United States v. Nash
| Decision Date | 07 November 1901 |
| Citation | 111 F. 525 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. NASH et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
R. D Hill, U.S. Atty.
J. B McCormick and W. H. Watson, for defendants.
The first count in the indictment in this case charges, in brief that the defendants, being the owners of a certain vessel of more than 15 tons burden, bearing the name of 'R Nash,' and propelled by means of fluid and gasoline power, engaged the said vessel in freight and passenger carriage for hire to and from Louisville, Ky., and to and from other points on the Ohio river, and that while so engaged the hull, tank, and appliances for storing, generating, and applying such fluid and gasoline as its motive power were not under license or certificate of inspection as required by law, nor were said hull, tank, and appliances then, nor had they theretofore been, inspected as required by law. The second count charges the defendants with having unlawfully and knowingly navigated said vessel without having thereon, and in charge and control of its engines and machinery, an engineer duly licensed as such, as required by law. The defendants have moved the court to quash the indictment upon two grounds, namely-- First, that the court has no jurisdiction of the offenses charged; and, second, that jurisdiction to punish such offenses is, by the laws of the United States, given exclusively to the surveyor of customs.
By the provisions of many enactments now grouped in title 52 of the Revised Statutes, congress has undertaken to make a comprehensive code for regulating navigation, and providing for the safety of vessels propelled by steam and other motive powers, and for the safety of the passengers and freight carried thereon, and from time to time has since improved this code by various separate amendments. The chief object of all this legislation was, of course, to secure the protection of life and property as against the many dangers naturally incident to the navigation of vessels of every character. At the time, however, of the enactment of the original legislation, steam was mainly the motive power in vogue. Later, others were introduced, and, becoming prevalent, vessels propelled by them were embraced in certain amendments to the various sections of the Revised Statutes in the title referred to.
In some cases congress, it is contended, has authorized the imposition and collection of penalties by the surveyors of customs, and sections 4496 and 4499 are relied upon to support that view, and probably many persons subjected to such exactions have paid them without questioning the power of congress to authorize this mode of procedure. In the case now before the court it is quite unimportant to attempt definitely to determine whether congress has such power or not. The question does not necessarily arise, particularly as the two last-named sections do not seem to reach the point at issue here, but, as I am pressed to do so, I will say this much upon it. The sixth amendment to the constitution of the United States expressly provides that:
'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.'
This being so, I should be greatly predisposed to hold that those provisions of the legislation referred to, if fairly susceptible of the construction contended for, would be unauthorized-- First, because they did not, in conformity to that constitutional principle, in any way provide for a trial by a jury of the issue of the guilt or innocence of the persons accused; and, second, because it is an attempt to bestow judicial powers upon merely executive officers, and to make them at once judges, jurors, and executioners. While, therefore, I should be much disposed to so hold if the question were involved in the pending motion, I make no decision upon it, for the reason indicated.
The real question to be determined is, has this court jurisdiction of the offenses charged in the indictment? It may be said that, even if the surveyor of customs had the power to enforce the penalties prescribed for violating any law or regulation respecting such matters, it would by no means necessarily follow that the courts would not also have jurisdiction if a public offense had been committed, and especially in order to give effect to the sixth amendment to the constitution. The matter now to be decided is, does the indictment charge any public offense made punishable under the criminal laws of the United States? It is essential, therefore, to inquire whether the facts stated in the indictment, if true, constitute offenses, under the laws of the United States, which are punishable through its courts. It is argued by the learned counsel for the defendant that sections 4496, 4499, Rev. St., put the matter entirely in the hands of the surveyor of customs. Those sections read as follows:
He contends that the facts alleged in the indictment do not constitute public offenses punishable by the courts, not only because the matter is committed entirely to the surveyors, but also because only a 'penalty' is prescribed, and in his argument he cites authorities tending to show the difference between a 'fine' as such and a 'penalty' as such. He says that:
'A 'fine' is defined as follows: 'In ordinary legal language, the term 'fine' means a sum of money, the payment of which is imposed by a court according to law, as a punishment for a crime or misdemeanor.' 13 Am.& Eng.Enc.Law (New Ed.) p. 53, Sec. 2. ' A fine is a pecuniary punishment...
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...whatever kind. 13 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 53. A fine is always a penalty, but a penalty may not always be a fine. United States v. Nash, [111 F. 525 (W.D. Ky. 1901)]." Bankers Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 96 Conn. 361, 368, 114 A. 104 (1921); Beacon Falls v. Posick, 17 Conn. App. 17, 42 n.1......
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