United States v. Nania

Decision Date30 July 2013
Docket NumberNo. 12–2028.,12–2028.
Citation724 F.3d 824
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. John V. NANIA, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Katherine Sawyer (argued), Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Carol A. Brook, Attorney, Office of the Federal Defender Program, Chicago, IL, Kristin J. Carpenter (argued), Attorney, Federal Defender Program, Rockford, IL, for DefendantAppellant.

Before MANION, KANNE, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

For more than three years, John V. Nania inflicted lasting torment on several young girls: he sexually abused them and documented that abuse in pornographic images. When authorities discovered Nania's appalling actions, they arrested him and charged him with multiple crimes. In Illinois state court, Nania was convicted for the sexual abuse itself. In federal court, he pled guilty to producing child pornography. At his federal sentencing hearing, Nania argued that the conduct involved in these state and federal offenses overlapped to such an extent that the sentences should run concurrently. The district court disagreed, however, and ordered that Nania serve his federal prison term consecutively to his state sentences. Nania now challenges that decision. After review, we find no error and affirm Nania's sentence.

I. Background

Cases involving the sexual abuse of children require care and discretion. We understand that need, and, in light of it, have left our descriptions vague when possible. Specific details are included only as needed to resolve the case.

In January 2009, A.M., a fourteen-year-old girl from Rockford, Illinois, told a worker at a children's center that she had been sexually abused for the past three years. (Presentence Investigation Report, “PSR,” at 3.) The aggressor was John V. Nania. A.M. knew Nania through his twin daughters, whom A.M. had babysat for several years. ( Id.) The children's center reported A.M.'s abuse to the Rockford Police Department, and investigations began. ( Id.) Within two weeks, officers searched Nania's home and recovered a computer containing many images of child pornography. ( Id.) The police also found a VHS cassette that depicted Nania sexually abusing his stepdaughter, S.M. ( Id. at 5–6.) When investigators subsequently interviewed S.M., she explained that Nania had sexually exploited her for years and that she had tried to commit suicide to escape the abuse. ( Id. at 6.) As investigations continued, several more victims emerged. ( Id.)

Eventually, these discoveries led to Nania's arrest. He was later convicted multiple times in Illinois state court. ( Id. at 12–14.) First, on December 8, 2009, a jury found Nania guilty of three counts of criminal sexual assault (Counts Four through Six in the state proceedings). ( Id. at 12–13.) All three counts related to Nania's abuse of S.M., his stepdaughter, and included a count for penetrating her vaginally when she was under the age of eighteen (Count Four). ( Id. at 13.) For each count, Nania received a separate sentence of fifteen years in custody and two years of supervised release. ( Id. at 12.) These sentences would run consecutively, for a total of forty-five years in custody and six years of supervised release. ( Id.)

Then, on June 25, 2010, at the conclusion of a bench trial, an Illinois state judge found Nania guilty of three more crimes: one count of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (Counts One through Three in the state proceedings). ( Id.) These convictions related to Nania's abuse of A.M., his daughters' babysitter. ( Id. at 12–13.) Important for our purposes, none of these counts charged Nania with vaginally penetrating A.M. ( Id.) Nania received another twenty years in prison for the predatory criminal sexual assault count and two seven-year sentences for the aggravated criminal sexual abuse counts. ( Id. at 12.) The seven-year terms would run concurrently to each other but consecutively to the twenty-year sentence. ( Id.) Thus, these crimes added another twenty-seven years in state prison to Nania's initial, forty-five-year sentence.

After securing these convictions, the State of Illinois dropped its remaining charges against Nania. ( Id.) His aggregate sentence for the state offenses totaled seventy-two years. Furthermore, Illinois law limits the amount of credit Nania can receive for good behavior to approximately 15% of his sentence. See730 ILCS 5/3–6–3(a)(2)(ii); ( see also Appellant's Br. at 6). Based on that figure, Nania is projected to be released from state prison when he is 103 years old. (Appellant's Br. at 6.)

