United States v. Murray

• Decision Date: 28 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15–2054.,15–2054.
• Citation: 821 F.3d 386
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Jamil MURRAY, a/k/a Smooth a/k/a Mills Jamil Murray, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

821 F.3d 386

UNITED STATES of America

v.Jamil MURRAY, a/k/a Smooth a/k/a Mills Jamil Murray, Appellant.

No. 15–2054.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

LAR 34.1a April 6, 2016.

Opinion Filed: April 28, 2016.

Submitted Under Third Circuit

Brian J. Zeiger, Esq., Levin & Zeiger, Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for Appellant.

Anita Channapati, Esq., United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.C., and Paul G. Shapiro, Esq., Office of the United States Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, and Sherri A. Stephan, Esq., Office of the United States Attorney, Allentown, PA, Counsels for Appellee.

Before: FISHER, RENDELL and BARRY, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BARRY

, Circuit Judge.

Jamil Murray entered a plea of guilty to drug distribution offenses, pursuant to a plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. He now appeals the denial of that motion, arguing that the District Court erred when it failed to suppress evidence that law enforcement officers obtained as a result of their entry into a motel room that he had rented, but that was occupied by a third party. Because the Court correctly concluded that the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they entered the motel room or when they frisked Murray upon his entry into the room, and because the Court's factual findings with respect to consent were not clearly erroneous, we will affirm.

I.

The facts as found by the District Court are as follows. On August 16, 2010, Officer David Clee of the Bensalem Township Police Department was investigating a report of suspected prostitution at the Sunrise Motel, one of a series of motels along Route 1 in Bensalem. An owner told Officer Clee that he believed prostitution was taking place in his motel, and that he had seen a woman he believed to be a prostitute being picked up by a green Cadillac. Later that day, Officer Clee learned that a “tip” had been called in by a woman named “Jessica Brown,” stating that a man named “Mills” was at the nearby Knights Inn, was in possession of drugs, and was driving a green Cadillac.

That evening, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Officer Clee and Corporal Adam Schwartz observed a green Cadillac parked outside another nearby motel, the Neshaminy Motor Inn. They learned that the car was registered to Room 302, which had been rented by one Jamil Murray. The officers knew, from their investigation of the “tip” earlier in the day, that Murray had rented two rooms at the Knights Inn, Rooms 157 and 158, paying cash, and they had seen a copy of Murray's driver's license on file at the Knights Inn.

Corporal Schwartz knocked on the door to Room 302. A woman wearing lingerie (later identified as Jessica Burns) answered the door, and asked Schwartz if he was “looking for a date.” He responded “no.” The officers then proceeded to the Knights Inn, where they saw the green Cadillac parked in front of Room 158. They observed a woman leaving Room 158, and saw Murray inside the room.

The officers returned to the Neshaminy Motor Inn, and Corporal Schwartz again knocked on the door to Room 302. Burns told him that she was busy, and to go away. Officer Clee then knocked, and when Burns told him, too, that she was busy, he identified himself as a police officer and asked her to open the door. He also knocked on the window, and showed his badge to Burns through the window. She opened the door.

The officers asked if they could come in, and Burns allowed them to do so. Burns told the officers that she was a prostitute and that she worked for the person who had rented the room, a drug dealer that provided her with drugs. Although she did not then tell the officers, she later testified that she had made the earlier 911 call using the alias “Jessica Brown,” and that she had called because she felt she was in danger.

While the officers were interviewing Burns, there was a knock at the door. Believing that it was another police officer, the officers allowed the door to be opened. Murray, whom the officers recognized from their investigation, came into the room. Corporal Schwartz patted him down, and Murray allowed the officers to remove items from his pockets and a lanyard from around his neck. They found a cell phone, a large sum of cash, and hotel room keys that, it was later determined, were keys to Rooms 157 and 158 at the Knights Inn. Murray attempted to flee, but was ultimately arrested.

The evidence that the officers obtained from Room 302—Burns' statements and the evidence taken from Murray's person—were used to obtain search warrants, including warrants for searches of Rooms 157 and 158 at the Knights Inn, and the Cadillac. In Room 157, officers found 192.4 grams of crack cocaine.

II.

Murray was charged in a superseding indictment with conspiracy to distribute 280 grams or more of crack cocaine, possession of crack cocaine, and other offenses. He moved to suppress the evidence that resulted from the encounter in Room 302 and argued that the evidence seized from Room 157 and pursuant to other warrants should also be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”

At the suppression hearing, Burns testified that she had no problem with the officers entering the room, and that she was “happy that they came and that they [were] there” and “wanted to open the door” because she had called earlier for help. Murray testified that he was not asked for, and did not provide, consent to the removal of items from his person.

The District Court denied Murray's motion, finding Burns' testimony to be credible and determining that she had common authority, or, in the alternative, apparent authority, to consent to the officers' entry into Room 302, and that her consent was voluntary. The Court also found that the frisk of Murray was lawful and supported by reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous, and that he consented to the seizure of items from his person. It determined, as well, that the warrants obtained for other locations were based on probable cause and did not include evidence that had been unlawfully obtained.

On the eve of trial, Murray entered a plea of guilty to the drug-related offenses pursuant to a plea agreement. In the agreement, the government agreed to dismiss the remaining charges, and Murray preserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C)

, the government agreed to recommend a sentence of 240 months' imprisonment, followed by 120 months' supervised release. At sentencing, the District Court imposed the recommended sentence. This appeal followed.

III.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231

, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. United States v. Golson, 743 F.3d 44, 50 (3d Cir.2014). “We review the District Court's denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual determinations but exercise plenary review over the District Court's application of law to those facts.” United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 230 (3d Cir.2011)

.

“[T]he question whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact,” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)

, which we review for clear error. United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d Cir.2003). A factual finding is clearly erroneous “when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948) ; see

United States v. Lowe, 791 F.3d 424, 427 (3d Cir.2015).

IV.

On appeal, Murray contends that Burns lacked common or apparent authority to grant access to Room 302, and was coerced into doing so. He also contends that the officers illegally frisked him and that any consent to the seizure of evidence from his person was coerced. He, thus, concludes and argues to us that Burns' statements, the evidence seized from his person, and the evidence seized at the other locations, was all “fruit of the poisonous tree” flowing from the officers' unlawful entry into Room 302.

A. Consent to Enter Room 302

“When ‘the Government obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or effects, ‘a “search” within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly occurred.’ ” Florida v. Jardines, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013)

(citing United States v. Jones, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 945, 950 n. 3, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012) ). Here, although the officers did no more than enter Room 302 and speak with Burns, we analyze their conduct as a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because they were gathering information in an area in which Murray had a legitimate expectation of privacy, and did so “by physically entering and occupying the area to engage in conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted” by him. See id. (holding that bringing a drug-sniffing dog onto a homeowner's porch constituted a search). The District Court found, and the parties do not dispute, that Murray had a legitimate expectation of privacy in Room 302. See

Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964).

While the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, “[c]onsent is an exception to the ‘requirements of both a warrant and probable cause.’ ” Stabile, 633 F.3d at 230

(citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041 ). “[T]he consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1973). This concept of “common authority” rests on the principle that one “assume[s] the risk” that a co-inhabitant ...