United States v. Myers

Decision Date11 January 2022
Docket Number18-cr-39 (CRC)
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LEUNEA MYERS, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In March 2018, Leunea Myers pleaded guilty to a single count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The Court sentenced her to a term of 51 months' incarceration, to run consecutive to a two-year term imposed in Fairfax County Virginia, for violating the terms of her probation there. Two years later, Myers filed a pro se motion to correct her sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Court construes Myers's motion to raise several ineffective assistance of counsel claims, centering on both her plea and sentencing proceedings. The Court will deny the motion because her claims are all untimely under the limitation periods set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). In addition, for the few claims that are arguably timely, the plea and sentencing records conclusively show Myers is entitled to no relief. For those reasons, the Court will deny the motion without an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

I. Background
A. Underlying proceedings

From February 2015 to November 2017, Myers worked as an office manager and bookkeeper for Sufka & Associates, a company providing professional management services for various trade associations. See Statement of Offense ¶¶ 1-2; Gov't's Sentencing Mem. at 1 n.1. During her time in that role, Myers embezzled funds from Sufka by making unauthorized charges on company credit cards and writing fraudulent checks to herself or to third parties to pay bills she owed. Statement of Offense ¶ 6. As part of this scheme, Myers also used funds directly from Sufka's clients' bank accounts. Id. ¶¶ 13-14.

In March 2018, Myers and prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia entered a plea agreement, under which Myers would plead guilty to a single-count Information for wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Plea Agreement at 1. In that agreement, Myers conceded that she fraudulently obtained $1, 550, 075.51 from Sufka and its clients, and agreed to restitution of that amount. Id. at 2, 8; Statement of Offense ¶ 15. The agreement also contained a tentative Sentencing Guidelines analysis, which estimated a recommended range of incarceration of 51 to 63 months. Plea Agreement at 4. The parties agreed they would not seek any departure from that range. Id. at 5. By accepting the agreement, Myers also waived her right to appeal and collaterally attack her sentence with some limited exceptions, including for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id. at 7.

On March 7, 2018, the Court accepted Myers's guilty plea.[1] See Minute Entry of Mar. 7, 2018. Because the wire fraud charge violated the terms of Myers's probation for an April 2016 embezzlement conviction in Fairfax County, Virginia, that jurisdiction issued a warrant for her arrest shortly after her guilty plea. See Gov't's Sentencing Mem. at 2. On May 25, 2018, Myers was sentenced to two years' incarceration for that probation violation. Id.

Several weeks later, the Court held a sentencing hearing in this case. The Court first accepted the Presentence Investigation Report's (PSR) factual recitation and Sentencing Guidelines calculation, which matched the estimate laid out in the parties' plea agreement. See Sentencing Hr'g Rough Tr. at 7:24-8:20. As part of its calculation of Myers's offense level, the Court included a 16-point enhancement for the amount of loss-more than $1, 500, 000 but less than $3, 500, 000-as well as a two-point enhancement because the offense resulted in substantial financial hardship. See id. at 8:3-8:5; see also PSR ¶¶ 44-45 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I), (b)(2)(A)(iii)). The Court ultimately adopted a total offense level of 22 and criminal history category of III, leading to an advisory Guidelines sentencing range of 51 to 63 months' incarceration. Sentencing Hr'g Rough Tr. at 8:17-20. The government asked for a sentence of 51 months. Id. at 14:14-16. In her sentencing memo and oral presentation, Myers's counsel advocated for a downward variance. Def.'s Sentencing Mem. at 7; Sentencing Hr'g Rough Tr. at 35:8-9. Among the justifications she raised was the uncertain nature of the stipulated loss amount used to calculate the offense level. Def.'s Sentencing Mem. at 17-18; Sentencing Hr'g Rough Tr. at 31:24-33:13. As counsel explained, there had never been a full review of the underlying financial records, and an initial review made clear that at least some number of transactions had in fact been authorized by Sufka. Def.'s Sentencing Mem. at 18. Myers's counsel thus asked the Court to consider the “reasonable likelihood” that the amount lost was below $1, 500, 000-which would have resulted in a lower Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months' incarceration. Id.

The Court ultimately agreed with the government and sentenced Myers to 51 months of incarceration, to run consecutively to the two-year term imposed for her Fairfax County, Virginia, probation violation. See Judgment at 2. In its explanation, the Court specifically noted that the chosen sentence would still be within Guidelines even if the true loss amount was “a little below” the $1.5 million mark. Sentencing Hr'g Rough Tr. at 45:23-46:2. The Court also sentenced Myers to three years of supervised release and restitution of $1, 550, 075.51. See Judgment at 3, 6.

B. Section 2255 Motion

More than two years later, on December 2, 2020, Myers filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asking the Court to correct her sentence. See Mot. at 12; Blount v. United States, 860 F.3d 732, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (considering motion by pro se incarcerated litigant filed on day placed in the prison mail system). In that motion, Myers raises four separate grounds for relief. The Court reads all of these grounds as allegations that Myers received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea or sentencing stages, in violation of her right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.[2]

First, Myers alleges that counsel failed to investigate or make a promised challenge to the loss amount used to calculate her Guidelines sentencing range. Mot. at 4. In support of this claim, Myers points to an adjusted calculation of the loss amount for one of Sufka's major clients, which was produced and made public in a related civil case brought against Sufka by that client. See id. at Attachments 1-2 (comparing initial loss amount calculations used in this case and in the D.C. Superior Court civil complaint). In Myers's view, that full analysis reveals that the actual loss amount could not have exceeded $1, 500, 000-as necessary for the 16-point enhancement she received. Id. at 4. Second, Myers alleges that trial counsel did not properly inform her of her right to appeal after sentencing. Id. at 5. Third, Myers contends that counsel induced her to plead guilty on the assumption that her state and federal sentences would run concurrently, and that she would be able to self-surrender to the Bureau of Prisons after “time to handle [her] personal affairs.” Id. at 7. In this claim, Myers also alleges counsel improperly failed to ask for a downward departure based on her “family circumstances.” Id. Fourth, Myers claims that there was a “breakdown in communication” with counsel. Id. at 8.

II. Legal Standards

A prisoner serving a federal sentence may petition the court to vacate, set aside, or correct its sentence if she believes that it “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . or is otherwise subject to collateral attack[.] 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). To obtain such collateral relief, the defendant “must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal, ” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982), and bears the burden of proving her claims by a preponderance of the evidence, United States v. Simpson, 475 F.2d 934, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Ordinarily, after receiving such a motion the court must notify the U.S. attorney and “grant a prompt hearing.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). But a district court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing before denying a § 2255 motion when “the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” Id. [I]f it plainly appears from the face of the motion and any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its summary dismissal.” United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting rules governing § 2255 proceedings).

The Court construes Myers's motion to claim that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Under the well-established test for such a claim Myers “must show both that counsel performed deficiently and that counsel's deficient performance caused [her] prejudice.” Buck v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 759, 775 (2017) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Strickland's first prong sets a high bar.” Id. To establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Judicial scrutiny of that performance is “highly deferential, ” and operates with “a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. To satisfy Strickland's prejudice prong, a defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. For a challenge to a...

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