United States v. Myers
| Decision Date | 20 October 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 16370.,16370. |
| Citation | 384 F.2d 279 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America ex rel. John W. SINGER v. David N. MYERS, Superintendent, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
James E. O'Brien, Asst. Dist. Atty., Lackawanna County, Scranton, Pa. (Joseph J. Cimino, Dist. Atty. of Lackawanna County, Scranton, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.
Aaron D. Blumberg, Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Before STALEY, Chief Judge, KALODNER, Circuit Judge, and SHERIDAN, District Judge.
Following a jury trial in November, 1962, in the Court of Oyer and Terminer, Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, in which he and two co-defendants were found guilty of rape, the appellee John W. Singer, was sentenced to a 6 to 15 year prison term which he is now serving in the Eastern Correctional Institution at Graterford, Pennsylvania.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in an Order entered October 27, 1966, granted Singer's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on its finding that a statement which Singer signed in the course of police investigation was "involuntary", and that its admission into evidence at his trial violated his federal constitutional rights.1
The respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings, David N. Myers, Superintendent of the state prison, has appealed. He contends: (1) the statement was "in all respects voluntary"; (2) in any event, Singer's failure to raise the question of the voluntariness of the statement at his trial "constituted a deliberate circumvention of state procedures" barring federal review; and (3) even if Singer is not now barred from raising the question, the District Court should have "returned `the case' to the state court for an evidentiary hearing on this issue".
Singer in reply urges that: (1) the District Court's conclusion that his "confession" was "coerced" and "involuntry" is supported by the evidence; (2) his failure to raise the question of the voluntariness of his "confession" at his trial does not bar him from relief in the Federal courts; and (3) the District Court did not err in refusing to return the case to the state courts for a hearing on that issue.
The available record discloses that at about 9:30 or 10:00 P.M. Friday, October 19, 1962, a car driven by Singer's co-defendant, Douglas Reilly, with Paul Snopek, Singer's other co-defendant, in the front seat and Singer in the rear, pulled over to the curb where a twentysix year old woman was walking, and one of the three forced the woman inside. Reilly then drove to a mountain road where the woman was allegedly raped by at least two of the men.
There is some dispute as to the extent of Singer's participation in the crime. There was trial testimony that he was one of the men who raped the woman. Singer testified, however, both at the trial and in the District Court, that he never had intercourse with the woman or attempted to force her to have intercourse with him, that he in fact tried to protect her from the advances of the other two men and that in doing so, a fight ensued during which he was clubbed unconscious.
It is undisputed that a fight did break out among the men at the scene of the rape; that Singer was knocked unconscious and left there by Reilly and Snopek; upon regaining consciousness, he walked to the main highway and obtained a lift to a friend's home about 1:00 A.M., Saturday morning, October 20, 1962; he later went home and fell asleep at about 2:30 A.M.; he was awakened at about 4:30 A.M. by Pennsylvania State Police who arrested him and took him to the police barracks for interrogation in connection with the rape.
Singer was interrogated at the barracks from about 5:00 A.M. to about 8:30 A.M. at which time the police took him to the scene of the occurrence where he pointed out to them certain details of the crime. The police then took him to a restaurant for breakfast, and about 10:00 A.M., he and the officers returned to the police barracks. Shortly thereafter, Singer's interrogation continued, and about 2 P.M. Saturday afternoon, he signed a statement typed by the police.
In it, Singer said that Snopek forced the woman into the car and that Reilly then drove to a mountain road; Singer tried to have intercourse with the woman, but was unsuccessful; the other two men then tried to molest her, whereupon he went to her aid and the fight described above broke out.
Singer claims that while he was in police custody, he was tired from lack of sleep, and that as a result of his earlier fight with Reilly and Snopek, his face looked like a "beefsteak, bruised, red and well-battered", and that he could not hear out of his left ear.2 He also claims that during the time he was in custody, the police denied his request for a doctor and a lawyer; several statements were prepared by the police which he refused to sign; and that he finally signed one statement without reading it, because, in his words:
The appellant Myers contends that police officers testified that only one statement was prepared by them which Singer read before signing and that Singer did not at the time request a doctor or a lawyer. Appellant further contends that although the signs of Singer's fight with Reilly and Snopek were visible, "his condition was definitely not such as would render his statement involuntary."
Singer was brought before a Justice of the Peace at approximately 3:00 in the afternoon of Saturday, October 20, 1962 and pleaded "not guilty". He was thereafter indicted and charged with rape.
At the joint trial of the three co-defendants, when the prosecution attempted to introduce Singer's statement into evidence, his attorney objected. However, the objection seems to have been based solely on the grounds that it was ex parte and induced by the police, and that it implicated Singer's co-defendants. It appears to be undisputed that Singer's counsel never objected to the statement on the ground that it was "involuntary" and that Singer's present Constitutional claims were never specifically raised at his trial.
Despite the objection, the statement was admitted into evidence and the jury found Singer and his two co-defendants guilty.
Singer did not appeal from his judgment of conviction, but on December 5, 1964, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, contending, inter alia, that the statement admitted into evidence at his trial was involuntarily given and the product of police coercion in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court denied the petition, without hearing, after concluding that "the voluntariness of the confession was neither controverted nor at issue in the trial" and that "there is no issue of fact to decide at a hearing." Commonwealth ex rel. Singer v. Myers, Opinion of Hoban, P. J., Court of Common Pleas, Lackawanna County, Pa., No. 823, November Term, 1964. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed per curiam, with two judges dissenting. Commonwealth ex rel. Singer v. Myers, 206 Pa.Super. 559, 213 A.2d 685 (1965). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied review.
Singer filed the instant petition in the District Court on March 25, 1966, alleging that the statement he gave the police was involuntary and "coerced", and that its admission into evidence at his trial was a denial of due process.
In granting it, after hearing, the District Court said in its opinion:
The District Court rejected Myers' contention that should it conclude that an issue of voluntariness in Singer's statement had been presented, it should afford the Pennsylvania courts an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. It construed Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964) as not requiring such action.
We are of the opinion that the District Court erred in failing to afford the Pennsylvania courts a reasonable opportunity to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of voluntariness under the teaching of Jackson v. Denno, supra.
We are further of the opinion that since Pennsylvania has enacted a post-conviction statute which affords an available remedy to correct an abuse of federal due process in the administration of its criminal laws, that the District Court erred in failing to abstain from acting on Singer's habeas corpus petition pending exhaustion of his post-conviction remedy. Case v. State of Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336-337, 85 S.Ct. 1486, 14 L.Ed.2d 422 (1965).
First, as to Jackson v. Denno, supra:
There, the Supreme Court held that where one "has not been given an adequate hearing upon the voluntariness of his confession he must be given one",5 and that such hearing "should occur initially in the state courts rather than in the federal habeas corpus court".6
In doing so the Court said at page 393, 84 Ct. at page 1789:
"* * * We think that the further proceedings to which Jackson is entitled should occur initially in the state courts rather than in the federal habeas corpus court. Jackson\'s trial did not comport with constitutional standards and he is entitled to a determination of the voluntariness of his confession in the state courts in accordance with valid state procedures; the State is also entitled to make this determination before this Court considers the case on direct review or a petition for habeas corpus is filed in a Federal...
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