United States v. Neuhauser, 13–6186.

Citation745 F.3d 125
Decision Date11 March 2014
Docket NumberNo. 13–6186.,13–6186.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jeffrey Cissel NEUHAUSER, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

ARGUED: Susan Amelia Hensler, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Kristi Noel O'Malley, Office of the United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge MOTZ wrote the opinion, in which Judge KING and Judge DIAZ joined.

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:

Shortly before his term of imprisonment on child sex offenses ended, Jeffrey Neuhauser received notification that the Government had certified him as a “sexually dangerous person” under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4248. The certification stayed his release from prison, where he remained confined in civil detention pending the resolution of his status. The district court ultimately concluded that the Government had not proven Neuhauser to be a “sexually dangerous person” and so ordered his release from prison. Neuhauser then moved to terminate the term of supervised release that had been imposed in conjunction with his term of imprisonment. He asserted that his term of supervised release began when his term of imprisonment ended, and thus, his supervised release ran throughout the time he spent in civil detention. The district court denied the motion, holding that Neuhauser's term of supervised release did not begin until he was freed from confinement. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

In September 1999, Neuhauser pled guilty to one count of interstate travel with intent to engage in sex with a minor and one count of distribution of child pornography. See18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) and 2252(a)(1). The court sentenced him to 109 months imprisonment and an additional five years of supervised release. The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) set a release date of June 6, 2007, and Neuhauser served his time in prison without significant incident.

On May 22, 2007, just two weeks before Neuhauser's scheduled release date, the Government certified him as a “sexually dangerous person” under the Adam Walsh Act. The certification triggered a stay of Neuhauser's discharge until a federal district court could determine whether he met the criteria for civil commitment. See18 U.S.C. § 4248(a). On June 6, 2007—Neuhauser's original release date—the BOP processed him for Adam Walsh Act “review” and transferred him to a different housing unit within the same federal prison. He remained there for the next four-and-a-half years while constitutional challenges to the Adam Walsh Act were resolved.1

On January 19, 2012, after an evidentiary hearing, the district court refused to certify Neuhauser for civil commitment. The court reasoned that although Neuhauser evidenced an interest in adolescent boys, the Government did not demonstrate that his condition qualified as a “mental illness” justifying civil commitment. United States v. Neuhauser, No. 5:07–HC–2101–BO, 2012 WL 174363, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 2012) (explaining that a pedophilia diagnosis requires the exhibition of an interest in preadolescent boys). On February 3, 2012, the BOP released Neuhauser, and he returned to his Maryland home.

Five months later, on June 6, 2012, Neuhauser moved to terminate his term of supervised release. He argued that his term of supervised release began on the date that his prison sentence ended: June 6, 2007. After that date, he noted, he was no longer serving time in prison pursuant to criminal sanction, but rather he remained in prison pursuant to the operation of a civil statute. Neuhauser maintained that civil detention, unlike criminal confinement, does not constitute “imprisonment.” Because federal law specifies that supervision begins on the date of a person's “release[ ] from imprisonment, he contended that his term of supervised release began when his confinement for Adam Walsh Act review began. See18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (emphasis added).

The district court disagreed. It credited Neuhauser's argument that a person's term of supervised release begins at the end of his imprisonment. The court reasoned, however, that “release from imprisonment” occurs only when a person is freed from confinement. Because the Government confined Neuhauser until the resolution of his civil-commitment hearing, the district court determined that his supervised release commenced only after that date, i.e., in February 2012, not in June 2007.

Neuhauser noted a timely appeal.2

II.

The sole dispute in this case concerns the date on which Neuhauser's supervised release began. Neuhauser contends that his supervised release began on June 6, 2007, the date on which his prison sentence ended. The Government maintains that Neuhauser's release began on February 3, 2012, the date on which his actual confinement ended. The parties thus dispute a question of law, which we consider de novo. Holland v. Pardee Coal Co., 269 F.3d 424, 430 (4th Cir.2001).

A.

This question requires us to determine whether the time a person spends in prison awaiting the resolution of his status pursuant to the Adam Walsh Act affects the date on which his supervised release begins, as determined by 18 U.S.C. § 3624. Under § 3624, a defendant's “term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). Ordinarily, the BOP releases a prisoner from confinement upon the expiration of his criminal sentence. See id. § 3624(a). But under certain conditions, a defendant's release from confinement will be stayed for some time beyond that date. In particular, under § 4248(a) of the Adam Walsh Act, the Government's certification of a prisoner as a “sexually dangerous person ... stay[s] [his] release” pending the outcome of a civil-commitment proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a). A prisoner so confined remains in BOP custody until a district court determines whether he satisfies the requirements for civil commitment. Id.

