United States v. Mtaza
| Decision Date | 09 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-20280,19-20280 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. AMON RWEYEMAMU MTAZA, Defendant—Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
Before HAYNES, HIGGINSON, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.
*
Amon Rweyemamu Mtaza pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, one count of wire fraud, and two counts of aggravated identity theft. After his conviction, Mtaza filed a pro se motion seeking return of property the government allegedly seized under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. The district court granted summary judgment to theGovernment on the Rule 41 motion and subsequently denied Mtaza's motion for reconsideration. Mtaza appealed. We affirm.
After Mtaza's convictions became final, he filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) for return of property the Government allegedly seized from him. He filed that motion in the district court docket for his criminal proceedings. Under our precedent, a motion filed under Rule 41(g) in a criminal docket once the criminal case is closed commences a new civil proceeding in equity. Bailey v. United States, 508 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 2007); Clymore v. United States, 217 F.3d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2000). Mtaza attached an affidavit listing the contested property—it included three vehicles, two boat titles, $6600 in cash, a wallet, jewelry, various electronics, a receipt, and a set of keys.
The Government moved for summary judgment. It submitted the affidavit of Agent Matthew S. Boyden of the United States Postal Inspection Service. Boyden averred the Government lawfully forfeited two of the vehicles; returned another vehicle to Mtaza's defense counsel; destroyed electronics containing contraband personal identifying information; and had never seized any of the other listed property. Mtaza opposed summary judgment and argued Boyden's testimony was not credible.
On October 18, 2018, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Government. On April 1, 2019, Mtaza moved for reconsideration. On April 8, 2019, the district court denied Mtaza's motion for reconsideration. On April 19, 2019, Mtaza filed a notice of appeal.
There are four issues in this appeal: First, whether we have jurisdiction over the district court's summary judgment order. Second,whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Government on Mtaza's Rule 41(g) motion. Third, whether the district court ought to have granted Mtaza leave to amend his complaint to add a Bivens claim. And fourth, whether it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny reconsideration. We consider each in turn.
The Government argues that Mtaza untimely appealed the district court's summary judgment order. Time-to-appeal limitations are jurisdictional, see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007), so we first assure ourselves that Mtaza was timely. He was.
We start with the relevant rules. In civil cases where the United States is a party, a litigant must notice his appeal "within 60 days after entry of judgment." FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(B); accord 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b). Generally, that clock begins to run when the court enters its judgment in the docket and the earlier of two events occurs: (A) the judgment is set forth in a separate document; or (B) 150 days pass. FED. R. CIV. P. 58(c)(2). Where a party files a timely motion asking the court to reconsider its decision, the appeal clock doesn't start until the court decides the motion. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A) ().
Here, the district court granted summary judgment and dismissed Mtaza's Rule 41(g) motion on October 18, 2018. The court never set forth its judgment in a separate document, so judgment was "entered" on March 18, 2019—150 days from the order's entry in the docket. See FED. R. CIV. P. 58(c)(2)(B) (the 150-day rule); Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc.,379 F.3d 327, 336 (5th Cir. 2004) ().
Mtaza filed a motion for reconsideration 14 days later on April 1, 2019. That motion was timely because Mtaza had 28 days from the entry of judgment to move under Rule 59(e). FED. R. CIV. P. 59(b) (); Demahy v. Schwartz Pharma Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (); cf. id. (). And because that filing was timely, it reset the limitation period for noticing an appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv) (). The district court denied the motion for reconsideration on April 8, 2019, thus starting the 60-day clock for noticing an appeal. Mtaza noticed his appeal eleven days later, on April 19, 2019—well within the allotted time.
Because Mtaza's notice of appeal was timely, we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the district court's grant of summary judgment.
In the dissent's view, the district court's order granting summary judgment was sufficiently "self-contained" and succinct to satisfy Rule 58's separate-document requirement. Post, at 13-14 (Haynes, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the dissent argues, Mtaza's notice of appeal was untimely and we may review only the district court's denial of the motion for reconsideration. There are at least three problems with that.
First, the dissent contravenes the text of Rule 58. The Rule is unequivocal: "Every judgment and amended judgment must be set out in aseparate document." FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a). The only exceptions are orders resolving motions under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 54, 59, or 60. See id. 58(a)(1)-(5). By implication, a separate document setting forth the judgment is required for every other kind of "order." See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002) (). Here, the district court's order resolved a summary judgment motion under Rule 56, so a document separate from that order was necessary. True, the district court's order might be characterized as short and succinct. See post, at 13-14 (Haynes, J., dissenting). But nothing in the text of Rule 58 makes the separate-document requirement turn on the lengthiness of the appealed-from order.1
Second, even if it were ambiguous whether the district court's order satisfied Rule 58(a), the Supreme Court has told us to resolve such ambiguity in a way that preserves a litigant's appeal rights. In Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, the Court gave its canonical explanation of the "sole purpose of the separate-document requirement." 435 U.S. 381, 384 (1978) (per curiam). Prior to enactment of Rule 58(a), "some difficulty ha[d] arisen, chiefly where [a] court ha[d] written an opinion or memorandum containing some apparently directive or dispositive words, e.g., 'the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted.'" Id. (quotation omitted). In such cases, there was "a matter of doubt whether the purported entry of judgment waseffective, starting the time running for post-verdict motions and for the purpose of appeal." Id. at 385. Rule 58 "eliminate[d] these uncertainties by requiring that there be a judgment set out on a separate document." Id. Importantly, the Court made clear "[t]he rule should be interpreted to prevent loss of the right of appeal, not to facilitate loss." Id. at 386 (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). The dissent would have us do the opposite, and in doing so return to the old days of uncertainty as to when judgment is entered for purposes of noticing an appeal.
Third, the dissent's primary authority is distinguishable. See post, at 12 (Haynes, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Perez, 736 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)). In Perez, a prisoner filed a notice of appeal months before the district court entered an order resolving his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See id. at 237. The panel held Perez's notice of appeal was untimely after noting the district court's "succinct" order complied with Rule 58. See id. at 237-38. Crucially, the panel explained that a district court's order on a § 2255 motion (at issue in Perez) was different than a summary judgment order (at issue here) for purposes of Rule 58: "unlike the summary judgment context, a 'judgment,' as distinguished from an 'order,' is not contemplated or required to finally dispose of a section 2255 motion." Id. at 238 n.3. Perez thus distinguished its holding from a summary judgment case "where the document claimed to be a judgment was in fact a combination of an opinion and a judgment, the very thing Rule 58 was designed to prevent." Id. (emphasis added). If anything, Perez supports strict adherence to Rule 58 here.2
Having determined we have jurisdiction to review the district court's summary judgment order, we do so de novo. Petro Harvester Operating Co., L.L.C., 954 F.3d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 2020).
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED R. CIV. P. 56(a). In the context of Rule 41(g) motions, summary judgment should lie where the government shows that it does not have the claimant's property. Bailey, 508 F.3d at 740 (...
To continue reading
Request your trial