United States v. Njoku

Decision Date02 December 2013
Docket NumberNo. 12–20095.,12–20095.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Caroline NJOKU; Mary Ellis; Terrie Porter; Ezinne Ubani, Defendants–Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Nina Goodman, Ellen R. Meltzer, Esq., Special Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Gregory Don Sherwood, Esq., Law Office of Gregory Sherwood, Austin, TX, Sarah Eilers Coble, Lauren Elizabeth Tanner, Stephen Gillham Tipps, Esq., Baker Botts, L.L.P., Kate Elizabeth Hill, Sidley Austin, L.L.P., Vivian King, Esq., Sesha Kalapatapu, Carmen Roe, Esq., Houston, TX, Andrew J. Williams, Kingwood, TX, for DefendantsAppellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

LESLIE H. SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judge:

The defendants were convicted on numerous counts related to their involvement in schemes to commit health care fraud, receive or pay healthcare kickbacks, and/or make false statements for use in determining rights for benefit and payment by Medicare. Caroline Njoku, Terrie Porter, and Mary Ellis appeal their convictions on grounds of insufficient evidence. Njoku also argues the sentences she received on two counts were multiplicitous and the oral pronouncement of her sentence conflicts with the written judgment. Ellis contends that she was twice put in jeopardy because of a previous acquittal and that collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of certain issues. Ellis further brings an evidentiary challenge involving rules of hearsay and relevancy, as well her right to present a defense. Ellis also argues her sentence resulted from an improper enhancement. Ezinne Ubani appeals her sentence based on the application of two enhancement provisions.

We REMAND for the district court to amend Njoku's written judgment to conform to her oral sentence. We AFFIRM in all other respects.

BACKGROUND

On October 7, 2010, Njoku, Porter, Ellis, Ubani, and other co-defendants who are not parties in this appeal were indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Njoku, Ellis, and Ubani were each charged with one count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349. Njoku, Porter, and Ellis were each charged with one count of conspiracy to receive or pay health care kickbacks under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Njoku and Porter were charged on one count and Ellis on three counts of receipt or payment of kickbacks in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Ellis and Ubani were charged with two counts each of making false statements for use in determining rights for benefit and payment by Medicare under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

There was evidence that articles of incorporation were filed on November 1, 2004 for a company named Family Healthcare Group, Inc., which would do business in Houston, Texas. The document listed Clifford Ubani, Princewill Njoku, and Ezinne Ubani as directors.1 The company submitted a Medicare provider application in May 2005, which was approved in early 2006. The document listed Clifford Ubani and Princewill Njoku as co-owners; Ezinne Ubani was listed as a director/officer.

An authorized Medicare provider may bill Medicare for covered services provided to eligible beneficiaries. Family Healthcare provided home health care to individuals by use of skilled nurses. To qualify for such services under Medicare regulations, the patient must be homebound, under a doctor's care, and require skilled nursing. A claims analyst who reviewed medical records for Medicare fraud testified that “homebound” meant that it was generally taxing for the patient to leave home. In the analyst's nine years of experience, the referral source for such care was the patient's primary care physician.

The analyst further explained that in order to initiate such care, a registered nurse (“RN”) was required to meet with the patient and complete an Outcome Assessment Information Set (“OASIS”). The questionnaire helped identify the patient's ability to function in daily living and would be used in part to determine whether the patient was homebound. Information from the OASIS would be entered into a computer program, which would produce a “plan of care.” The same nurse who completed the OASIS was required to sign the plan of care. The plan would then be submitted to the referring physician to certify and sign.

If approved by the physician, a period of care lasted 60 days for purposes of Medicare regulations. A licensed vocational nurse (“LVN”) provided the skilled nursing in the patient's home. The law required LVNs to keep nursing notes to document their visits and prove the care given. Additionally, these notes could provide a log of medication and patient conditions for future use. Agent Harshaw, a special agent charged with the investigation of criminal violations of the health care fraud laws, testified that Medicare required the nursing notes be preserved for auditing purposes.

