United States v. Mustafa Abdul-Qadir Al-Din Walee Abdulazeem Al-Din Charles Kunta Lewis (In re Freed)

• Decision Date: 31 July 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:11–CR–97.
• Citation: 960 F.Supp.2d 716
• Parties: In re Juror Steven Phillip FREED. United States of America v. Mustafa Abdul–Qadir Al–Din Walee Abdulazeem Al–Din Charles Kunta Lewis, Sr. Ralphael Remier Crenshaw.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

960 F.Supp.2d 716

In re Juror Steven Phillip FREED.United States of America

v.Mustafa Abdul–Qadir Al–Din Walee Abdulazeem Al–Din Charles Kunta Lewis, Sr. Ralphael Remier Crenshaw.

Case No. 1:11–CR–97.

United States District Court,

W.D. Michigan,

Southern Division.

July 31, 2013.

Scott Allen Mertens, Mertens Laxton and Clement PLLC, Lansing, MI, for Defendant Mustafa Abdul–Qadir Al–Din.

Scott Graham, Scott Graham PLLC, Portage, MI, for Defendant Walee Abdulazeem Al–Din.

Jeffrey J. O'Hara, Grand Rapids, MI, for Defendant Charles Kunta Lewis, Sr.

Paul Mitchell, Paul L. Mitchell PLLC, Grand Rapids, MI, for Defendant Ralphael Remier Crenshaw.

Timothy P. VerHey, Brian K. Delaney, U.S. Attorney, Grand Rapids, MI, for United States.

ORDER

ROBERT J. JONKER, District Judge.

This Civil Contempt Order involves Juror Steven Phillip Freed, Juror Number 02–0084. The Court summoned Mr. Freed by standard juror summons. Mr. Freed appeared as part of the jury venire, responded to questions from the Court and counsel for the parties and was ultimately selected to sit as one of two alternate jurors for an estimated three week trial. When the Court instructed the jurors to stand and be sworn, Mr. Freed refused to stand. After entreaty from the Court, Mr. Freed did eventually stand, but he did not take the oath with this fellow jurors. When questioned by the Court, he persisted in his refusal to take the oath and submit to jury service as required by the original juror summons, by his ultimate selection to serve, and by the direct order of the Court. After consulting with counsel, the Court determined that it had no choice but to hold Mr. Freed in civil contempt.The Court did so and remanded Mr. Freed to the Marshal. As of the close of business on jury selection day, the Marshal Service informed the Court that Mr. Freed was not interested in purging his contempt at the time, and so the Court arranged overnight lodging for Mr. Freed in Marshal custody. After consulting with counsel, the Court selected another juror to serve in the seat Mr. Freed was initially selected to occupy. The jury of twelve, with two alternates, was then sworn.

It is a basic proposition of law that parties must comply promptly with all orders and judgments of courts. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458, 95 S.Ct. 584, 42 L.Ed.2d 574 (1975). Failure to do so may lead to contempt citation and sanctions.

A contempt finding is appropriate where a party shows by clear and convincing evidence that the litigant violated “ ‘a definite and specific order of the court requiring him to perform or refrain from performing a particular act or acts with knowledge of the court's order.’ ” Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Cincinnati Bronze, Inc., 829 F.2d 585, 591 (6th Cir.1987), ( quoting SEC v. First Financial Group of Texas, Inc., 659 F.2d 660, 669 (5th Cir.1981)); see also Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229, 244 (6th Cir.1998) ( quoting Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 703, 708 (6th Cir.1991)). Any sanction imposed for a civil contempt must have as its goal coercing compliance with the Court's orders or compensating for losses sustained because of the contempt, and not punishment for wrongdoing. See Glover v. Johnson, 199 F.3d 310, 313 (6th Cir.1999) (citing TWM Manufacturing Co. v. Dura Corp., 722 F.2d 1261, 1273 (6th Cir.1983)).

In International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, the Supreme Court said that, “The paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction, as set forth in Gompers [ v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911) ], involves confining a contemnor indefinitely until he complies with an affirmative command such as an order ‘to pay alimony, or to surrender property ordered to be turned over to a receiver, or to make a conveyance.’ ” 512 U.S. 821, 828, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994) (emphasis added). The Bagwell Court went on to cite several other Supreme Court cases upholding imprisonment for civil contempt for either an indefinite term or a lengthy, fixed term. See, e.g., Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442, 31 S.Ct. 492 (recognizing that indefinite detention is not unlawful because contemnor “carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket” and can “end the sentence and discharge himself at any moment by doing what he had previously refused to do”); McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64, 59 S.Ct. 685, 83 L.Ed. 1108 (1939) (upholding detention “until [witness] purges himself of contempt by obeying [court's] order” to testify); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 n. 6, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966) (upholding as valid exercise of civil contempt authority “a determinate [2–year] sentence which includes a purge clause”). From these cases, it appears that the duration of the civil contempt power is co-extensive with the existence of the purpose.

The task of the Court is to apply these general principles to this unique fact pattern. It is perhaps not surprising that the Court has found a dearth of case law on civil contempt for jurors. That is undoubtedly because the Court is blessed with citizens that routinely fulfill their civic duty to serve, when called upon to do so, even when the service is difficult or inconvenient. In fact, in the experience of the Court and the six attorneys present in the Courtroom at the time of the contempt, no one was personally aware of any precedent for this kind of juror behavior. The Court's research has uncovered only one parallel case, In re Schramm, 432 F.Supp.2d 711 (E.D.Mich.2006). In that case, William Schramm was summoned as part of a grand jury venire. The court explained to Schramm the purpose of the grand jury and the time commitment involved in serving, then administered an oath requiring the prospective jurors to “truthfully answer the questions put to [them] touching upon [their] qualifications to sit as a grand juror.” Id. at 712. Schramm took the oath and participated in voir dire....