There is no dispute that Neuhauser remained confined pursuant to § 4248 beyond the expiration of his prison sentence. The question is whether his confinement beyond his scheduled release date qualifies as “imprisonment” under § 3624. Neuhauser stresses that from June 2007 onward, he was held in civil detention pending the outcome of a hearing. This was not imprisonment, he argues, because the term “imprisonment” refers only to incarceration imposed as a punishment for a crime. In view of the fact that § 4248 is not punitive in nature, see Timms, 664 F.3d at 456, he maintains that his Adam Walsh Act confinement lacked the requisite indicia of punishment to count as “imprisonment” under § 3624.

Like any issue of statutory interpretation, we begin our analysis with the statute's plain text. Broughman v. Carver, 624 F.3d 670, 675 (4th Cir.2010). The ordinary meaning of “imprisonment” evinces no necessary link to criminal punishment. On the contrary, to “imprison” someone is simply to “put [a person] in prison.” Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 572 (1979). As Judge Chasanow has recently noted, numerous dictionaries confirm that the term “imprisonment” “focuses on the nature of ... confinement,” not the reason for its imposition. Tobey v. United States, 794 F.Supp.2d 594, 598 (D.Md.2011) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (2009) (defining “imprisonment” as the state of being confined; a period of confinement”); Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed.1989) (defining “imprisonment” as “detention in a prison or place of confinement; close or irksome confinement”)). Indeed, in other legal contexts, the term “imprisonment” describes something other than a defendant's service of a criminal sentence. See18 U.S.C. § 3041 (permitting imprisonment before trial).3 Thus, we find no support for Neuhauser's argument in the text of § 3624.

Nor does the structure of the statute assist Neuhauser. Section 3624 contains two provisions regulating supervised release: a provision regulating when supervised release begins and another regulating when supervised release is tolled. See18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). According to the statute, a term of release begins when a person is “released from imprisonment,” while a term of release is tolled when a person “is imprisoned in connection with a conviction. Id. (emphasis added). The distinction between “imprisonment,” on the one hand, and “imprisonment in connection with a conviction,” on the other, belies Neuhauser's suggestion that “imprisonment” must involve a conviction. If Neuhauser were correct, and “imprisonment”necessarily related to punishment, there would be no need for Congress to qualify the term “imprisonment” in the statute's tolling provision. Under Neuhauser's definition, “imprisonment” would always be “in connection with a conviction,” and the inclusion of that phrase in the tolling provision would be entirely unnecessary. To avoid an interpretation of the statute that would “render [its] terms meaningless or superfluous,” the word “imprisonment” must mean something broader than detention “in connection with a conviction.” See Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132, 139 (4th Cir.2003).

Finally, we note that only a broad definition of “imprisonment” comports with the purpose of § 3624. As we explained in United States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 451 (4th Cir.2011), [t]he congressional policy in providing for a term of supervised release after incarceration is to improve the odds of a successful transition from the prison to liberty.” See also id. (“Supervised release ... is a unique method of post-confinement supervision that fulfills rehabilitative ends distinct from...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • United States v. Surratt
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • July 31, 2015
    ......We must examine the text of the savings clause to decide whether the statute can afford Surratt any relief. See United States v. Neuhauser, 745 F.3d 125, 128 (4th Cir.2014) (starting with the text in a question of statutory interpretation). The parties principally discuss whether ......
  • United States v. Surratt, 14-6851
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • July 31, 2015
    ...must examine the text of the savings clause to decide whether the statute can afford Surratt any relief. See United States v. Neuhauser, 745 F.3d 125, 128 (4th Cir. 2014) (starting with the text in a question of statutory interpretation). The parties principally discuss whether Surratt's ca......
  • Stinnie v. Holcomb, CASE NO. 3:16-cv-00044
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Western District of Virginia)
    • March 13, 2017
    ...principle of statutory interpretation is that the examination of a law must begin with its text. See United States v. Neuhauser, 745 F.3d 125, 128 (4th Cir. 2014). The analysis often concludes there too: "When the text of the statute is clear, our interpretive inquiry ends." Fogerty v. Fant......
  • United States v. Maranda, 13–3917.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • July 31, 2014
    ...of his Adam Walsh Act proceedings. We therefore join two of the three circuits to have addressed this question, see United States v. Neuhauser, 745 F.3d 125 (4th Cir.2014), petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 22, 2014) (No. 14–5372); United States v. Mosby, 719 F.3d 925 (8th Cir.2013), cert......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT