United States v. Newton

Decision Date29 November 2021
Docket Number17 CR 455-3
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ANGELITA NEWTON, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Virginia M. Kendall, United States District Judge

Defendant Angelita Newton was charged by Superseding Indictment with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (“Count One”). (Dkt. 147). Following a five-day trial, a jury convicted Newton. (Dkt. 186). Newton has filed a Motion for Judgement of Acquittal and Motion for a New Trial. (Dkt 243). For the reasons explained below, Newton's motion [243] is denied. The jury's verdict stands.

BACKGROUND

Newton is a former employee of Care Specialists, Inc. (“Care Specialists”), a home health agency operated by Mr Ferdinand Echavia and Mrs. Maria Luis Echavia. (E.g., Trial Tr. at 271:11-13 (noting Mr Echavia's ownership of Care Specialists), 279:11-19 (noting transfer of ownership to Mrs. Echavia); see also Id. at 468:19-21 (witness explaining that Care Specialists is a “home health agency that provides services to patients at home)). Newton worked at Care Specialists between about 2011 and 2017 as both a secretary to Mr. Echavia and a quality assurance employee (or “QA”). (E.g., id. at 7:11-13, 570:14-19). While QAs were generally responsible for reviewing nurses' patient visit notes for completeness and accuracy alone, (id. at 385:8-19), Newton's role also notably included drafting Mr. Echavia's visit notes, (id. at 570:14-571:2).

In December 2019, Newton and the Echavias were charged by Superseding Indictment with conspiracy to commit health care fraud and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. (See generally Dkt. 147). The Government alleged that over many years, the defendants (1) submitted claims to Medicare for home health care services that were medically unnecessary or never provided at all; (2) concealed the submission of such false and fraudulent claims to Medicare; (3) paid kickbacks to patients for their participation in this scheme; and (4) diverted the resulting proceeds for their personal use and benefit. (Id. at 5). The Echavias both pled guilty to the Superseding Indictment. (See Dkts. 173, 175). Newton proceeded to trial on February 10, 2020. (Dkt. 178).

At Newton's trial, the jury heard from a variety of witnesses during the Government's case: (1) Bambi Molyneux, an expert witness on Medicare regulations and policies for home health services; (2) Reginald Onate, the government's cooperating witness who previously worked as a nurse at Care Specialists; (3) several individuals who Care Specialists falsely claimed as patients to Medicare, and who received kickbacks from Mr. Echavia - including Joseph Davis, Michael Maiden, Melvin Meeks, and Curtis Williams; (4) Fia Rivera, who worked as a biller at Care Specialists; (5) Melanie Onal, who worked as a QA for Care Specialists; (6) Michelle Santos, another former Care Specialists QA; (7) Anthony Demata, a previous Care Specialists employee who worked off jobs around the office; and (8) Special Agent Loan Bermudez, who aided in the Government's investigation of this case. (See generally Dkt. 243 at 4-9). The Government presented extensive evidence of the conspiracy at Care Specialists to inflate Medicare payouts by, for example, misrepresenting patients' conditions and the medical care they received.

(See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 373:10-374:19). The Government adduced evidence showing that the defendants also manufactured medical records to conceal the fraudulent nature of their Medicare claims. (E.g., id. at 493:20-494:23). Several witnesses implicated Newton in the charged conspiracy. For example, testimony showed that Newton often wrote Mr. Echavia's patient visit notes that would ultimately be used in support of the false Medicare claims. (E.g., id. at 479:3-9; see also Id. at 651:25-562:5 (witness noting that it was standard practice for QAs to write patient visit notes)). Testimony also revealed that Mr. Echavia provided Newton with barebones outlines for these patient visit notes. His notes merely listed basic vital signs which Newton would transform into detailed, “head-to-toe” assessments of patient health. (Id. at 657:18-660:7; see also Id. at 650:23-651:21 (witness explaining that such “head-to-toe” assessments included descriptions of a patient's “pain, their gastrointestinal assessments, respiratory, musculoskeletal, cardiovascular, joint pain, nutrition, endocrine, [and] emotional” health, as well as the treating nurse's “nursing interventions, instructions, and teachings”)). The Government argued that Newton thus agreed to “make up content for [Mr. Echavia] without having seen the patient.” (Id. at 755:3-756:6). In addition, the Government produced a recorded custodial interview of Newton in which she claimed that she never wrote patient notes for Mr. Echavia - a claim overwhelmingly controverted by the trial record. (Id. at 766:11-769:1).

