United States v. Myers

• Decision Date: 06 May 1955
• Docket Number: Cr. No. 11313.
• Citation: 131 F. Supp. 525
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Theron Theodore MYERS, Defendant.

131 F. Supp. 525

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Theron Theodore MYERS, Defendant.

Cr. No. 11313.

United States District Court N. D. California N. D.

May 6, 1955.

Lloyd H. Burke, U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Robert E. Woodward, Asst. U. S. Atty., Sacramento, Cal., for plaintiff.

Robert K. Winters, Benicia, Cal., for defendant.

HALBERT, District Judge.

Defendant is charged by an indictment with a violation of Section 1001, of Title 18, of the United States Code. Trial by jury has been waived, and the matter has been submitted to this Court on what is, for all practical purposes, an agreed statement of facts.

The pertinent facts can be briefly summarized. The defendant was Deputy Property Disposal Officer at the United States Army's Benicia Arsenal at the time of the offense. Approximately five years prior to the time of the offense, the defendant's wife purchased a 1942 Ford automobile from the War Assets Administration, but at the time, with which we are concerned, did not have any documentary evidence of her title. Some time prior to the date of the offense, the vehicle was sold to a Mrs. Frances Jones, and in order to get the car registered in the name of Mrs. Jones, the defendant took from the supplies in his office a printed official government form entitled United States Government Certificate of Release of Motor Vehicle (Standard Form 97. Promulgated April, 1948 by Bureau of Budget. Circular A-25), which is sometimes called a "Government Green Slip", and which will hereinafter be referred to simply as Form 97. Defendant completed this document in the regular and usual manner so as to show that the vehicle was sold to Mrs. Jones by the Government on November 4, 1953. No copy of the Certificate was kept at the Benicia Arsenal. This Certificate, as completed by the defendant, correctly describes his wife's Ford automobile and states and represents, among other things: (1) That the vehicle was being sold by Benicia Arsenal of the War Department to Mrs. Jones; (2) that the vehicle was the property of the United States Government; (3) that the sale for which the Certificate was issued was the first transfer of the vehicle in ordinary trade and commerce subsequent to acquisition by the United States Government; and (4) that the Certificate was issued by the defendant as Property Disposal Officer of the Benicia Arsenal. It is conceded that each of these last four statements were false, that the document as completed by the defendant is itself false, and that the defendant knew such to be the fact when he executed and delivered the same to Mrs. Jones. It is further conceded that he had no authority from the United States Government to sign the Certificate of Release, and likewise, had no authority to use or deliver it to Mrs. Jones, or any one else, in his official capacity.

After the Certificate of Release was issued and delivered to Mrs. Jones, she used it to secure a Certificate of Registration for the Ford automobile through the Department of Motor Vehicles of the State of California. Obviously, the Department of Motor Vehicles of the State of California relied upon the authenticity of this document as an official document of the United States Army's Benicia Arsenal in issuing the Certificate of Registration to Mrs. Jones.

Defendant contends that he used this form only as a means of transferring title from his wife to Mrs. Jones, and that he did not sign it in his official capacity.

Having the pertinent facts in mind, let us turn to the statute under which the defendant is charged and the specific charge that is made against him in the indictment on file in this case. As already indicated, the defendant is charged with a violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 1001, which provides that any person is guilty of a public offense when such person:

"* * * in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry * * *."¹

The pertinent portions of the indictment in this case charge that:

"* * * defendant, Theron Theodore Myers, did unlawfully, knowingly, and wilfully falsify a material fact and make a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, and make a false writing or document by making an entry upon the official records of Benicia Arsenal, United States Army, a department of the United States, in the form of his signature upon a United States Government Certificate of Release of Motor Vehicle showing title to a 1942 Ford Fordor automobile, Serial No. IGA 104336, to be transferred to Francis A. Jones, 591 East M Street, Benicia, California, knowing such entry to be false, fictitious and fraudulent in that said motor vehicle was not the property of the War Department, Benicia Arsenal, and was not the first transfer of said vehicle in ordinary trade and commerce subsequent to acquisition by the United States Government, as indicated by said Certificate."¹

