United States v. One Marmon Automobile, 953.

Decision Date29 April 1925
Docket NumberNo. 953.,953.
Citation5 F.2d 113
PartiesUNITED STATES v. ONE MARMON AUTOMOBILE.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

D. K. Johnston and Chas. G. Reynolds, both of Atlanta, Ga., for claimant.

John W. Henley, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Atlanta, Ga.

SIBLEY, District Judge.

This libel is, by stipulation of the parties, for decision by the court without a jury. I find the material facts to be as follows:

The libeled automobile was sold by the intervening claimant to one Hopkins, a resident of Atlanta, Ga., on credit, with title retained to secure the purchase money by a duly recorded contract; the purchase money being still unpaid. At the time of the sale the seller did not know of any likelihood that the buyer would unlawfully transport liquors with the car. Later it learned that he was reported to be an illicit liquor hauler, and sought to rescind the sale; but the buyer refused. On the morning of the day the car was seized by government officers, who were both deputy collectors of internal revenue and prohibition agents, they saw it in the mountains of Northeast Georgia, in a vicinity where many illicit stills were operated, in charge of Robinson and Hall. Suspecting that it was hauling liquor, they later struck its track and trailed it for two miles, in a direction away from the mountains and toward Atlanta, to the rear of a barn, where it was found abandoned; two unidentified men being seen going away in the distance. The car contained, concealed under a blanket, 52 gallons of white corn whisky, in rectangular, one-gallon cans, with no stamps, marks, or brands whatsoever upon them to show that it had been lawfully bottled under the revenue laws, Act of March 3d, 1897, chap. 379 (Comp. St. §§ 6070-6077), or under the Prohibition Law, tit. 2, § 12 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 10138½f). No tax had ever been paid on the whisky. I infer from the circumstances that the operators of the car had come from Atlanta to the mountains to get a load of whisky from illicit distillers, or their representatives, and to transport it to Atlanta for sale as a beverage; had procured this whisky from a person unknown, had deposited and concealed it in the car, and had probably transported it to the place of seizure all in pursuance of this general intent. All persons concerned knew a tax was due upon the production of the whisky, and that it had not been paid and was not intended to be paid by any one. Their active intent, however, was more taken up with escaping the penalties of the Prohibition Law than with the matter of evading the taxes. It is not shown that the whisky was gotten directly from a distiller who owed the taxes, nor that Robinson and Hall had the evasion of the taxes especially in mind in concealing and removing it in the car, if they were the operators.

Under these facts, is the car forfeited under R. S. § 3450 (Comp. St. § 6352), providing for forfeiture of vehicles used "whenever any goods or commodities for or in respect whereof any tax is or shall be imposed * * * are removed, or are deposited or concealed in any place, with intent to defraud the United States of such tax"? This section is not a liquor law, but applies to all taxed articles. Cognate provisions as to distilled liquors are found in R. S. § 3296 (Comp. St. § 6038), prohibiting the removal of them before the tax is paid to a place other than the distillery warehouse, or the concealment of them when so removed or the removal of them from a warehouse in an unlawful manner, or concealment of them when so removed. There is no specific intent required in this statute, but felony punishments are imposed for the acts denounced. No...

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5 cases
  • United States v. 673 Cases of Distilled Spirits and Wines
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • July 5, 1947
    ...of libel. Jackson v. United States, D.C., 21 F. 35; In re Quantity of Distilled Spirits, Fed.Cas. No. 11494; and United States v. One Marmon Automobile, D.C., 5 F.2d 113, 115. Therefore it is incumbent upon the government in the instant case to affirmatively show that the liquor seized was ......
  • United States v. One Reo Truck
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • October 31, 1938
    ...of any specific intent to defraud, citing U. S. v. One 1935 Model Chevrolet Coupé Automobile, D.C., 14 F.Supp. 680, and U. S. v. One Marmon Automobile, D.C., 5 F.2d 113. But in these cases intent was found and it was stated in U. S. v. One 1935 Model Chevrolet Coupé Automobile, D.C., 14 F.S......
  • Vandevander v. United States, 12339.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • February 1, 1949
    ...but the question is one of fact, and not of law. United States v. One Kissel Automobile, D.C., 289 F. 120; United States v. One Marmon Automobile, D.C., 5 F.2d 113; United States v. One Dodge Coupe, D.C., 34 F.2d 942; United States v. One 1939 Chevrolet Sedan, D.C., 35 F.Supp. 142. Compare ......
  • Busic v. United States, 5354.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • May 10, 1945
    ...D.C., 29 F.2d 424; General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. United States, 8 Cir., 32 F.2d 121. In the case of United States v. One Marmon Automobile, D.C., 5 F.2d 113, 115, the court "* * * The specific intent to defraud may, however, be shown, and generally must be shown by circumstances.......
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