Despite these formidable state sentences, law enforcement authorities were not finished with Nania. Federal prosecutors had also taken up his case. In May 2009, a federal grand jury indicted Nania for two counts of producing child pornography and two counts of possessing child pornography. (R. 30–2 at 8–11.) On December 21, 2011, Nania pled guilty to Count Two of the indictment, which charged him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (producing child pornography). ( Id. at 304.) More specifically, Count Two charged Nania with “employ[ing], us[ing], persuad[ing], induc[ing], entic[ing] and coerc[ing] [A.M.] to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct, ... which ... was produced using materials that had been mailed, shipped, and transported in interstate commerce.” 1 ( Id. at 9.) The charge was based on a specific image Nania had produced, referred to as “Digital Image 2.” ( Id.) This picture depicted Nania vaginally penetrating A.M. Nania signed a written plea agreement, (R. 30–2 at 305–22), and the government later dismissed the remaining counts against him, ( id. at 372).

The district court held Nania's sentencing hearing on April 16, 2012. ( Id. at 370.) During the hearing, the court adopted the factual findings of the PSR. (R. 31 at 31.) The court also adopted the PSR's calculations for the sentence recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. ( Id. at 32.) In determining that recommendation, the PSR took into account Nania's exploitation of four victims: A.M., S.M., and two others not mentioned in the state court proceedings. (PSR at 7–11.) Ultimately, the PSR concluded that Nania's total offense level was 43, ( id. at 11), for which a life sentence was recommended, ( id. at 26). But 18 U.S.C. § 2251 has a statutorily imposed maximum sentence of 360 months. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). As a result, that maximum became the recommended sentence. SeeU.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a). The district court departed downward from the recommendation and sentenced Nania to 330 months in prison. (R. 31 at 47.)

The last remaining question was whether that federal sentence should run concurrently or consecutively to Nania's state sentences. Nania argued that U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) applied, in which case the Sentencing Guidelines would have recommended that Nania's federal sentence run concurrently with his state sentences. The district court, however, agreed with the government that § 5G1.3(c) and Application Note 3(D) of that provision applied, which meant the Guidelines made no explicit recommendation about concurrent or consecutive sentences. Rather, the Guidelines provided a list of factors for the district court to weigh when deciding whether to give a concurrent sentence. Taking those considerations into account, the district court ordered Nania to serve his federal sentence consecutively to his state sentences. (R. 31 at 52.) Disagreeing with that conclusion, Nania timely appealed his sentence on April 26, 2012. (R. 30–2 at 376.)

II. Analysis

Fair, appropriate sentences for criminal defendants—this goal ranks among the central purposes of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A at 2. Today, we consider one aspect of that multi-faceted mission: discouraging sentences that punish defendants twice for the same conduct. The Guidelines institute this policy in part through U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, which applies to defendants who face an already existing, but not yet completed, prison term. If the conduct that led to the undischarged term sufficiently overlaps with the conduct for the current offense, then the Guidelines recommend that the prison terms run concurrently.

That potential recommendation is the precise issue Nania raises. First, he argues that the district court incorrectly decided which subsection of § 5G1.3 applied. If so, then the court procedurally erred by misunderstanding whether the Guidelines recommended a concurrent sentence. Alternatively, Nania argues that, even if the district court correctly determined the applicable provision, the court's decision to impose the sentences consecutively was nonetheless substantively unreasonable. We address each argument below, although under two different standards. We review the procedural challenge de novo but review the substantive challenge for abuse of discretion. United States v. Vallar, 635 F.3d 271, 277–78 (7th Cir.2011). In the end, we find neither of Nania's arguments convincing.

A. Procedural Error

Nania and the government disagree over which subsection of § 5G1.3 applies to this case. In particular, the debate centers on whether subsection (b) or (c) controls. According to the government, the correct answer is subsection (c), which gives the district court broad discretion. When § 5G1.3(c) applies, a court can order a defendant's multiple prison terms “to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively”—essentially in any format the court feels “achieve[s] a reasonable punishment for the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c). The Guidelines direct the court to a set of factors it should assess in making that decision, but the Guidelines provide no further guidance. See id. & cmt. n. 3(A).

In contrast, subsection (b) creates a subclass...

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