The statute, insofar as it concerns us here, requires first, that the offense must be committed "within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States"; secondly, that the act shall be done knowingly and wilfully and with full knowledge of the true facts; and third, that the accused shall do one or more of the several acts, namely: (1) Falsify a material fact; (2) Make a false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) Make a false writing or document. The indictment in this case charges the defendant with doing each and every one of the three acts last above described knowingly and wilfully and with full knowledge of the fact that they were false, fictitious and fraudulent. In addition, the indictment alleges in detail what record was falsified; what department of the United States is involved; what the defendant did in connection with it; and makes a detailed statement concerning the portions of the document that are claimed to be false, fictitious and fraudulent.

The indictment charges the defendant with a series of acts, any of which separately, or together, would constitute a single offense. This is entirely proper, Yip Wah v. United States, 9 Cir., 8 F.2d 478, certiorari denied, 270 U.S. 645, 46 S.Ct. 336, 70 L.Ed. 777; Pon Wing Quong v. United States, 9 Cir., 111 F.2d 751; Chandler v. United States, 1 Cir., 171 F.2d 921, certiorari denied, 336 U.S. 918, 69 S.Ct. 640, 93 L.Ed. 1081; and United States v. Sander, 27 Fed.Cas., page 949, No. 16219. Even though there might possibly have been some question about the form of the indictment, this was waived by the failure of the defendant to object to the indictment prior to the trial, Beauchamp v. United States, 6 Cir., 154 F.2d 413, certiorari denied, 329 U.S. 723, 67 S.Ct. 66, 91 L.Ed. 626, and Harris v. United States, 10 Cir., 190 F.2d 503. Furthermore, the charge against the defendant was confined to a single charge by the specific allegations in the indictment concerning the acts committed, the time when, and the place where they were committed. The indictment is so drawn that it makes it abundantly clear that there is but a single charge being made against the defendant, and, therefore, it is not subject to challenge for duplicity or other technical defects at this time, Beauchamp v. United States, supra; Blum v. United States, 6 Cir., 46 F.2d 850; and Proffitt v. United State, 9 Cir., 264 F. 299.

The indictment being sufficient, what burden of proof was on the prosecution? Of course, the prosecution had the burden of proof required in every criminal case, namely, to establish the defendant's guilt to a moral certainty and beyond all reasonable doubt. It should, however, be borne in mind that where a statute such as the one under which the indictment in this case was drawn denounces a series of acts each of which separately, and all of which together, may constitute one single offense, and the indictment charges all or several of the acts denounced by the statute, the prosecution meets the burden of proof required of it if it establishes by appropriate evidence to the required degree one or more of the series of acts denounced by the statute and charged in the indictment, Todorow v. United States, 9 Cir., 173 F. 2d 439, certiorari denied, 337 U.S. 925, 69 S.Ct. 1169, 93 L.Ed. 1733; United States v. Mascuch, 2 Cir., 111 F.2d 602, certiorari denied, 311 U.S. 650, 61 S.Ct. 14, 85 L.Ed. 416; United States v. Otto, 2 Cir., 54 F.2d 277; and People v. McClennegen, 195 Cal. 445, 234 P. 91. The defendant having admitted all of the pertinent facts in this case, the only question is whether under the evidence the defendant committed one or more of the acts denounced by the statute and charged in the indictment.

The defendant relies largely, if not entirely, on the case of United States v. White, D.C., 69 F.Supp. 562, for his defense. This case does not help with the decision of the case at bar, for it is quite dissimilar in several respects. First, the White Case involved an oral representation, whereas the case at bar involves an official printed government document completed by the defendant himself so as to set forth certain information which the defendant knew was false. Secondly, the White Case involved a representation by a citizen to a peace officer of the State of California, who had neither the authority, nor the power, nor perhaps even the inclination to do anything about the alleged federal offense involved in that case. In the case at bar, the defendant signed the official printed government document which he himself completed by filling in false data, and which shows on its face that he signed the same in his official capacity.² In so doing, he sought to make it appear, and...