United States v. Ortiz
| Decision Date | 20 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Action No. 11–251–08. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Miguel ORTIZ a/k/a “Miguelito”. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Sozi Pedro Tulante, Ashley Kruidenier Lunkenheimer, for Government.
Michael J. Diamondstein, for Appellee.
Defendant Miguel Ortiz is charged by Third Superseding Indictment with offenses arising from his alleged involvement in a large-scale drug distribution scheme. Defendant filed several pretrial motions, and the Court held a hearing and oral argument on June 21 and 22, 2012. This Memorandum addresses defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, which presents issues relating to the government's use of GPS tracking devices left unsettled by the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Jones, –––U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012). For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that installation and monitoring of a Global Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking device on a vehicle requires a warrant. The Court further concludes that the so-called “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply due to the absence of binding precedent authorizing warrantless GPS installation and tracking. Accordingly, the Court grants defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence.
Defendant is charged by Third Superseding Indictment with: one count of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base (“crack”), and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)-(C); two counts of distribution of and aiding and abetting the distribution of five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and one count of distribution of and aiding and abetting the distribution of five kilograms or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.1 Defendant filed a document entitled Omnibus Pre–Trial Motions on May 11, 2012 (“Omnibus Motion”), which contained ten separate motions, including the Motion to Suppress Evidence. He subsequently filed two amendments to the Omnibus Motion as well as a Motion in Limine.
The Court held a hearing and heard oral argument on June 21 and 22, 2012. At the hearing and by Orders dated June 22, 2012, the Court resolved a number of defendant's pretrial motions, set forth a schedule and procedure to address certain other motions, and took under advisement, inter alia, defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, on which the Court now rules.
The Motion to Suppress Evidence arises from the fact that Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents attached two separate GPS tracking devices to defendant's vehicle during their investigation without obtaining a warrant. Defendant moves to suppress the GPS data and “any and all observations made by agents as a result of utilizing” the GPS monitoring. (Def. Mot. Suppress Evidence (“Def.Mot.”), part of Def. Miguel Ortiz's Omnibus Pre–Trial Motions, at 3.)
A. How GPS Trackers Work and How DEA Agents Use Them
DEA agents typically use a GPS tracker that is “the size of [a] fist, and it has two very strong magnets attached to it.” (June 21, 2012, Hr'g Tr. (“6/21/12 Tr.”) 65.) Because each tracker has its own battery, it does not rely on the car for power. ( Id.) The DEA agents call this style of device a “slap on” tracker because it can be installed merely by “slapping it” onto a vehicle's undercarriage. ( Id. at 67.) The case agent, DEA Special Agent David Pedrini, testified that agents generally place the tracker on “the bottom of the undercarriage of the vehicle, ... usually towards the rear bumper.” ( Id. at 65.) The tracker “pings” periodically, meaning that its location is logged wirelessly to a remote computer server at a time interval that is adjustable. 2 ( Id. at 65–66; see also id. at 129.) Agents can log on to a secure website to view the log of the tracker's location. ( Id. at 66.) According to Agent Pedrini, the tracker has a “50 yard to 100 yard” margin of error, so his practice is to confirm a vehicle's location by physical surveillance if he needs to determine it with precision. ( Id. at 66–67.) Moreover, because the pings are one-directional, agents only know where the tracker is when it transmits a ping and cannot remotely determine where the tracker is until it pings again. ( Id. at 68 ( ).)
Agent Pedrini stated at the hearing that his “practice” in determining whether or not to use a tracker in an investigation is that “if the target is big enough, and we believe that the ... vehicle is used to distribute drugs, or distribute or pick up drug proceeds, then ... I would like to put [a] tracker on that vehicle.” ( Id. at 64–65.) When asked whether he believed he needed a warrant to install a tracker, Agent Pedrini testified that, in his fifteen years of experience with the DEA in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, “if the vehicle was parked on a public way, on a public street,” the agents did not need a warrant or a court order. ( Id. at 67; see also id. at 125 (...
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