United States v. ONE 1941 CADILLAC SEDAN, NO. 5367924, 8623.

Decision Date20 October 1944
Docket NumberNo. 8623.,8623.
Citation145 F.2d 296
PartiesUNITED STATES v. ONE 1941 CADILLAC SEDAN, MOTOR AND SERIAL NO. 5367924. VALENTI v. UNITED STATES.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Oscar B. Thiel and Herbert J. Morris, both of Gary, Ind., for appellant.

Alexander M. Campbell, U. S. Atty., of Fort Wayne, Ind., James E. Keating, U. S. Atty., of South Bend, Ind., H. Hugh Kennerk, U. S. Atty., of Fort Wayne, Ind., and Tom C. Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before EVANS, SPARKS, and MAJOR, Circuit Judges.

EVANS, Circuit Judge.

The District Court decreed the forfeiture of a Cadillac car, 1941 make, which had been seized while transporting non-tax paid liquor. The court denied the claim of intervener, appellant herein, who contends the evidence conclusively showed her to have had an interest in the car. In fact, she asserts she is the sole owner of said Cadillac. It was as the owner of an interest in the car that she based her right to intervene, and her contention that the instant proceedings were invalid because not duly and properly authorized by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. She appeals from the decree sustaining the libel.

Controlling the disposition of this appeal, the evidence established these facts. Prior to the institution of the libel growing out of the use of the automobile for conveying untaxed liquor, one Steve Valenti, appellant's husband, was charged with the crime of "transporting nontax paid moonshine whiskey." He pleaded guilty to this charge. At the same time the car was seized and the instant libel proceedings were instituted, a monition was issued, the car possessed, appellant intervened, gave a bond which was approved, and the possession of the car was surrendered to her.

In her intervening petition, appellant alleged that the car belonged to her; that she acquired it in good faith; that she did not know and had no reason to believe it was being "used in violation of the laws of the United States" relating to liquor.

The applicable statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 646 (b), reads:

"In any such proceeding the court shall not allow the claim of any claimant for remission or mitigation unless and until he proves (1) that he has an interest in such vehicle or aircraft, as owner or otherwise, which he acquired in good faith, (2) that he had at no time any knowledge or reason to believe that it was being or would be used in the violation of laws of the United States or of any State relating to liquor, * * *."

Upon the controverted fact issues, the court found in substance:

Upon the 9th day of October, 1943, Steve Valenti was in possession of the 1941 Cadillac sedan in the city of Gary, Indiana, and was using the car to transport non-tax paid whiskey in violation of the Internal Revenue Laws of the United States.

Appellant was not the true and lawful owner of the full title to said car.

Appellant never acquired an interest in said above described motor vehicle in good faith.

Appellant married Steve Valenti in 1928 and the records of the City Court at Gary, Indiana, where appellant and her husband lived, show that Steve Valenti was arrested and brought into that court for liquor violation in 1922, 1923, 1924, and 1926; that on one charge for liquor violation in 1923, he was fined and sentenced to six months' imprisonment. The records of the Criminal Court show that in the year 1931, while appellant was living with said Steve Valenti he was arrested on a charge of violating a state liquor law in Indiana. From 1940 to 1943, Valenti was a partner in the operation of a tavern and daily participated in its business. Appellant had reason to believe that the motor vehicle would be used in violation of the laws of the United States relating to liquor.

It is appellant's contention that the evidence wholly fails to support the finding that she never acquired an interest in the above described motor vehicle in good faith. She also argues that no evidence supports the finding that appellant had reason to believe the car would be used in violation of the laws of the United States.

On the assumption that she owned the car or that she had "an interest in such vehicle as owner or otherwise which she acquired in good faith" she contends that the libel failed to allege, and the proof failed to show, there was a valid authorization of the suit as provided by Section 3740, 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev.Code. In other words, it is argued that the evidence fails to show that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue authorized, or sanctioned the libel proceedings or that the Attorney General directed its institution.

It is clear, under the statute, that appellant was required to show that she had "an interest in such vehicle as an owner or otherwise which she acquired in good faith." Otherwise she has no standing in court to assail the validity of the libel proceedings.

The evidence showed that appellant was married to Valenti in Italy in 1928, at which time her father gave her a dowry of $20,000 which she invested in real estate upon coming to the United States. She still holds the real estate and makes use of the car in management of it. Out of her dowry she purchased a LaSalle car which was turned...

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19 cases
  • United States v. Williams
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • September 28, 2012
    ...at p. 2. In addition, the law presumes that Department of Justice attorneys act within their authority. United States v. One 1941 Cadillac Sedan, 145 F.2d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1944) ("The United States attorney is a part of the Department of Justice. He must be presumed, in absence of evidenc......
  • Taylor v. United States
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • September 28, 1949
    ...evidence to the contrary. R. H. Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 62-64, 54 S.Ct. 325, 78 L.Ed. 647;United States v. One 1941 Cadillac Sedan, 7 Cir., 145 F.2d 296, 299;United States v. Ettelson, 8 Cir., 159 F.2d 193, 195-196. In our view the commissioners had authority to allow the......
  • U.S. v. Twenty-Eight ""Mighty Payloader"" Coin-Operated Gaming Devices
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • June 11, 1980
    ...which it was not, the Government's allegations of authority contained in the complaint are sufficient. United States v. One 1941 Cadillac Sedan, 145 F.2d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1944); United States v. Twenty-Two Firearms, 463 F.Supp. 730 (D.Colo.1979). The owners argue that the action was initi......
  • United States v. Mark II Electronics of Louisiana, Inc., Cr. No. 29903.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
    • March 27, 1968
    ...155 F.Supp. 650, 656. 19 The Government cites Chin Chuck Ming v. Dulles, 9 Cir., 1955, 225 F.2d 849, 852; United States v. One 1941 Cadillac Sedan, 7 Cir., 1944, 145 F.2d 296, 299; In re Coleman, S.D.Miss., 1962, 208 F.Supp. 199, 20 Note 17 supra. ...
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