United States v. Owens, Crim. No. SA71CR341.
| Citation | 344 F. Supp. 1355 |
| Decision Date | 21 June 1972 |
| Docket Number | Crim. No. SA71CR341. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Curtis Leroy OWENS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
William S. Sessions, U. S. Atty., Joel Conant, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiff.
Fred A. Semaan, San Antonio, Tex., for defendant.
The defendant was indicted for knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute approximately 27 grams of heroin, a controlled substance, in violation of Title 21, U.S.C. Section 841(a) (1). He subsequently entered a plea of not guilty to that charge, and urged a motion to suppress certain packets of heroin removed from his person, on the ground that they were acquired through an unreasonable search and seizure. The motion to suppress was overruled, and the defendant having waived a jury, trial was had before this Court on May 24, 1972.
The evidence reflects that on or about October 3, 1971, agents of the antipiracy detail at the San Antonio International Airport first became suspicious of the defendant when they entered an airport restroom and saw him flee to a toilet area. Further observation led agents to believe that defendant was not using the toilet facilities in a normal manner, although he was present therein for some ten minutes. During this period, the agents heard a clinking that sounded like porcelain hitting glass. After defendant had left the toilet at an unsteady gait, a search of the stall revealed a stack of burned paper and matches.
Their suspicions properly aroused by defendant's actions, the agents placed him under further surveillance. In going to a snack bar, defendant's walk was very quick, and his overall manner made him appear to be extremely nervous. While closely observing people around him, he spotted the trailing agents, whereupon he immediately left the snack bar area, his hands shaking noticeably, his walk still very fast and always in the opposite direction from the agents who were trying to follow him. Finally, the agents caught up with defendant, properly identified themselves, and asked him to accompany them to the office of the Airport Customs Station, which he voluntarily did.
Upon reaching the office, the agents noticed defendant's hand close to a bulge in his pocket and asked him to remove his hand. At that point, defendant removed his hand and swept it to his mouth, placing what appeared to be a cellophane package in his mouth. At the same time, he pushed agents out of his path and fled toward the airport exit. In the corridor, however, he was stopped by the agents, arrested and hand-cuffed. At that time, agents removed part of the packages from defendant's mouth and moved him back to the customs office. Upon arrival, agents had a clear indication that other parts of the packages remained in defendant's stomach, and ordered him to a local hospital to have his stomach pumped. The packages removed from defendant's mouth, was well as the material removed by the stomach pumping, contained a total of 26 grams of heroin hydrochloride, the contraband upon which the indictment was based.
The above undisputed facts were developed at the preliminary hearing, a transcript of which was offered and accepted into evidence at the trial before the Court, with the agreement of the parties. At the trial on the merits, the Government called only one additional witness to the stand, agent Harris, who testified that immediately after defendant's arrest he noticed collapsed veins and track marks in defendant's arms, and that it appeared to him that defendant was a narcotic addict. The Government then rested, after which the defendant took the stand and testified that he was in fact an addict at the time of his arrest; that he used approximately one and one-half grams of heroin per day; and that the 26 grams of heroin in his possession was for his personal use only. The Government made no attempt to refute defendant's testimony in this respect. On the other hand, as indicated, the agent corroborated the defendant's testimony that he was an addict.
The evidence is uncontradicted that the defendant knowingly and intentionally had in his possession approximately 26 grams of heroin, in violation of Title 21 U.S.C. Section 844(a). The only issue is whether or not he possessed the heroin with the intent to distribute it. In attempting to prove the intent element, the Government offers no direct evidence; they merely contend that the amount of heroin in defendant's possession is ipso facto a commercial quantity. Also, the Government argues that the mere possession of...
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U.S. v. Franklin
...870, 877 (E.D.Va.1981) (possession of 73 grams of marijuana not inconsistent with possession for personal use); United States v. Owens, 344 F.Supp. 1355, 1356 (E.D.Wis.1972) (possession of 26 grams of heroin, standing alone, insufficient evidence of intent to distribute), aff'd, 475 F.2d 75......
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U.S. v. Harold, 75--4012
...'intent to distribute' is necessary in a situation of this kind to support a conviction under Section 841(a)(1).' United States v. Owens, 344 F.Supp. 1355, 1356 (W.D.Tex.1972), aff'd, 475 F.2d 759 (5th 1973); United States v. Clayborn, 383 F.Supp. 1186 (W.D.Tex.1974). Even believing Harold'......
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United States v. Moses, Crim. No. 72-279.
...1 We note that this amount may not be enough in and of itself to establish intent to distribute, compare United States v. Owens, 344 F.Supp. 1355 (W.D.Texas 1972) with Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970), and United States v. Cerrito, 413 F.2d 1270 (7t......
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U.S. v. Hardy
...or entered into an agreement to do so. See United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1019 n. 3 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Owens, 344 F.Supp. 1355, 1356 (W.D.Tex.1972), aff'd, 475 F.2d 759 (5th Cir.1973). There was no evidence that Hardy possessed drug dilutants, drug packing parapherna......