable...

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3 cases
  • C. F. & I. Steel Corp. v. Charnes
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • October 26, 1981
    ...Heiner, 57 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1932); Greylock Mills v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 31 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1929); United States v. Mortell, 248 F.Supp. 706 (N.D.Ill.1965); see generally 10 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § C.F. & I. executed the unlimited waiver on October 9, 1973......
  • McManus v. C. I. R.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • October 4, 1978
    ...difference between not sending a letter here and granting a further extension. A similar agreement was upheld in United States v. Mortell, 248 F.Supp. 706 (N.D.Ill.1965). We hold that the 1968 assessments were not beyond the limitations B. Capital Asset The question here is whether Tract 23......
  • United States v. Cook, Civ. A. No. 70-H-53.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • January 27, 1972
    ...Commissioner. It is this period plus one year which determines the extension of the statute of limitations. Accord United States v. Mortell, 248 F.Supp. 706 (N.D.Ill.1965); United States v. Sunbrock, 192 F.Supp. 455 (S. D.Fla.1961); United States v. Bosk, 180 F.Supp. 869 (S.D.Fla.1960). See......

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