United States v. Murguia-Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 01 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 14–10400.,14–10400.
• Citation: 815 F.3d 566
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Adalberto MURGUIA–RODRIGUEZ, aka Adalberto Rodriguez–Murguia, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

815 F.3d 566

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Adalberto MURGUIA–RODRIGUEZ, aka Adalberto Rodriguez–Murguia, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 14–10400.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Aug. 11, 2015.

Filed March 1, 2016.

Daniel L. Kaplan (argued), Assistant Federal Public Defender, and John M. Sands, Federal Public Defender, Phoenix, Arizona, for the Defendant–Appellant.

Carmen F. Corbin (argued), Assistant United States Attorney; John S. Leonardo, United States Attorney; Robert L. Miskell, Appellate Chief, United States Attorneys' Office, Tucson, Arizona, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Before: STEPHEN REINHARDT, A. WALLACE TASHIMA, and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge REINHARDT

; Dissent by Judge CALLAHAN.

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

The Court Interpreters Act protects the rights of federal litigants with limited English proficiency by requiring that courts utilize the services of certified interpreters in proceedings instituted by the United States when the failure to do so would inhibit the party's ability to participate fully in the proceedings. The Act also provides procedural safeguards to ensure that any waiver of this right is done knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Prior to his trial, Defendant Adalberto Murguia–Rodriguez stipulated that law enforcement officers found marijuana in the truck he had been driving. At trial, with the assistance of an interpreter, he explained that he had borrowed the vehicle and did not know that there was marijuana inside. He was convicted of possession with the intent to distribute marijuana. He was then sentenced to 55 months in custody. He did not, however, have an interpreter at the sentencing proceeding, because the district court took his statement that the sentencing proceeding could proceed "in English" as a waiver of his right to have an interpreter during that proceeding.

On appeal, Murguia–Rodriguez challenges his conviction, arguing that the district court erred by failing to ensure that his stipulation was knowing and voluntary. He also contends that the district court erred at sentencing by, among other things, dismissing his court-appointed interpreter contrary to the provisions of the Court Interpreters Act. In a memorandum disposition filed concurrently, we hold that the district court did not err in concluding that Murguia–Rodriguez entered into his trial stipulation knowingly and voluntarily. In this opinion, however, we hold that the district court dismissed Murguia–Rodriguez's interpreter without adhering to the procedures required by the Court Interpreters Act. Accordingly, we affirm Murguia–Rodriguez's conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

I. BACKGROUND

Interpreters play an important role in protecting the rights of non-English speaking persons. Over 60 million people in the United States speak a language other than English at home. U.S. Census Bureau, Language Use in the United States: 2011 at 3 (Aug. 2013).¹ Of that number, 15.4% speak English "not well" and 7% (over 4 million) speak English "not at all." Id. Effective language assistance is necessary to ensure that these individuals have meaningful access to government entities and programs. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 41455, 41457 (June 18, 2002). Such assistance is of particular importance in the courtroom where individuals must communicate in "precise language" under stressful conditions and key determinations affecting the individual's personal liberty or financial well-being are often "made based on credibility." Id. at 41471. This is especially so in criminal proceedings.

The Court Interpreter's Act of 1978 was designed to accommodate individuals with limited English proficiency and to ensure that they could fully "understand and participate in their own defense." H.R. Rep. 95–1687 at 4 (1978). The Act requires that a certified interpreter be utilized in proceedings instituted by the United States when a party "speaks only or primarily a language other than the English language ... [thus] inhibit[ing] such party's comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counsel or the presiding judicial officer[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1).² The Act also restricts the party's ability to waive his right to an interpreter. A party may waive that statutory right if, and "only if," (1) the waiver is made "expressly on the record" by the party, (2) "after opportunity to consult with counsel," (3) the presiding judge has explained to the party "the nature and effect of the waiver," and (4) the waiver is approved by the presiding judge. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(f)(1).³

Murguia–Rodriguez was charged with (1) the knowing and intentional possession with the intent to distribute marijuana and (2) the knowing possession of ammunition as a previously convicted felon. Murguia–Rodriguez, a legal permanent resident of this country for many years, could read English, but only understood spoken English "about 60 percent" of the time. The presiding magistrate judge determined at Murguia–Rodriguez's initial appearance that he required a Spanish-language interpreter, and one was appointed for him.