The analyst explained that such services were not intended to be continuous. Nurses would instruct the patient or a caregiver on how to provide the needed care without a nurse's assistance. If a patient continued to need skilled nursing after the initial period, recertification for 60 more days was available. During the last five days of the first period, an RN would be required to visit and reassess the patient. This recertification process required the completion of a second, condensed OASIS. Agent Harshaw testified that an RN would partly rely on the LVN's nursing notes to complete the recertification evaluation. Adelma Sevilla, an RN who worked for Family Healthcare, testified that she reviewed nursing notes during this process. Once the recertification OASIS was complete, a new plan of care would be prepared, signed by the RN, and submitted to a physician for signed approval. The physician's approval generally involved the physician personally visiting the patient.

Medicare would reimburse service providers in bifurcated installments. The first was a payment of 60 percent of the claim after the initial billing. Medicare did not necessarily receive a patient's OASIS or plan of care at that time but instead relied on the service provider's representation subject to future inspections via audit. The remaining portion of the claim was paid once a sufficient number of skilled nursing visits were made. The indictment stated that Family Healthcare was paid approximately $5.2 million for home health care services between April 2006 and August 2009. We describe in more detail below each individual's role. For now, we provide a general overview.

Njoku and Ellis worked as LVNs who provided skilled nursing care to patients. Ellis also referred Medicare beneficiaries to Family Healthcare. Porter also referred Medicare beneficiaries. Ubani worked as an RN who completed OASIS questionnaires and signed plans of care. At times, Family Healthcare used specific physicians to certify the plans of care.

Evidence at trial showed that Family Healthcare billed Medicare for services to beneficiaries who were ineligible for home health care because they were either not homebound or not in need of skilled nursing. RNs would sign OASIS questionnaires both on initial assessments and during recertifications without visiting the patients. Skilled nursing services were allegedly inadequate and misrepresented in the documented nursing notes. At least one physician was paid to authorize plans of care despite not having examined the patients. Recruiters were paid kickbacks to refer Medicare beneficiaries in order to accumulate additional patients.

After an eleven day trial, the jury found Njoku, Ellis, and Ubani guilty of conspiracy to commit health care fraud in Count 1. Njoku, Porter, and Ellis were found guilty of conspiracy to receive or pay health care kickbacks in Count 2. The jury found Njoku not guilty of receipt or payment of health care kickbacks in Count 12. Porter was found guilty of receipt or payment of health care kickbacks in Count 17. Ellis was found guilty of receipt or payment of health care kickbacks in Counts 3, 4, and 5. Finally, the jury found Ellis and Ubani guilty of making false statements for use in determining rights for benefit and payment by Medicare in Counts 20 and 21.

The district court announced Njoku's sentence as 63 months on Count 1 and 60 months on Count 2, to run concurrently.2 Porter was sentenced to 24 months on Counts 2 and 17 to run concurrently. The court sentenced Ellis to 63 months on Count 1 and 60 months on Counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 20, and 21 to run concurrently. Ubani was sentenced to 97 months on Count 1 and 60 months on Counts 20 and 21 to run concurrently. These defendants appealed.

DISCUSSION

Njoku, Ellis, and Porter challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on some of the counts. Njoku, Ellis, and Ubani raise arguments as to their sentences. Ellis raises a variety of other issues. We address each issue in turn.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review the defendants' “preserved challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo.” United States v. Grant, 683 F.3d 639, 642 (5th Cir.2012). We view both circumstantial and direct evidence “in the light most favorable to the government, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices to be made in support of the jury's verdict.” Id. In doing so, we ask “whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

1. Count 1 (Conspiracy to Commit Health Care Fraud)

A conspiracy to commit health care fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1347 requires that the fraud be the object of the conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. § 1349. The conspirators must “knowingly and willfully” execute a scheme “to defraud any healthcare benefit program” or “to obtain, [through false pretenses] any of the money or property owned by...

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