United States v. One Chevrolet Automobile
| Decision Date | 24 August 1927 |
| Docket Number | No. 398.,398. |
| Citation | 21 F.2d 477 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. ONE CHEVROLET AUTOMOBILE (GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Claimant). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
J. Osmond Middleton, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Montgomery, Ala.
S. H. Dent, Weil, Stakely & Cater, and C. A. Stakely, Jr., all of Montgomery, Ala., for claimant.
The Segrest-Gentry Motor Car Company sold the automobile described in the libel to J. E. Frederick for a partial cash payment and his negotiable paper for $450 for the balance of the purchase money. In that it was stipulated that the title to the automobile was in and should remain in the vendor until the payment of all the purchase money, and with the right to retake the machine in case of the failure to meet any future installment. This instrument was sold before maturity by the Segrest-Gentry Motor Car Company in regular course of business to the General Motors Acceptance Corporation, the claimant herein, and was owned by it at the time of the seizure by the federal prohibition officers.
It was established that Frederick, the purchaser of the automobile, had, in good faith, lent it on the day of its seizure to Edison Girdner, upon the request that he (Girdner) have it long enough to use it in going to his home to get his supper. The evidence further showed that Frederick was not in collusion or connivance with Girdner, who, from the evidence, abused the privileged use of the automobile lent to him for a short while for the purpose stated. The testimony leaves no doubt that Frederick bore a good character at the time of the purchase of the automobile and at the time of this trial; that he was not a bootlegger, and had never been even suspected of being or of having been engaged at any time in violating the Prohibition Law (27 USCA Comp. St. § 10138¼ et seq.). About 8:30 o'clock on the night when the automobile was lent, while Frederick, the purchaser and ostensible owner, was waiting for its return to him, Girdner drove it up and parked it across the street from where Frederick was. The prohibition officers, Roberts and Myrick, saw the automobile, went to it, and observed lying in the bottom of the automobile, which was an open touring car, certain packages wrapped in paper. Without search warrant they examined the packages and found them to be twenty pints of moonshine whisky. Under these circumstances they seized the liquor and destroyed it. Their actions in discovering and destroying the whisky are approved, for they were in the lawful pursuance of their official duty.
The automobile was taken by the prohibition enforcement officers and the matter reported to the district attorney, who brought this libel under section 3450, R. S. (26 USCA §§ 1181, 1182 Comp. St. § 6352). On the trial of the case, the prohibition agents testified, in substance, that in seizing the liquor and the automobile they were not endeavoring to collect any taxes on the whisky, but were acting under the Prohibition Law, and to stop the transportation of and to prevent the sale of alcoholic beverages.
The foregoing statement seems to be a fair summary of all the facts necessary in the consideration of the law involved. There is no doubt that the claimant was the innocent purchaser and transferee of the negotiable paper, and was vested with the right to take the automobile on default of payment of the balance of the purchase money. The claimant's business was legitimate, and I do not think it was incumbent upon it to keep a daily watch over the automobile in order to see to it as to how it was used at any and all times.
In my opinion, the automobile cannot be condemned in this proceeding. In the argument cases were cited by the district attorney, and others by the attorneys for the claimant. Particular stress was laid upon United States v. One Ford Coupé, 272 U. S. 321, 47 S. Ct. 154, 71 L. Ed. 279, 47 A. L. R. 1025; but, after having read the very interesting opinion rendered by the learned justice for the majority of the court, it does not seem to me that anything was definitely decided, except that Judge Grubb, the District Judge, should not in that case have dismissed the libel on motion, but should have heard it on its merits, and that the Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Bryan speaking, committed error in adopting the conclusion of the District Judge (4 F.2d 528). It also appears to me that in his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Stone bottomed his concurrence upon the idea that the case should have been heard in the District Court upon its merits rather than upon a motion to dismiss, in its nature a general demurrer.
In order to make more understandable my conception of the law applicable in the present case, the following language is quoted from the concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Stone in the Ford Coupé Case, supra, loc. cit. 335 (47 S. Ct. 159) the italics being supplied:
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