United States v. Olson

• Decision Date: 01 November 1917
• Docket Number: 3785.
• Citation: 253 F. 233
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. OLSON. SAME v. SURANSKY.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

253 F. 233

UNITED STATES v. OLSON.

SAME v. SURANSKY.

No. 3785.

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Northern Division.

November, 1917

Clay Allen, U.S. Atty., and Ben. L. Moore, Asst. U.S. Atty., both of Seattle, Wash.

Mark M Litchman, of Seattle, Wash., for defendant Olson.

Jacob Kalina, of Seattle, Wash., for defendant Suransky.

NETERER District Judge.

Indictments were returned against each of the above-named defendants in three counts: First, charging that defendant refused to present himself for registration, being within the ages of 21 and 31 years; second, charging that defendant 'did willfully * * * fail * * * to present himself for registration and submit thereto as provided in the said act * * * '; and, third, charging that the defendant 'did willfully * * * fail * * * to perform a duty required of him * * * in the execution of said act,' by failing to exhibit his registration certificate when called upon by a police officer. Demurrers were filed to each count in the indictment: First, 'that they do not state facts sufficient to constitute a crime;' second 'that the act is unconstitutional, contrary to the Constitution and Amendments 1, 2, 5, and 13.' With the consent of all parties, the issues thus raised, being the same in both cases, were submitted together.

The technical objection raised in argument that the indictment is faulty, because the President's proclamation provided for in Selective Service Act May 18, 1917, c. 15, 40 Stat. 76, is not set out in full in the indictment, is overruled. The statement in the indictment with reference to the proclamation is sufficient to give the defendant all the notice and information required for every purpose.

Nor is the contention that the provisions of the act requiring a person to exhibit his registration card, as charged in count 3, in contravention of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that 'no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. ' This provision is analogous with section 3239, Revised Statutes, Internal Revenue Act, as amended February 27, 1877, c. 69, 19 Stat. 248 (Comp. Stat Sec. 5962), which requires that all persons liable to a special tax ' * * * shall place and keep conspicuously in his establishment or place of business all stamps denoting the payment of said special tax. * * * ' This has long been recognized as within the special of proper legislation. Justice Field, in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366, sustains the doctrine that Congress can undoubtedly prescribe rules for civil conduct to which persons within the jurisdiction must conform. This case, while cited by defendants, cannot afford comfort to them. The issues in that case and this are not analogous. The court, in that case, at pages 379, 380 of 4 Wall. (18 L.Ed. 366), said:

'The Legislature may undoubtedly prescribe the qualifications for the office, to which he must conform, as it may, where it has exclusive jurisdiction, prescribe qualifications for the pursuit of any of the ordinary avocations of life. The question, in this case, is not as to the power of Congress to prescribe qualifications, but whether that power has been exercised as a means for the infliction of punishment, against the prohibition of the Constitution. That this result cannot be effected indirectly by a state under the form of creating qualifications we have held in the case of Cummings v. State of Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 71 U.S. 356 (18 L.Ed. 356), and the reasoning by which that conclusion was reached applies equally to similar action on the part of Congress.'

The issue in Cummings v. Missouri, supra, was whether, under the form of creating a qualification or attaching a condition, a state can in effect inflict punishment for a past act which was not punishable at the time it was committed, and it was held that it could not be done. Again, at page 380 of 4 Wall. (18 L.Ed. 366), the court, in Ex parte Garland, said: 'This view is strengthened by a consideration of the effect of the pardon produced by the petitioner, and the nature of the pardoning power of the President. The Constitution provides that the President 'shall have the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States except in cases of impeachment. * * * ' The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated. It extends to every offense known to law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions. Such being the case, the inquiry arises as to the effect and operation of a pardon, and on this point all the authorities concur. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.'

It will thus be seen that this case has no application.

The next contention, that the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, is unconstitutional, is equally unfounded. The contention that the President has not power to raise and support an army by the selective method cannot be sustained. For the purpose of creating a strong national government, instead of a weak and ineffective confederation of states, the Constitution conferred upon the Congress the power:

'To provide for the common defense and general welfare,' 'to declare war,' 'to raise and support armies,' 'to provide and maintain a navy,' 'to make rules for the government and regulation of land and naval forces,' 'to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by the Congress.'

Article 2, Sec. 2: 'The President shall be commander-in-chief of the army of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States.'

Amendment 5: 'No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service, in time of war or public danger.'

The distinction between the National Army and state militia is pointed out by Attorney General Wickersham, in his opinion of February 17, 1912 (29 Op.Attys.Gen. 322), in which he said:

'When the Constitution gives to Congress the power 'to raise and support armies,' and 'to provide for calling of the militia to execute the laws of the Union, * * * ' and makes the 'President the commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into actual service of the United States,' it is speaking of two different bodies-- the one the Regular Army, in the continuous service of the government, and liable to be called into actual service at any time, or in any place where an armed force is required; and the other a body for domestic service, and liable to be called into the service of the government only upon the particular occasions named in the Constitution.' It is not contended that power to draft an army is expressly withheld, but that it is not expressly conferred. The liability of all inhabitants of the United States to be drafted into military service in time of war, it appears, cannot be questioned. It results from the sovereignty of the nation, and the power conferred upon Congress must carry with it the necessary means of carrying out the power. The validity of the draft acts of the Civil War in the North and the South was contested in the courts and sustained. ^[1]

Nowhere in the Constitution is there a limitation as to the means by which Congress shall raise an army, and, guided by the history of the times, the draft method of raising an army was not foreign to the Constitution makers or the 'fathers of our country.' The General Assembly of Virginia in May, 1777, passed a conscription act which had been drafted by Thomas Jefferson. Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2, page 123 (Ford's edition). In 1777 New York adopted a Constitution which declared:

'It is the duty of every man who enjoys the protection of society to be prepared, and willing, to defend it.'

The Continental Congress, of February 26, 1778:

'Resolved that the several states hereafter named are required forthwith to fill up by drafts from their militia, or any other was that may be effectual, their respective battalions of continental troops, according to...