United States v. ONE 1971 FORD TRUCK, SERIAL NO. F25HRJ82180

• Decision Date: 16 August 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 72-1126.
• Citation: 346 F. Supp. 613
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. ONE 1971 FORD TRUCK, SERIAL NO. F25HRJ82180, its tools and appurtenances, and $100.00 in U. S. Currency, Defendants, v. Franklin L. BATES, Claimant.

346 F. Supp. 613

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. ONE 1971 FORD TRUCK, SERIAL NO. F25HRJ82180, its tools and appurtenances, and $100.00 in U. S. Currency, Defendants, v. Franklin L. BATES, Claimant.

Civ. No. 72-1126.

United States District Court, C. D. California.

August 16, 1972.

William D. Keller, U. S. Atty., and Larry L. Dier, Asst. U. S. Atty., for plaintiff.

Franklin L. Bates, in pro. per.

DECISION AND ORDER

HAUK, District Judge.

This action was instituted through the filing of a libel by the United States of America for the forfeiture of a certain 1971 Ford Truck, its tools and appurtenances under the provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 782¹, and for the forfeiture of $100.00 in U. S. Currency under the provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 7302.² Franklin Lawton Bates filed a claim for the truck, its tools and appurtenances, and appeared in propria persona. The Government appeared by its counsel, William D. Keller, United States Attorney and Larry L. Dier, Assistant United States Attorney. No claim was filed for the $100.00 in United States Currency. The parties stipulated to waive pre-trial conference, and the Court trial was held on July 31, 1972.

FACTS

On February 22, 1972, Special Investigators of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division of the United States Treasury Department went to Dude's Bar, 1566 West Fifth Street, Oxnard, California. While there, Special Investigator Erik Roberts met with the owner of the bar and engaged in a conversation concerning the possible purchase of a sawed-off shotgun. Roberts then proceeded into the parking lot of the bar where he was joined by John Franklin Bates, the son of the claimant herein. Bates took Roberts to a 1971 Ford pickup truck, and obtained a weapon from behind the back seat. This firearm was a Western Field, 20 gauge sawed-off shotgun with a barrel length of 9½ inches and an overall length of 21 inches. It contained no serial number and was not registered as required by 26 U.S.C. § 5841³ and 26 C.F.R. 179.101⁴. After a discussion as to price, Bates sold the weapon to Special Investigator Roberts for $100.00, whereupon Bates was arrested and the 1971 Ford truck and the $100.00 in currency were seized.

Bates was subsequently charged in a two count indictment filed on March 22, 1972 with possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d),⁵ and the illegal transfer of a firearm, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(e).⁶ On April 27, 1972, Bates was convicted upon his plea of guilty to the offense of wilfully and knowingly possessing a firearm which had not been registered.

Although young Bates was using the 1971 Ford truck at the time of the offense, it has been conclusively proved that his father, Franklin Lawton Bates, the claimant herein, is the true and registered owner of the vehicle. The elder Bates' uncontradicted testimony at the trial also proved that, at the time of the commission of the offense by his son for which this truck has been seized, the father was not present and had absolutely no connection with the crime whatsoever. It was further shown that the claimant-father had neither the knowledge that this offense would be committed by his son nor the suspicion that his truck might be involved in the commission of the crime. In fact, Franklin L. Bates was in Europe at the time of the offense and had been there for several days prior to the commission of the crime. The evidence also established that young Bates had absolutely no interest whatsoever in the 1971 Ford Truck and, in fact, had been specifically instructed by his father that he was not to use the car, except to take his mother to the airport on one occasion. He was further instructed that upon completing this sole task he was to return the truck immediately to the residence of his father and leave it there.

However, on either the 21st or 22nd of February, 1972, John Franklin Bates, without authorization from his father and contrary to his father's express instructions, took the 1971 Ford truck from the residence of his father and converted it to his own use. It was on February 22, 1972, that John Bates was apprehended with the illegal weapon in the 1971 Ford Truck.