Newton exercised her right not testify in her defense. (Trial Tr. 797:3-5). She initially planned to present the testimony of Norma Bolender, a former QA at Care Specialists. (See Dkt. 243 at 3). However, Bolender invoked the Fifth Amendment prior to taking the stand. (Trial Tr. 591:24-592:2). The defense ultimately called no witnesses at trial. (See Id. at 742:11-12).

On February 14, 2020, after five days of trial, a jury convicted Newton of one count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud and wire fraud. (Dkt. 186). Newton has now briefed Rule 29 and Rule 33 motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial. (See Dkt. 243). Newton argues that the evidence was insufficient for a rational jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she was aware of and agreed to participate in the conspiracy at Care Specialists. (See, e.g., id. at 31). She also alleges various errors throughout the trial that, she argues, warrant a new trial should the Court consider the government's evidence sufficient under the Rule 29 standard. (Id. at 10, 36-38).

DISCUSSION
I. Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a) provides that [a]fter the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” See United States v. Kohli, 847 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir. 2017). A court will overturn the jury's verdict only if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the record is devoid of evidence from which a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Wrobel, 841 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Campbell, 770 F.3d 556, 571-72 (7th Cir. 2014)); see also United States v. Kruse, 606 F.3d 404, 408 n.1 (7th Cir. 2010) ([W]e shall affirm if the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the Government, is sufficient to prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”); United States v. Presbitero, 569 F.3d 691, 704 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining same); but see United States v. Wilson, 879 F.3d 795, 802 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that, for this inquiry, the court examines the evidence as a whole, including that presented by the defendant). In other words, a court will “set aside a jury's guilty verdict only if ‘the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed,' from which a jury could have returned a conviction.” Presbitero, 569 F.3d at 704 (quoting United States v. Moses, 513 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2008)). See also United States v. Shorter, 874 F.3d 969, 977 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Bek, 493 F.3d 790, 798 (7th Cir. 2007)) (same).

“In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, [a defendant] bears a heavy, indeed, nearly insurmountable, burden.” United States v. Warren, 593 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see also United States v. LeBeau, 949 F.3d 334, 346 (7th Cir. 2020); cf. United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336, 339-40 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that “the height of the hurdle depends directly on the strength of the government's evidence”). In other words, a defendant faces an uphill battle in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Orlando, 819 F.3d 1016, 1021 (7th Cir. 2016). It follows that under Rule 29, courts “do not reassess the weight of the evidence or second-guess the trier of fact's credibility determinations.” United States v. Arthur, 582 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Severson, 569 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2009). Instead, [s]orting the facts and inferences is a task for the jury.” Warren, 593 F.3d at 547. [A] verdict may be rational even if it relies solely on circumstantial evidence.” Kruse, 606 F.3d at 408 (citing Warren, 593 F.3d at 547); see also, e.g., United States v. Freed, No. 13-cr-951, 2016 WL 6618517, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2016) (“The Government may prove intent to defraud using circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from the scheme itself.”).

B. Discussion

Count One of the Superseding Indictment charged Newton with conspiring to commit health care and wire fraud with the Echavias and an unnamed co-conspirator in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. (Dkt. 147). To convict a defendant of conspiracy, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “knowingly and intentionally joined in an agreement with one or more other individuals to commit an unlawful act.” Orlando, 819 F.3d at 1022 (quoting United States v. Avila, 557 F.3d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, the government had to show that Newton knew the essential nature and scope of the charged conspiracy and...

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