United States v. Myers

• Decision Date: 16 March 1923
• Docket Number: 10197.
• Citation: 287 F. 260
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. MYERS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

287 F. 260

UNITED STATES v. MYERS.

No. 10197.

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky.

March 16, 1923

W. S Ball, U.S. Atty., of Louisville, Ky.

James P. Edwards, of Louisville, Ky., for defendant.

WALTER EVANS, District Judge.

The only witness heard for the United States was J. L. Asher Prohibition Agent. He testified that while riding in his automobile along one of the public highways leading into the city of Louisville he passed another automobile coming in the same direction. He observed what he thought were indications that the driver of the latter was intoxicated, and drove on until he came to a bridge. When he reached a point near its farther end he turned his automobile across it, got out, and drew his pistol. With that in his hand he went back to the other approaching automobile and halted it. Retaining the pistol in his hand, he proceeded, without the consent of the owner, to open the door of this automobile, searched it, and found whisky in it. Asher at this time had no search warrant nor had he the owner's consent to search the automobile.

This being the case of the government, as presented by its testimony, the defendant has moved the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. The question thus presented, and which has been fully argued, is as old as our Constitution, and was regarded by the people as so essential to their liberties that in a very short time after the Constitution itself was ratified an amendment thereto was made effective covering cases like this.

The essential question raised by the defendant's motion though of great importance, is by no means new nor difficult. It has indeed come before us under various circumstances, and has always been decided in the same way, if the facts were such as appear here. This was done upon grounds now to be briefly stated.

Ignoring for the present the fact that there was an absence of a search warrant as being comparatively insignificant, we come to the question of prime importance, namely: Can testimony against any citizen, obtained as this was, be the sole basis of a conviction for a public offense, or can testimony thus extorted be used against the defendant at all?

The National Prohibition Act (41 Stat. 305) is, of course, very important, and its provisions are to be obeyed and enforced, as they always have been here in a vast number of proper cases; but that act is by no means the supreme law of the land. That great instrument, the Constitution of the United States, yet occupies that exalted position.

Article 5 of the Amendments thereto provides, among other things, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The vital question presented here, therefore, is: Was this defendant in this criminal case, by the conduct of Asher in acquiring information in the way described, thereby compelled to give testimony against himself?

Time at our command just now is too limited to afford opportunity for going into much detail, but it seems entirely clear that evidence obtained in the manner shown here cannot be used against the defendant without an energetic disregard of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. In many cases, however, the subject has been fully considered and the applicable principles very clearly stated.

In Snyder v. United States, 285 F. 3, recently decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit, those decisions were summarized, when it was said that:

'The federal courts have therefore adopted the policy of excluding evidence illegally obtained by a federal officer, whether the evidence so obtained was by unlawful invasion of his home or of his person, on the ground that to hold

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