THE LAW

There being no claim filed for the $100.00 in United States Currency, it is undisputed that the funds were used in the unlawful transfer of a contraband firearm upon which neither a transfer application was made, 26 U.S.C. § 5812⁷ nor a transfer tax paid 26 U.S.C. § 5811⁸. Since the money was transferred in violation of the above internal revenue laws, it is subject to seizure and forfeiture. 26 U.S.C. § 7302; United States v. Amore, 335 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1964).

Franklin Lawton Bates, the registered owner of the 1971 Ford Truck has filed a claim for the vehicle, its tools and appurtenances. While it is plain that the truck was used to conceal an unlawful firearm, the claimant's total lack of involvement in the illegal venture raises serious and significant questions in the Court's mind as to the constitutionality as well as the efficacy of the forfeiture proceedings in this instance.

We are fully aware of the supposedly sacrosanct legal principle that personal property may be seized and forfeited even though its owner may be completely innocent of any conduct which can be characterized as criminal or wilfully negligent. Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581, 51 S.Ct. 282, 75 L.Ed. 558 (1931); United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321, 47 S.Ct. 154, 71 L.Ed. 279 (1926); Goldsmith Jr.Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 41 S.Ct. 189, 65 L.Ed. 376 (1921); Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 24 L.Ed. 637 (1871); Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1, 6 L.Ed. 531 (1827). This principle has flowered upon the legal fiction that the inanimate objects themselves are guilty of the wrongdoing and therefore it is they that are being punished and not their owners. We note, however, that while formally giving it lip service, courts have consistently criticized both the rule of law itself and the legal fiction upon which it is based.

As far back as 1886, the United States Supreme Court recognized the inadequacy of the fiction upon which forfeiture proceedings were based. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) the Court pointed out that "proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in form are in their nature criminal." And more recently, the Court held that "a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character. Its object, like a criminal proceeding is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law." One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 1250, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965).

The readily apparent injustices of certain forfeiture proceedings have also caused the lower Courts, while faithfully following the precedents and entering judgments of forfeiture, to speak out with rarely seen vehemence declaring their distaste for the effect of forfeiture statutes on innocent claimants. For example, when faced with a forfeiture proceeding similar to the one presently before us, the Court in United States v. One 1962 Ford Thunderbird, 232 F.Supp. 1019, 1022 (N.D.Ill.1964) citing as authority the by now customary yet antiquated precedents, finds the statute constitutional while opining that "as a legislator, we might express grave doubts as to the efficacy of the policy as it affects innocent lienors . . ." And perhaps the best illustration of the Federal Courts' position on forfeiture statutes and the fiction upon which they are based is the statement of the Honorable Frank W. Wilson of the Eastern District of Tennessee that "the laws relating to forfeitures do cause one who is raised in the traditions of the Anglo-American principles of justice and who is committed to the constitutional principles of due process and just compensation to search closely for a constitutional violation." United States v. One 1961 Cadillac Hardtop Automobile, 207 F.Supp. 693, 698 (E.D.Tenn.1962)

We have searched carefully and although mindful of the many cases to the contrary, we feel compelled to do away with this enclave of injustice which has persisted in spite of the many and varied attacks upon it. In doing so, we do not find fault with our Brothers of the Bench who have found contrarily, since they were not afforded the benefit of recent rulings of both the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals which seem to mandate the decision which we make here.

Of greatest import in our decision is the case of United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721, 91 S.Ct. 1041, 1045, 28 L.Ed.2d 434 (1971) which, upon viewing the forfeiture statutes in their entirety, held that they "are intended to impose a penalty only upon those who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise." Thus, laying to rest forever any argument that forfeiture proceedings are not intended to and do not penalize an individual, the Supreme Court went on to state that when dealing with an innocent claimant any forfeiture statute with such a broad sweep raises serious constitutional questions under the commandment of the Fifth Amendment "that no person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S.CONST. amend. V. Considering this constitutional problem the Court refers with approval to Blackstone's condemnation of "the seizure of the property of the innocent as based upon a `superstition' inherited from the `blind' days of feudalism." United States v. United States Coin & Currency, supra, 401 U.S. at 720-721, 91 S.Ct. at 1044.

In light of the statements of the Court in United States Coin & Currency, it is exceedingly difficult to reconcile the forfeiture statute under which the instant case is brought with the...