United States v. Musso

• Decision Date: 25 January 2019
• Docket Number: No. 18-1260,18-1260
• Citation: 914 F.3d 26
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Daniel E. MUSSO, Sr., Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

914 F.3d 26

UNITED STATES, Appellant,

v.Daniel E. MUSSO, Sr., Defendant, Appellee.

No. 18-1260

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

January 25, 2019

Matthew T. Hunter, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom Scott W. Murray, United States Attorney, Seth R. Aframe, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and John S. Davis, Assistant U.S. Attorney, were on brief, for appellant.

Penny S. Dean, Concord, NH, for appellee.

Before Lynch, Stahl, and Barron, Circuit Judges.

LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

The government appeals from the district court's pretrial dismissal of four charges of violations of the National Firearms Act (NFA), 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq., brought against Daniel Musso. Musso bought four military M67 fragmentation grenades from an FBI agent during an undercover sting operation. The FBI had obtained the grenades used in the sting from the U.S. Marine Corps. M67 grenades are issued to Marines for combat. Before the sale to Musso, the FBI had replaced each grenade's original, operable fuze with an identical but inoperable one. The district court agreed with Musso that, because the operable fuzes had been removed and replaced with inoperable fuzes, the grenades were not "explosive grenades" under the NFA. United States v. Musso, No. 16-CR-033-JD, 2018 WL 1313977, at *8 (D.N.H. Mar. 9, 2018).

For purposes of the motion to dismiss, Musso admitted, among other things, that each grenade was still armed with its original explosive charge: 6.5 ounces of Composition B high explosives. Composition B is a mixture of TNT and RDX that, when in the amount included in an M67 grenade, has a killing radius of about five meters (just over sixteen feet). The motion further admitted that each grenade could be made to explode by reinserting a live fuze or by a "commercial/military/improvised detonator."

Based on the admitted facts and on the complete text, statutory context, and Congress's intent in enacting the "explosive grenade" provision of the NFA, we reverse and hold that each grenade, as purchased by Musso, was an "explosive grenade."

I.

A. The National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5801, et seq.

The NFA makes it a crime to receive or possess an unregistered "firearm." 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). There is no dispute that the grenades here were "unregistered." Under the NFA, the definition of the term "firearm" includes a "destructive device." Id. § 5845(a)(8). The act later, in Section 5845(f)(1), defines a "destructive device" as

(1) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas

(A) bomb,

(B) grenade,

(C) rocket having a propellent [sic] charge of more than four ounces,

(D) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce,

(E) mine, or

(F) similar device....

Id. § 5845(f)(1). The government relies on this definition. We note that the NFA does not define the terms "explosive" or "grenade."

Section 5845(f) has two later sections that include other things as destructive devices:

(2) any type of weapon by whatever name known which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant, the barrel or barrels of which have a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter, except a shotgun or shotgun shell which the Secretary finds is generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes; and

(3) any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into a destructive device as defined in subparagraphs (1) and (2) and from which a destructive device may be readily assembled.

Id. § 5845(f)(2)-(3).

Following these terms, the statute has a separate sentence that excludes "any device which is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon" and "any device, although originally designed for use as a weapon, which is redesigned for use as a signaling, pyrotechnic, line throwing, safety, or similar device." Id. Those exclusions present affirmative defenses; they do not define elements of the substantive offense. United States v. Beason, 690 F.2d 439, 445 (5th Cir. 1982).

The NFA was not the first statute to deal with devices like those at issue here. In April 1968, six months before Congress enacted the above "destructive device" provision, Congress made it a crime to, among other things, teach the "use, application, or making of any firearm or explosive or incendiary device." 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1). One such "explosive or incendiary device" is an "explosive ... grenade." 18 U.S.C. § 232(5)(B). Congress again addressed these devices when it enacted a "destructive device" provision as part of the gun control provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 921(a)(4). Congress shortly thereafter added the same "destructive device" provision to the NFA with the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA). See United States v. Oba, 448 F.2d 892, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1971).

The GCA's purpose was "to provide support to Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials in their fight against crime and violence." Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 101. It represented "a Congressional attempt to stem the traffic in dangerous weapons being used in an increasing number of crimes involving personal injury." United States v. Posnjak, 457 F.2d 1110, 1113 (2d Cir. 1972). And, in the GCA, Congress included the "destructive device" provision at issue here to cover "military-type weapons," id. at 1115 (citing S. Rep. No. 90-1501, at 25, 30 (1968) ), and "objectively identifiable weapons of war," id. at 1116.

Unlike with many other crimes, Congress chose not to criminalize attempts to violate the GCA's destructive device provision. A practical consequence of that decision is that agents engaged in undercover sting operations actually pass destructive devices like explosive grenades to the target, which runs some operational risks. Law enforcement tries to reduce those risks to agents, targets, and the public by removing fuzes from otherwise live grenades.

B. Background

The essential facts are undisputed for our purposes and are worth repeating. The FBI replaced the grenades' original fuzes with mechanically and visually identical, but inoperable, fuzes before giving them to Musso. Each grenade was, however, armed with its original explosive charge of Composition B.¹ Each grenade could be made to explode by, for example, replacing the inoperable fuze with an operable one, by using a commercial or homemade detonator, or by a sufficient impact. The government concedes that the grenades as purchased by Musso would not have detonated absent these other circumstances had Musso or anyone else merely pulled their pins. A search of Musso's property following his arrest did not turn up any fuzes or other detonators.

C. Procedural History

Musso moved to dismiss four counts of the resulting indictment, arguing that the grenades he received were not "explosive grenades" and so were not destructive devices under the NFA. On March 9, 2018, the district court granted Musso's motion to dismiss those counts. Musso, 2018 WL 1313977, at *8.

The district court consulted several dictionaries and concluded that "the ordinary meaning of ‘grenade’ implies a device that contains not only explosive material but also a means of detonating that explosive material." Id. at *5. The district court next reasoned that "explosive," when modifying "grenade," necessarily implied that the grenade "must, in fact, be capable of exploding." Id. Combining these understandings, the district court found that "the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘explosive grenade’ ... is a device that is in and of itself capable of exploding." Id. The district court then dismissed the counts. Id. at *8.

II.

We clear away a preliminary procedural issue. Although we have not before addressed the issue, other "circuit courts have almost uniformly concluded" that, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1), "a district court may consider apretrial motion to dismiss an indictment where the government does not dispute the ability of the court to reach the motion and proffers, stipulates, or otherwise does not dispute the pertinent facts." United States v. Weaver, 659 F.3d 353, 355 n* (4th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases). We join this consensus.

The facts necessary to resolve the issue now on appeal are not in dispute, and the government had requested that the district court resolve the issue. We review the district court's conclusion de novo, id. at 356, and determine that the court erred and so reverse.

III.

As framed, on admitted facts, the question before us is an issue of law. The government bears the burden of establishing that the grenades here met the definition of "explosive grenades." Musso, in turn, bears the burden as to whether the grenades fall within the exclusionary clause. On the facts presented, we reject Musso's definitional argument as well as his argument, based on the exclusionary clause, that the FBI's removal of the grenades' fuzes means the grenades are not "designed" as weapons. In addressing his argument based on the exclusionary clause, we treat Musso as having raised that affirmative defense and bypass any potential forfeiture resulting from his failure to pursue that argument in his motion to dismiss.

We begin, as always, with the statutory text concerning "explosive grenades." The NFA definitional section requires that to be a "destructive device," a grenade must be an "explosive, incendiary, or poison gas ... grenade." 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f). And an NFA "destructive device" must have been "designed [or] redesigned for use as a weapon," and not, if originally designed as a weapon, "redesigned for use as a signaling, pyrotechnic, line throwing, safety, or similar device." Id. No issue is before us of the interpretation of other parts of the statute concerned with other destructive devices or with the clause in Section 5845(f)(3) concerning "any combination of parts ... from which a destructive device may be readily assembled."²

We dispose of Musso's argument based on the statutory...