United States v. Murry

Citation31 F.4th 1274
Decision Date19 April 2022
Docket Number20-1214, No. 20-1241, No. 20-1243, No. 20-1245
Parties UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Galima MURRY, Defendant - Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Rajesh Ramcharan, Defendant - Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Diann Ramcharan, Defendant - Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Ken Harvell, Defendant - Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)

Ryan A. Ray, Norman Wohlgemuth, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant Galima Murry.

Grant R. Smith, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public Defender, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant Rajesh Ramcharan.

James L. Hankins, Edmond, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant Diann Ramcharan.

Jonathan S. Willett, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant Ken Harvell.

Marissa R. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney (Matthew T. Kirsch, Acting United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before HARTZ, KELLY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.

CARSON, Circuit Judge.

Fundamental to our justice system—and even our democracy—is the jury. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 855, 860, 197 L.Ed.2d 107 (2017). The jury checks government power. It resolves factual disputes. It determines ultimate questions of guilt or innocence. In doing so, "its judgments find acceptance in the community, an acceptance essential to respect for the rule of law." Id. And voir dire—allowing the court to question potential jurors—helps guarantee an impartial jury.

Three out of four defendants here identify as minorities, and two are illegal immigrants. They assert that the district court abused its discretion in failing to ask the potential jurors whether they harbored racist views. One defendant posits that if "America as an institution harbors racial prejudice in the context of immigration law, it stands to reason that some members of that same institution also harbor similar views." But the Supreme Court has long held that no constitutional presumption of juror bias exists for or against members of any particular racial or ethnic groups. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981) (plurality opinion). And we decline to create such a presumption today. Rather, without any substantial indication that racial or ethnic prejudice likely affected the jurors, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ requests to directly examine the jurors about the subject.

Defendants also appeal the district court's evidentiary rulings, the jury instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Finding Defendants’ arguments with respect to these issues equally unpersuasive, we affirm.

I.

Defendants Rajesh and Diann Ramcharan immigrated to the United States from Trinidad and Tobago with their son Raul. After overstaying their temporary-visitor visas, Rajesh and Diann moved to Colorado Springs, Colorado. They integrated themselves into the community—becoming involved in a local church pastored by Defendant Ken Harvell and starting a landscaping business.

The Ramcharans and Harvells became close—so close that the Ramcharans listed the Harvells as emergency contacts on their children's school forms. Despite marrying in 2001 in Trinidad and Tobago, the Ramcharans remarried in the United States in 2010 with Defendant Harvell officiating. A short two months later, the Ramcharans filed for divorce while Diann was seven-months pregnant with their third child. The government asserts this was the beginning of a paper trail that the Ramcharans and Harvell initiated to obtain green cards for Rajesh, Diann, and Raul. The divorce petition listed Diann's address as the family home. Rajesh listed the Harvells’ home as his address. Despite the separate addresses, Rajesh and Diann continued to live in the same home, renewing the lease on their apartment several times, taking out renters’ insurance together, and continuing to present themselves as husband and wife to friends and neighbors.

Five days after her divorce became final, Diann married a United States citizen—Defendant Galima Murry. Once again, Defendant Harvell signed the marriage certificate. Despite the marriage, Rajesh and Diann opened a new bank account together the next day. Three weeks following the wedding, Murry, an Army sergeant stationed in Colorado Springs, deployed to Afghanistan. Before deploying, Murry drafted a note, which provided that his new wife, Diann, would receive nothing in the event of his death, serious injury, or divorce. Rather, his assets would pass to his brother. Diann signed the note. Murry's brother remained the beneficiary on his life insurance. Murry and his brother were not close. Murry's brother was unaware of Diann's existence.

Once married, Murry immediately began collecting an extra $250 per month in Afghanistan for a "family separation allowance." Upon his return to the United States, Murry obtained additional perks from both the military and the Ramcharans. Murry began claiming Raul, the Racharans’ oldest son, as a dependent on his taxes. He received extra money from the Army in the form of a housing allowance because of Diann and Raul, which amounted to over $1,000 per month—a stipend he collected for nearly six years and benefited him around $100,000. The Ramcharans gave Murry a vehicle bought through their landscaping business. But as the vehicle-transfer paperwork shows, Murry did not live with Diann. Rajesh listed his address as the location where Diann lived and listed Murry's address as Murry's separate apartment. The Ramcharans used Harvell's Social Security number to register the car with the Department of Motor Vehicles and listed Harvell as an "authorized employee" though he never worked for the landscaping business.

After Murry deployed, Diann filed paperwork for a green card—form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, and form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. Because of Murry's deployment, Diann attended her interview alone and testified under oath that Rajesh had returned to Trinidad and Tobago. Diann became a conditional permanent resident, which allowed her to obtain a green card for a two-year period.

The Army transferred Murry to Washington, then Maryland, then Georgia. Murry requested reimbursement for moving expenses from the Army for not only himself, but also Diann and Raul. On the transfer forms, he misspelled Diann's first name on each form and gave four different birth dates for Raul.

Three years after her wedding to Murry, Diann filed form I-751, Petition to Remove Conditions on Residence. On the form, Diann and Murry signed a statement certifying their marriage was "not for the purpose of procuring an immigration benefit." They attached a letter to the petition from Harvell stating that he had married the couple and that they were still together. The government approved the form and Diann became a lawful permanent resident with a green card valid for ten years, which enabled her to obtain a green card for Raul.

Having secured lawful permanent-resident status, Diann began to arrange a marriage for Rajesh. While working at Walmart, Diann became friends with a co-worker, Angelica Guevara. Diann told Guevara that she had married a United States citizen to stay in the United States. Diann referred to Murry as her "green card husband." Diann told Guevara that Murry benefited too from his additional Army benefits. She explained that Rajesh's visa had expired and that he could face deportation. She further explained that Rajesh faced danger in Trinidad and Tobago, that he might be unable to return to the United States if deported, and that her children would lose their father as a result. Diann asked Guevara to marry Rajesh to keep her family together—assuring Guevara that people did not get in trouble for this type of activity. Diann told Guevara that she would walk her through the process. Guevara would just have to take some pictures, sign some papers, and wait two years before she could obtain a divorce. Guevara agreed.

Guevara married Rajesh with Harvell officiating. Harvell explained to Guevara that she was doing God's work. The wedding was small and without fanfare. And in Guevara's words, "it wasn't a real ceremony." After Harvell pronounced them husband and wife, "everybody laughed." No pictures show Guevara and Rajesh kissing on the mouth because she did not want to do so. After the ceremony, Harvell, the Ramcharans, and Guevara had lunch together at Burger King, and Diann told Guevara that the post office would deliver her mail to Harvell's address to make it appear that she lived there with Rajesh. Guevara executed a lease for the Harvell's basement. She never saw the basement and instead moved in with her boyfriend a few months after her marriage.

The government became suspicious during an interview for Raul's green card that Murry did not attend. The interviewer asked Diann about Murry's absence. She replied that he was deployed to Maryland. The interviewer asked whether she moved to Washington with Murry. Diann replied that she had not because her children wanted to be near their father. When the interviewer looked back at Diann's file, he noticed that she had once stated that she lived in Washington with Murry and that Rajesh had returned to Trinidad and Tobago. The interviewer forwarded the file for investigation.

United States Custom and Immigration Services began its investigation and noticed the connection between the Ramcharans, Murry, Guevara, and Harvell. Immigration agents visited the Ramcharans’ house on a weekday morning in Colorado Springs, where they found Rajesh outside scraping ice off his car. Shortly after that visit, Rajesh filed his form I-485, on which he swore that he lived at the Harvells’ address...

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