United States v. Murray, 9958.

• Decision Date: 25 October 1965
• Docket Number: No. 9958.,9958.
• Citation: 352 F.2d 397
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. John G. MURRAY, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

352 F.2d 397 (1965)

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. John G. MURRAY, Appellant.

No. 9958.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued October 7, 1965.

Decided October 25, 1965.

John G. Murray, pro se.

Arthur G. Murphy, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Thomas J. Kenney, U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee.

Before SOBELOFF, BRYAN and J. SPENCER BELL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This case, if not unique, is certainly a rara avis in the annals of federal appellate courts. It is an appeal from a fine of $50.00 for a parking violation on government property.

Appellant is a Civil Service employee at the Bureau of Old Age and Survivor Insurance BOASI Building at Woodlawn, Maryland. In August of 1964 his car was ticketed for being parked outside the white lines delineating assigned parking places. Murray appeared before a United States Commissioner authorized by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3401¹ to try such offenses, and pursuant to the right granted under section 3401(b) Murray and two other defendants elected to have their cases tried in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Appellant was represented by counsel before and during the trial. A jury trial was waived, and counsel for both sides agreed to waive stenographic recordation of the proceedings. Murray and his codefendants were found guilty as charged and the court imposed the maximum permissible fine.

On appeal, discussion in the briefs and oral arguments took a wide range. The only point calling for any extended treatment is whether the defendant violated a valid regulation. It is true that in the Information the United States Attorney cited, among other sections of the law, 44 C.F.R. § 100.52(c) (1960).² The United States Attorney concedes that these provisions were revoked after the alleged offense and before the filing of the Information. See 44 C.F.R. 60 (1965 Supp.). On this ground the appellant argues that the prosecution was abated, but the Government answers that 1 U.S. C.A. § 109 (1958), the general saving clause, preserves this prosecution. We find it unnecessary to decide between the respective contentions as to abatement, for there was and still is a valid subsisting regulation covering the act specified in the Information.

The General Services Administration was and is authorized to promulgate parking regulations for any area under its control. 40 U.S.C.A. § 318a.³ Pursuant to this authority the General Services Administration in 1956 issued general regulations dealing with the operation of motor vehicles in or on government property, and these were published in the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations.⁴ They were supplemented by specific parking regulations applicable only to the grounds adjacent to the Social Security Building in Woodlawn, Maryland. These specific regulations, posted at Woodlawn as required by section 318a, provided:

"Vehicles shall be parked well inside marked parking spaces. Parking vehicles in such a manner as to block or partially block lanes is prohibited."

We deem the marking of a parking space the equivalent of the posting of a sign under section 318a. No further publication was necessary. There is no contention that the marking was obscure or that the appellant did not have actual notice.

The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support some of the District Judge's findings of fact as set forth in his opinion. The Judge's certificate stated that because the Government and the defendant's attorney had agreed that the testimony was not to be recorded, the District Judge at the end of the trial dictated a statement of his findings of fact and conclusions of law. This statement was included in the record, and no other account of the proceedings was tendered. The defendant contends that he was unaware of and is not bound by his attorney's agreement to waive the recording of the proceedings, arguing that the Court Reporter Act contemplates such waiver only in civil cases, not criminal.⁵ But we think that in a case involving a mere parking violation where the defendant is represented by an attorney who agrees with the United States Attorney that the testimony need not be recorded, the infraction is as slight as the law ever notices and hardly can be said to rise to the gravity of a "crime" within the spirit of the Court Reporter Act.⁶

We have considered numerous other matters urged by the appellant, but find them without merit.

The extraordinary exertions of the defendant in pressing his appeal in this petty matter were occasioned, he says, by the fear of adverse consequences on his eligibility for promotion. We cannot believe that such a trifling breach of a parking regulation will be permitted by any fair minded administrator to affect his judgment of a meritorious employee.

Affirmed.

1 "§ 3401 * * * (a) Any United States commissioner specially designated for that purpose by the court by which he was appointed has jurisdiction to try and sentence persons committing petty offenses in any place over which the * * * United States has concurrent jurisdiction, and within the judicial district for...