United States v. New York Cent Co Same v. Nevada County Narrow Gauge Co 21 25, 1929
| Citation | 49 S.Ct. 260,279 U.S. 73,73 L.Ed. 619 |
| Decision Date | 11 March 1929 |
| Docket Number | 304,Nos. 238,s. 238 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. NEW YORK CENT. R. CO. SAME v. NEVADA COUNTY NARROW GAUGE R. CO. Argued Feb. 21-25, 1929 |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
The Attorney General, Mr. William D. Mitchell, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D. C., and Mr. Robert P. Reeder, Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen., for the United States.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 74-75 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Frederick H. Wood, of New York City, George H. Fernald, Jr., of Boston, Mass., Ben B. Cain, of Washington, D. C., and Clarence M. Oddie, of San Francisco, Cal., for respondents.
On February 25, 1921, and June 30, 1921, the respondent railroads respectively filed applications with the Interstate Commerce Commission for a readjustment of the compensation for services in carrying the mails rendered by them, from dates before the applications and for the future. The Commission at first expressed an opinion that it had 'authority to establish rates only for the future' but made orders establishing rates as fair and reasonable after the date of the orders. On further hearings however it made new orders establishing the same rates as fair and reasonable for the times between the filing of the applications and the orders previously made. In re Railway Mail Pay, 85 I. C. C. 157; Id., 95 I. C. C. 493. See Id., 144 I. C. C. 675. The railroads applied to the Postmaster General for payment as ordered by the Commission, but their applications were refused. Thereupon they sued in the Court of Claims and got judgments for compensation computed according to the last orders of the Commission. New York Cent. R. R. Co. v. U. S., 65 Ct. Cl. 115; Nevada County Narrow Gauge R. R. Co. v. U. S., 65 Ct. Cl. 327. The United States asked and obtained a writ of certiorari from this Court.
The ground taken by the United States is that the Interstate Commerce Commission had been given no authority to change the rates of payment to be received by the railroads for any time before its orders went into effect. The question is one of construction which requires consideration not of a few words only but of the whole Act of Congress concerned. This is the Act of July 28, 1916, c. 261, § 5, 39 Stat. 412, 425-431 () which made a great change in the relations between the railroads and the Government. Before that time the carriage of the mails by the railroads had been regarded as voluntary, New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 123, 127, 40 S. Ct. 67, 64 L. Ed. 182, now the service is required (Code, tit. 39, § 541 (39 USCA § 541)); refusal is punished by a fine of $1,000 a day (Code, tit. 39, § 563 (39 USCA § 563)), and the nature of the services to be rendered is described by the statute in great detail. Naturally, to save its constitutionality there is coupled with the requirement to transport a provision that the railroads shall receive reasonable compensation. The words are 'All railway common carriers are hereby required to transport such mail matter as may be offered for transportation by the United States in the manner, under the conditions, and with the service prescribed by the Postmaster General and shall be entitled to receive fair and reasonable compensation for such transportation and for the service connected therewith.' 39 USCA § 541. The Government admits, as it must, that reasonable compensation for such required services is a constitutional right. So far as the Government has waived its immunity from suit this right may be enforced in the absence of other remedies not only by injunction against further interference with it but by an action to recover compensation already due. Accordingly ...
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