United States v. Oliver, CASE NO. 3:09-CR-00144-R
| Decision Date | 05 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:09-CR-00144-R |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF v. ISIAH THOMAS OLIVER DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
Before the Court is Defendant Isiah Thomas Oliver's ("Oliver") motion to suppress (DN 17). On March 19, 2012, a suppression hearing was held in Louisville, Kentucky. Robert Bonar, AUSA, appeared on behalf of the Government. Patrick J. Bouldin appeared on behalf of Oliver. Alan W. Wernecke, official court reporter, recorded the proceedings.
The Government introduced the testimony of Officer William Pearson III ("Pearson") of the Louisville Metro Police Department ("LPD"). He was the only witness to testify. Subsequent to the hearing, the Government and Oliver submitted briefs on the relevant legal issues (DN 23; DN 24). This motion is now ripe for adjudication. Having considered the testimony, the arguments by the attorneys, and the parties' briefs, the Court makes its ruling below.
BACKGROUND
Oliver is charged with being a felon in possession of a handgun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He moves to suppress a handgun found during the search of Marchelle Woodson's vehicle on October 24, 2008, as well as statements he made to police during the search. Oliver argues that exclusion of this evidence is necessary because the police violated the Fourth Amendment when they seized him without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and searched Woodson's car without knowing and voluntary consent.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. On October 24, 2008, Detective Michael Brackett of the Louisville Police Department's Airport Interdiction Unit contacted Pearson with a tip he had received. Hearing Transcript ("HT"), DN 18 p. 4, 8, 15. A confidential informant had contacted Brackett and told him that an African-American man named "Sonny" was in possession of four or five ounces of heroin and dealing it from apartment #15 at 1361 South Floyd Street in Louisville ("Apartment"). HT, DN 18 p. 4, 8, 15. Brackett told Pearson that the tip came from someone he had worked with previously but did not offer any specifics on how the informant acquired the knowledge or whether the informant had a reliable track record. HT, DN 18 p. 16. Despite Pearson's unfamiliarity with the informant, he acknowledged that Brackett had provided "sound" information in the past and was a trustworthy officer. HT, DN 18 p. 16. Pearson agreed to look into it.
Immediately after his conversation with Brackett, Pearson started to investigate the Apartment's address on the LPD's computer system. HT, DN 18 p. 4, 7, 15-16. He found information on the address and people linked to the Apartment, including an individual named "Willie Mitchell." HT, DN 18 p. 9. This is an alias that Oliver occasionally uses. The entry in the system included a mug shot of Oliver, which Pearson printed out. HT, DN 18 p. 9. Although Oliver's mug shot was in the system and the indictment shows he has an arrest record, Pearson did not articulate at the hearing what criminal offenses he knew Oliver had committed before their encounter.
After completing his search, Pearson traveled to the Apartment with several other officers to set up surveillance. Pearson and Detective Jimmy Adams took up a position across the street in an unmarked police cruiser. From their vantage point, they could observe the Apartment'sentrance. Two other officers waited in an unmarked police cruiser down the street to provide assistance if it became necessary.
After watching the building for thirty to forty minutes, an African American man and woman emerged from the Apartment. HT, DN 18 p. 16. The woman was carrying an infant and the man was carrying a large baby bag. The couple descended the stairs from the residence and started to toward a Pontiac Grand Prix parked nearby. Pearson and Adams exited their vehicle and approached the man and woman with the intention of asking for consent to search the Pontiac and apartment. Pearson did not recognize the man as Oliver from across the street, but as he drew closer, Pearson could tell the suspect resembled Oliver's photograph. HT, DN 18 p. 4, 8, 18-19. By the time Pearson and Adams reached the couple, they were in the Pontiac preparing to drive away. Pearson radioed the other officers to pull around and park in front of the Pontiac to prevent the couple from leaving the area. The other cruiser moved into position with its blue lights activated. HT, DN 18 p. 5, 6, 20-21.
With the other police cruiser blocking the middle of the road, Pearson and Adams began to speak with the man and woman. HT, DN 18 p. 10-11, 22-24. The woman, Marchelle Woodson, was in the driver's seat, Oliver was in the passenger seat, and the infant was in the backseat. Adams asked Oliver to step out of the vehicle and to speak with him on the sidewalk. HT, DN 18 p. 24. Oliver obliged without incident. Concurrently, Pearson spoke with Woodson, informed her of the investigation, and asked for consent to search the Pontiac and the Apartment. After a five-to-ten-minute discussion, Woodson assented to the request and signed a "Consent to Search" form. Oliver was not asked for consent to the search the vehicle or the Apartment.
Pearson began his search of the Pontiac at the trunk. After a few moments of examining its contents, Pearson found a pistol. HT, DN 18 p. 12-13. This discovery prompted Pearson totell Adams that he had located a weapon. Adams was still speaking with Oliver on the sidewalk roughly ten feet away. HT, DN 18 p. 12-13. Pearson testified that though the comment was directed to Adams, Oliver responded with "She doesn't know anything about that; it's mine." HT, DN 18 p. 12-13. The officers then placed Oliver in handcuffs for safety purposes but did not arrest him. After he was restrained, the officers did not question him. Sometime later, the officers ran the serial numbers on the pistol and learned it was stolen.
DISCUSSION
The Court analyzes three aspects of the parties' arguments to determine the propriety of this motion: (1) if Oliver has standing to challenge the search of the vehicle, (2) whether Oliver's encounter with the police was consensual, and (3) if the seizure was non-consensual, was it supported by reasonable suspicion? Each is discussed in turn below.
The Fourth Amendment was established to protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). "[It] protects people, not places, and provides sanctuary for citizens wherever they have a legitimate expectation of privacy." Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96 n. 5 (1990) (citation omitted). "[The] capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). It is axiomatic that the defendant bears the burden to show a privacy interest in the place searched. United States v. Whitehead, 415 F.3d 583, 587 (6th Cir. 2005).
Passengers in vehicles generally do not have an expectation of privacy in a vehicle and, as a result, are without standing to challenge the vehicle's search. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49; United States v. Torres-Ramos, 536 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, a passenger in a vehicle may challenge the constitutionality of a detention and move to suppress the evidentiary fruits of the detention. United States v. Ellis, 497 F.3d 606, 612 (6th Cir. 2007) .
In United States v. Ellis, 497 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2007), the Sixth Circuit found that a passenger in a vehicle could not challenge the driver's consent to search that vehicle. Following a traffic stop, the police officer separated the driver from the passenger and spoke privately with the driver. Id. at 612. The officer asked the driver for permission to search the vehicle and was granted consent. Id. In the subsequent search, the officers discovered a quantity of cocaine. Id. The appeals court upheld the district court's decision that while the passenger had no standing to challenge the driver's consent to the search, he could contest the constitutionality of the traffic stop and the evidence that "flowed from the search and seizure." Id.
Oliver's circumstances are sufficiently similar. No evidence was offered to show Oliver had a property or possessory interest in the Pontiac. It is therefore doubtful that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in its trunk. Accordingly, he may not challenge whether the officers breached protocol when they obtained consent from Woodson to search the vehicle. Rather, his only avenue to contest the search is to challenge the constitutionality of his stop and seizure while inside the Pontiac.
Besides unreasonable searches of places, the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unlawful seizures. A seizure occurs where an officer "by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968). "A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government's action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, 'by means of physical force or show of authority,' terminates or restrains his freedom of movement 'through means intentionally applied.'" Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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