United States v. Oregon

• Decision Date: 23 January 2023
• Docket Number: 22-2000
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose OREGON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

58 F.4th 298

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Jose OREGON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-2000

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued December 5, 2022

Decided January 23, 2023

Robert Ladd, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Rockford, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Steve A. Greenberg, Attorney, Greenberg Trial Lawyers, Chicago, IL, Barry A. Spevack, Attorney, Monico & Spevack, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Brennan, Scudder, and St. Eve, Circuit Judges.

St. Eve, Circuit Judge.

Jose Oregon owed the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") approximately $60,000 in back taxes and penalties but could not afford to pay. To raise the money, Oregon agreed to launder $100,000, which he understood to be the proceeds of illegal drug sales. What Oregon did not know, however, was that the person for whom he was laundering money was an undercover agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Oregon was subsequently indicted and pled guilty to one count of money laundering. The district court sentenced him to eighteen months in prison—six months below the range calculated under the Sentencing Guidelines.

Oregon timely appealed contending that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court failed to consider relevant mitigating factors, and improperly relied on the need for general deterrence and to avoid sentence disparities. We affirm.

I. Background

Oregon was married in 1997 and had two children from that marriage. In 2011, Oregon and his wife divorced, and his ex-wife retained custody over their children. After his divorce, Oregon failed to file and pay taxes for three years. When he ultimately filed his late tax returns, he mistakenly claimed his two children as dependents.

Because of this mistake, Oregon owed the IRS approximately $60,000 in back taxes and penalties.

A. The Offense

Looking for additional work to help earn money to pay the IRS, Oregon visited some friends who owned a ranch. While there, a ranch hand overheard Oregon asking for work. The ranch hand offered to introduce Oregon to a man who needed help laundering his proceeds from illegal drug sales and told Oregon that he could keep ten percent of everything he laundered. Oregon agreed, not knowing that the man for whom he would launder money was an undercover FBI agent.

Oregon later met with the agent, who gave him $100,000 to launder. After laundering over $85,000, Oregon had a change of heart and stopped. Even after the agent tried to convince him to continue, Oregon refused to launder any more money.

On March 19, 2019, Oregon was indicted on nine counts of laundering money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B). On July 12, 2021, Oregon pled guilty to count one of the indictment.

B. Sentencing

At sentencing, the district court found that Oregon had an offense level of seventeen, a criminal history category of I, and a corresponding Guidelines range of twenty-four to thirty months. The government requested a sentence at the low end of the range, and Oregon requested what is effectively a non-custodial sentence—a sentence of one day in prison, followed by a period of supervised release.

In assessing the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court considered Oregon's background and characteristics and found that there was no need for specific deterrence because Oregon was unlikely to recidivate. Understanding that the conduct arose out of an undercover operation, the court noted that "Oregon has no criminal history and has continuously been employed and promoted within his line of work. Oregon also only laundered money on one occasion and later denied additional requests to launder money." However, to "deter[ ] others from committing similar offenses, sanction[ ] Oregon for his conduct, and promote[ ] respect for the law," the court sentenced Oregon to eighteen months in prison—six months below the low end of the Guidelines range. The district court refused to impose a non-custodial sentence because, in its opinion, that would result in "too far of a disparity in sentencing people with this amount of money laundering [and] would not be appropriate as far as sending the message of promoting respect for the law."

On appeal, Oregon alleges that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence because it failed to afford sufficient weight to relevant mitigating factors, and instead improperly focused on general deterrence and the need to avoid nonexistent sentence disparities.

II. Analysis

We review a district court's sentencing decision in two steps. "First, we assess de novo whether the court followed proper procedures. If the decision below is procedurally sound, then we ask whether the resulting sentence is substantively reasonable. Whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines range, we review the sentence for an abuse of discretion." United States v. De La Torre , 940 F.3d 938, 953 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).¹

"[T]here is a nearly irrebuttable presumption that a below-range sentence is reasonable." United States v. Miller , 829 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2016). "Indeed, we have never ‘deemed a below-range sentence to be unreasonably high.’ " United States v. Gibson , 996 F.3d 451, 468 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Brown , 932 F.3d 1011, 1019 (7th Cir. 2019) ). To prevail on appeal, Oregon must "show[ ] that the sentence does not comport with the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." De La Torre , 940 F.3d at 953 (citations omitted). These factors include:

the nature and circumstances of the offense; the defendant's history and characteristics; the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter crime, [and] protect the public ...; the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similar defendants; and the need for victim restitution.

United States v. Daoud , 980 F.3d 581, 591 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing § 3553(a) ). When evaluating whether the district court's sentence was reasonable, we recognize that " ‘[t]he sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case,’ because ‘[t]he sentencing judge has access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant before him than the Commission or the appeals court.’ " United States v. Reyes-Hernandez , 624 F.3d 405, 415 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gall , 552 U.S. at 51–52, 128 S.Ct. 586 ). "In general, a disagreement about how much weight to give each § 3553(a) factor does not warrant reversal." United States v. Warner , 792 F.3d 847, 856 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).

Oregon alleges several reasons why his sentence is unreasonable and the district court should have imposed a lower sentence: (1) there is no need for specific or general deterrence; (2) the court failed to consider that Oregon was unable to provide substantial assistance under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 ; (3) Oregon has several family members who depend on him for support; (4) Oregon voluntarily paid restitution prior to sentencing; and (5) the court improperly relied on the need to avoid sentence disparities without any evidence that sentencing Oregon to a non-custodial sentence would create such disparities among similarly situated defendants. We address each of these issues in turn.

A. General and Specific Deterrence

Oregon argues that there is no need for specific deterrence because he is not likely to recidivate and poses no threat to the public. But the district court expressly recognized this fact: "Oregon demonstrates a very low risk of recidivism. At 44-years old, Oregon has no criminal history and has continuously been employed and promoted within his line of work. Oregon also only laundered money on one occasion and later denied additional requests to launder money." The court further understood that Oregon was looking for honest work, he had never laundered money before, and that this offense arose from an undercover operation.² Indeed, Oregon's background and characteristics are the primary reason the district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence.

The court noted, however, that general deterrence requires looking beyond the defendant to see how a sentence would impact others considering committing the same offense. The court then found that money laundering was a serious offense because it allows drug dealers to remain in business, and determined that a custodial sentence was "appropriate under the money laundering laws in order to deter others."

Oregon contends that a custodial sentence was unnecessary to promote general deterrence because "[t]he fact the Government charged [Oregon] ... should have been enough to convince like-minded individuals not to engage in money laundering activity." Even if we believed that merely charging someone constituted adequate general deterrence (we do not), "[i]t is not our job to reweigh the § 3553(a) factors." De La Torre , 940 F.3d at 954. The district court "was entitled to make that judgment focusing primarily on the seriousness of [Oregon's] offenses and the need for general deterrence in the larger community." United States v. Buncich , 20 F. 4th 1167, 1177 (7th Cir. 2021). In doing so, the court did not abuse its discretion.

B. Substantial Assistance Under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1

Oregon next argues that the district court overlooked that he was unable to obtain a downward departure for providing substantial assistance to the government under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Specifically, Oregon told the court that he "made extensive efforts to cooperate," but the FBI never used him because "he just had never engaged in any illegal conduct" so there was nothing he could do to assist the FBI. While Oregon's efforts did not amount to substantial assistance warranting a motion by the government for a downward departure, he did receive credit for acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(c). Moreover, Oregon benefited...