United States v. Myers
Decision Date | 09 September 1964 |
Docket Number | Misc. No. 2758. |
Citation | 233 F. Supp. 563 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Alfred PARKER v. David N. MYERS, Superintendent State Correctional Institution, Graterford, Pennsylvania. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Alfred Parker, pro se.
James C. Crumlish, Jr., Dist. Atty., Gordon Gelfond, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
This is a habeas corpus proceeding. Petitioner has raised unsuccessfully in the state courts the argument that the denial of counsel at his preliminary hearing, at which he pleaded guilty, was a deprivation of his constitutional right to counsel. See Commonwealth ex rel. Parker v. Myers, 414 Pa. 427, 200 A.2d 770 (1964).
Lack of counsel at a preliminary hearing constitutes a denial of constitutional rights if, under the circumstances of the particular case, that hearing was a "critical" stage of the proceedings. In this sense, a preliminary hearing, not normally a critical stage under the procedure of a given state, can nevertheless become critical if events transpire which are likely to prejudice the trial. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963); DeToro v. Pepersack, 332 F.2d 341, 343 (C.A.4, 1964). In White, relator had plead guilty, without counsel, at the preliminary hearing. He later changed his plea and his uncounseled preliminary guilty plea was used against him. He was convicted. In reversing, the Court said, at page 60 of 373 U.S., at page 1051 of 83 S.Ct.:
* * *"
In United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608 (C.A.2, 1964), speaking of White, the court said, at page 611:
"* * * It is clear that what made the preliminary hearing `critical' was that a guilty plea had been entered and that the plea had been used against petitioner at trial. * * *"
The hearing and plea in this case partook of none of the elements of White. The relator did not change his plea, and an examination of the state record, which I have before me, shows that the preliminary plea was not used or introduced at the hearing to determine the degree of guilt. Hence, in the White sense, the hearing here was not a critical stage of the proceedings.
However, a preliminary hearing may, because of peculiarities of state procedural rules, be critical per se.
Thus, in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961), the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant unrepresented by counsel at the arraignment. The Court held that the arraignment was a critical stage in the Alabama criminal proceeding because certain rights were waived, if not raised at the arraignment. The Court said, at page 54, at page 158 of 82 S.Ct.:
* * *"
I cannot add to what the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania1 and my Brother, Judge Wood2 said as to the inherent nature of a magistrate's hearing in Pennsylvania. Suffice it to say, that unlike the arraignment in Alabama no rights are lost by pleading. Rather, the hearing is primarily to protect from imprisonment or the requirement of bail when there is no evidence to support a charge against the accused. Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa.Super. 382, 124 A.2d 666 (1956). In United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, supra, the court said, at page 612 of 333 F.2d:
* * *"
So here, the nature of a Pennsylvania magistrate's hearing is such that it is not ordinarily a critical stage of the proceedings, and since nothing transpired to make it critical in this case, the lack of counsel abridged no constitutional right.
One other thing:
In DeToro, the relator argued that because he had no counsel at the preliminary hearing he was unable to cross-examine the witnesses there. Thus, he argued, he was unable to learn of the state's case and was deprived of this preliminary cross-examination for impeachment purposes at the trial. In disposing of this...
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