Before trial, Murguia–Rodriguez stipulated that (1) law enforcement officers found 60 kilograms of marijuana in the truck that he had been driving, (2) law enforcement officers also found 45 rounds of .32 caliber ammunition in that vehicle, and (3) he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. At trial, with the assistance of his court-appointed interpreter, Murguia–Rodriguez testified that he was unaware of the presence of the drugs and ammunition in the vehicle. The jury returned a mixed verdict. It convicted Murguia–Rodriguez of Count 1, and found that the offense involved 50 kilograms or more of marijuana. The jury acquitted Murguia–Rodriguez on Count 2, the possession of ammunition. Based on Murguia–Rodriguez's offense level and criminal history, the probation officer calculated a guidelines range of 51 to 63 months.

Murguia–Rodriguez filed a sentencing memorandum in which he urged the court to consider the "effect of [his] imprisonment on third parties." He noted that he was in an 11–year common-law relationship with a woman named Belinda Angulo, with whom he had a 12–year–old son. He further noted that he helped raise Angulo's teenaged children, and that prior to his arrest, he "use[d] to take them and pick them up from school" and was "actively involved in their lives providing guidance and support." He concluded his sentencing memorandum with a request for 33 months of incarceration.

At the outset of his sentencing hearing, the district judge said to Murguia–Rodriguez: "[J]ust before the case was called the interpreter indicated that you had indicated you prefer to proceed in the English language this morning. Is that correct, sir?" Murguia–Rodrigez replied affirmatively.

The judge then asked: "Do you want the interpreter to remain in case you have any difficulties, or is it okay with you if she leaves the courtroom?" To which Murguia–Rodriguez replied, "She can stay."

The judge then urged Murguia–Rodriguez to let the interpreter cease performing her duties, stating: "But do you need her—she has other duties. Do you need her to stay, or do you feel comfortable proceeding in English?" Murguia–Rodriguez answered "I am comfortable proceeding in English," and the judge promptly dismissed the interpreter.

Ultimately, the judge accepted the probation officer's guidelines calculation of 51 to 63 months. She sentenced Murguia–Rodriguez to 55 months of custody, followed by three years of supervised release. She entered judgment that same day, and Murguia–Rodriguez filed his notice of appeal three days later.

II. ANALYSIS

Murguia–Rodriguez challenges his sentence on three grounds: (1) that the dismissal of his court interpreter violated the Court Interpreters Act, (2) that the district court erred procedurally by failing to address his non-frivolous argument in support of a below-Guidelines sentence, and (3) that the court should reconsider his sentence in light of recent retroactive amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. He also challenges his conviction on the ground that the district court failed to ensure that his guilt-phase stipulation was entered into knowingly and voluntarily, an argument that we address in the memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion.

When a court becomes aware of a criminal defendant's potential difficulties in understanding or speaking the English language, it has a mandatory duty to make a determination on the record whether an interpreter is required, and if so, to appoint a certified individual. See, e.g., United States v. Si, 333 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir.2003). Any waiver of the right to a certified interpreter, whether before or after that determination, must comply with the express provisions of the Court Interpreters Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(f)(1).

At the outset, we note that this case is unlike the other Court Interpreters Act cases that we have previously encountered. Those cases have typically come before us in one of two postures. First, we have considered cases in which the defendant's need for an interpreter was overlooked by the district court and an interpreter was never appointed. Rather than decide whether an interpreter was required for the first time on appeal, we have regularly remanded these cases to the district court to make an initial determination whether the defendant should have been provided with an interpreter. See, e.g., Si, 333 F.3d at 1043 n. 4 & 1044 ; Mayans, 17 F.3d at 1179–81 ; United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470 (9th Cir.1986).

Second, we have encountered cases in which the defendant challenges the district court's explicit decision not to...