United States v. Olivas
| Decision Date | 17 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-MJ-2051-MAT |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. HECTOR ALFREDO OLIVAS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Defendant Hector Olivas (“Defendant”) was charged in September 2021 with Possession with Intent to Distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl. He was evaluated by a psychologist and found not competent by this Court in February 2022. On March 3, 2022, the Court ordered his transportation to a suitable facility within the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), for a period not to exceed four months, to determine whether his competency could be restored. As of October 2022, he had not been transported a delay of nearly eight months. On September 28, 2022 Defendant moved to dismiss his case, asserting that the length of his delayed transportation violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Government responded, arguing that there was no speedy trial violation. The Court finds that the Defendant's right to a speedy trial pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, was violated and DISMISSES the criminal complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
On September 17, 2021, Defendant was charged with possessing with intent to distribute 3.2 kilograms of methamphetamine and 0.3 kilograms of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. (ECF No. 1, p. 1-2). On October 19, 2021, Defendant moved for a psychiatric examination to determine whether he was competent to stand trial, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241. (ECF No. 11). The resulting report, by Dr. Cynthia Rivera, found Defendant to be competent. (ECF No. 15). However, at a Mental Competency Hearing held after Dr. Rivera's report was submitted to the Court, (ECF No. 18), the parties agreed to have an additional examination performed by a different mental health expert, which the Court then ordered. (ECF No. 17).[1] On February 7, 2022, this subsequent examination was performed by Dr. James Schutte, who determined that Defendant was not competent. (ECF Nos. 23, 26). As required by statute, after a February 24, 2022 hearing, the Court on March 3, 2022 ordered Defendant to be committed to the custody of the Attorney General to be transferred to a suitable facility for “a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four (4) months” to determine whether there was a “a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future Defendant [would] attain the capacity to permit the trial to proceed.” (ECF No. 27, p. 1, 3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)).[2]
On September 28, 2022, Defendant filed his Motion to Dismiss asking the Court to dismiss the Criminal Complaint on due process and speedy trial grounds, noting that the Defendant had not been transferred since the Court's March 3 Order, a delay of over six months at the time of the Motion's filing. (ECF No. 39). The Government responded and submitted a declaration from Dr. Dia Boutwell, Forensic Evaluation Coordinator for the BOP, which details the purported reasons for the delays experienced by Defendant and similarly situated individuals waiting for court-ordered evaluation and competency restoration treatment. (ECF No. 43). In explaining the causes of the delays, the Declaration focuses on the small number of BOP facilities capable of providing competency restoration services, the staffing and bed space issues that they are experiencing, and the increased need for the services “over the years.” Id. ¶4. The Declaration also alludes to certain “pipeline”-disrupting events that can further extend the delays. Id. ¶5. The Court held a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss on October 18, 2022. (ECF No. 44).[3]
Defendant was in the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service, awaiting transfer to competency restoration services, from March 3, 2022 until October 19, 2022, the date of the Court's Order dismissing the Criminal Complaint.[4] (ECF No. 27, Text Order dated Oct. 19, 2022). Defendant was never indicted in this case. (ECF No. 39, p. 1). The parties agreed to waive the time limit to indict under the Speedy Trial Act on three occasions (ECF No. 42, p. 2 n.1); only the third was filed with the Court, on February 8, 2022. (ECF No. 22). The last of these agreed waivers expired on April 17, 2022. (ECF No. 39, p. 7 n.3).
The Court granted the Motion and dismissed the Criminal Complaint in a Text Order on October 19, 2022, in which it indicated that a written opinion would follow. (Text Order dated Oct. 19, 2022). Thus, for Speedy Trial Act purposes, the delay at issue in this case is the 185 days between the expiration of Defendant's final stipulated waiver and the Order of Dismissal.[5]
Defendant's Motion argues that the Criminal Complaint should be dismissed because his delayed transfer to competency restoration services violated his constitutional rights to due process and a speedy trial. More specifically, he asks this Court to adopt the recent Ninth Circuit holding in United States v. Donnelly, 41 F. 4th 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2022) and construe any delay in transportation to competency restoration treatment that lasts longer than the maximum four-month time period allowed for the treatment itself to be a violation of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Alternatively, Defendant argues that the case should be dismissed pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, which provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). Additionally, he argues that dismissal for a speedy trial violation is appropriate under the common law test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b).
In response, the Government argues first that no statutory violation of § 4241(d) has occurred, as the four-month limitation for hospitalization under that subsection begins only when a defendant begins his hospitalization. The Government also contends that there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act, as the law excludes from the speedy trial calculation any period of time spent transporting a defendant to a court-ordered examination or hospitalization. In the alternative, the Government argues that the causes of the delay in Defendant's transportation were “reasonable” and should therefore be excluded from the calculation even if the Court decides to apply the presumption of unreasonableness for delays in transportation beyond ten days that is set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F). Finally, the Government disputes that the Court should find a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial under either the common law test set out in Barker or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b).
As an initial matter, the Court addresses Defendant's claim that the Government violated the Speedy Trial Act by not indicting Defendant within thirty days of April 17, 2022, the expiration of the parties' final stipulated waiver of time to indict.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Speedy Trial Act gives effect to this right by setting deadlines within which defendants must be indicted after arrest, and within which they must be brought to trial after indictment. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b-c). Among these deadlines is the requirement that the government must indict a defendant within thirty days of their arrest or service of summons. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). However, at § 3161(h), the Speedy Trial Act provides that certain periods of time are “excludable” for purposes of determining whether the government violated the time limits in the Act. At issue in this case are two of these provisions that potentially exclude certain periods of time relating to delayed transportations to court-ordered examinations:
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). While § 3161(h)(1)(A) is a broader provision excluding from the speedy trial calculation any amount of time related to determinations of mental or physical capacity of the defendant, § 3161(h)(1)(F) presents a stricter, seemingly less flexible exclusion of time wherein the first ten days of a delay are excludable, but any additional delay is presumed unreasonable. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F).
The apparent applicability of both the more general § 3161(h)(1)(A) and the more timespecific § 3161(h)(1)(F) to delays in transportation of defendants to court-ordered examinations or hospitalizations presents a conflict on which the circuits are split. Compare United States v Williams, 917 F.3d 195, 201-03 (3d Cir. 2019) (), with United States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1990) (...
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