United States v. Padilla-Galarza
Decision Date | 05 March 2021 |
Docket Number | No. 18-2078,18-2078 |
Citation | 990 F.3d 60 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. José PADILLA-GALARZA, a/k/a Joey, Defendant, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Rafael F. Castro Lang for appellant.
Alexander L. Alum, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.
Before Lynch, Selya, and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-appellant José Padilla-Galarza, having created a ruckus before a jury empaneled to hear criminal charges against him for armed bank robbery and related crimes, tries to turn the tables. He asserts that his outburst should have prompted the district court to grant his motion for a mistrial. For good measure, he spells out an alphabet of putative errors, ranging from allegations of arbitrary authorization of protective orders to allegations that the district court failed to zap excesses of prosecutorial zeal. Concluding, as we do, that the appellant's claims lack force, we affirm the judgment below.
We start by briefly rehearsing the background of the case, drawing the facts from a balanced assessment of the record. To the extent that the government's evidence about the scheme and the appellant's involvement in it differs from the appellant's own testimony, we generally credit the government's evidence (as did the jury). Cf. United States v. Maraj, 947 F.2d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1991) ( ). We then sketch the travel of the case.
On November 29, 2014, an armed heist took place at a Banco Popular branch in Bayamón, Puerto Rico. Three individuals — Johan Dávila-Rivera (Dávila), Jorge Camacho-Gordils (Camacho), and Samuel Figueroa — entered the bank disguised as construction workers and wearing helmets, black gloves, and fake facial hair. Once inside, the trio brandished firearms, ordered everyone to the floor, and demanded money from the bank's vault. A teller complied, filling bags with what was later determined to be a total of $64,633.13. But this was not all: the teller also inserted electronic dye-pack devices designed to spew dye, smoke, and other substances when removed from the premises.
Bags of money in hand, the three robbers fled. At that point, their plan promptly began to unravel. Dávila was forced to discard some of the bags when they began to smoke. With what loot remained, the robbers sped off in a getaway car (a green Toyota Tercel). Soon thereafter, they switched cars, abandoned the Toyota, and scattered (with Figueroa retaining most of what money remained).
Subsequent investigation revealed that Dávila, Camacho, and Figueroa did not act alone in carrying out the robbery: the appellant played a leading role both in recruiting a crew and in developing and executing the scheme. Among other things, the evidence supported findings that he did the planning, delivered the disguises used in the robbery, and laid out the approach to the bank.
When the authorities dug deeper, they learned that the appellant's scheme extended beyond the bank robbery itself. As part of the plot, two other coconspirators — Miguel Torres-Santiago (Torres) and Jomar Hernández-Román (Hernández) — had been slated to rob the nearby Abraham Rosa Credit Union earlier the same day. The appellant enlisted their participation and met with them several times at Hernández's residence. At the second such meeting, the appellant mentioned that he intended to have fake bombs planted as a distraction.
The appellant set both phases of the scheme in motion on the morning of November 29. At approximately 8:00 a.m., Torres and Hernández proceeded to the credit union to carry out that aspect of the plot. The appellant had instructed Torres to enter the credit union and pretend to cash a check, at which point he would be "taken hostage" by Figueroa. Hernández was to serve as the lookout.
What happened next was reminiscent of the legendary gang that couldn't shoot straight. See Jimmy Breslin, The Gang That Couldn't Shoot Straight (1969). Torres entered the credit union but Figueroa never appeared. Consequently, Torres retreated in confusion and the holdup at the credit union never materialized.
Meanwhile, acting on the appellant's instructions, Camacho and Figueroa planted two bogus bombs furnished by the appellant — one near the ATM outside Bayamón City Hall and the other outside a Banco Popular branch in Loma Verde. Although the record is nebulous as to when and how the bogus bombs were first spotted, the local police force soon responded to reports about suspicious objects. The officers deployed specialized personnel to defuse any discovered explosives.
With the distraction operation underway, the robbers proceeded to enter the Banco Popular branch in Bayamón. We already have chronicled what transpired inside the bank. See text supra.
Both local police and agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) responded to the scene of this robbery. It did not take long for them to discover the abandoned Toyota a quarter mile from the bank, dye-stained money littering the interior. A discarded construction helmet and black gloves were found in a nearby trash can. The Toyota yielded another important clue: a receipt, found in the back seat, documented a transaction that had taken place four days earlier at a Party City store in San Patricio. Surveillance footage obtained from the store showed the appellant, