United States v. Murphy
| Decision Date | 08 July 1932 |
| Citation | 59 F.2d 734 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. MURPHY. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Harry T. Smith & Caffey, of Mobile, Ala., for the motion.
Alex C. Birch, U. S. Dist. Atty., of Mobile, Ala., opposed.
This matter comes on to be heard on the motion of John G. Murphy, who was convicted on the prosecution and moves to retax the costs taxed against him in the cause.
This case was tried three times; the first trial resulted in a judgment of conviction, which was set aside, the second resulted in a mistrial, and on the third, the defendant was again convicted.
The first item to be retaxed consists of stenographic services rendered on the various trials, and in the matter it is agreed by the government that the motion should be granted because there was an understanding between the United States and the defendant as to the payment of the stenographic charges. The first ground of the motion is therefore granted.
The second item objected to is in the matter of a number of witnesses who were summoned and yet were not examined on the trial. Among these witnesses were Edward Samuels, Reginald Clarke, Charles Kelly, Joseph G. Myers, Robert Lee Powell, and Louis Moore, all of whom were members of the crew at the time of the foundering of the vessel, which foundering was charged in the prosecution to have been intentionally brought about by the defendant John G. Murphy. I can readily conceive that the testimony of these witnesses under certain phases of the case could have become very material. The motion is therefore denied as to these witnesses.
One of the other witnesses, Dr. J. K. Griffith, was brought over to testify in rebuttal of testimony given by Mrs. Hursey, and I can see how his testimony may have been very material in the case. The motion is overruled as to him.
The other witness, J. E. P. Hocken, presents a very different aspect. The testimony showed that Martinez, who was an officer of the foundered vessel and was charged in the indictment with having conspired with Murphy to bring about her sinking, and who first disclosed the facts to the agent of the insurance companies who were defending the claim for insurance on the said vessel, was brought from Spain to New York by these insurance companies. In New York he was placed in the custody of Hocken. When he came to Mobile as a witness in the case he came in the custody of Hocken, who was the agent of the various insurance companies.
When the first trial began, the court ordered Martinez and Fulford, another conspirator, both of whom had then pleaded guilty and had been made the states witness, to be confined in the Mobile county jail in the custody of the marshal during the progress of the trial. Upon motion of the government thereafter made, these two witnesses were turned over to the custody of the said Hocken, who had charge of them during the trial. When the case was called, Hocken was sworn as a witness, but the court was asked to excuse him from the rule on the ground that he was an experienced navigator and familiar with the construction of vessels and was needed in an advisory capacity by the District Attorney in the prosecution of the case. The request was granted by the court, and Hocken thereafter stayed in court giving assistance to the District Attorney in the prosecution of the case. This witness knew nothing of the facts of the case, and I don't see anything in the case which, under any contingency, could have rendered his testimony pertinent to the trial. His knowledge of navigation and construction may have been of assistance to the District Attorney on trial, but I don't see anywhere in the trial that any testimony he could have given would have been pertinent. He was here as the agent of the insurance companies and as the custodian of Martinez.
The two grounds of the motion are granted so far as the mileage and attendance of Hocken are concerned. The third ground of the motion goes to the costs incurred in the care of the jury during the three trials. The jury was ordered kept together on each trial from the time they were sworn in to the time they were discharged. This order was made at the instance of the government....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Rideau, 2005-1470.
...of which is an ordinary burden of government. That the enumerated items could not be taxed as costs was expressly held in United States v. Murphy (D.C.) 59 F.2d 734, and we are satisfied with the conclusions concerning taxation of costs there indicted. Id. at 403. (citations omitted). See a......
-
U.S. v. Ross
...of which is an ordinary burden of government. That the enumerated items could not be taxed as costs was expressly held in United States v. Murphy (D.C.) 59 F.2d 734, and we are satisfied with the conclusions concerning taxation of costs there indicated. See, also, U. S. v. Wilson (C.C.) 193......
-
Arnold v. State
...prosecution. Other holdings of United States Courts are to the same effect. See United States v. Wilson, C.C., 193 F. 1007; United States v. Murphy, D.C., 59 F.2d 734; United States v. Hoxie, 8 Alaska 210, 222, 223. The courts of several of our states have reached similar conclusions. As ea......
-
State v. Ayala
... ... ---, 619 P.2d 847 (Ct.App.1980) ... Section 31-12-6, N.M.S.A.1978 states: "In every case wherein there is a conviction, the costs may be adjudged against the defendant." ... so we must seek such authority from our statutes." ... United States v. Pommerening, 500 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1974) states: "Statutes relating to taxable costs are ... Murphy, 59 F.2d 734 (D.C.S.D.Ala.1932); State v. Jungclaus, 176 Neb. 641, 126 N.W.2d 858 (1964) ... ...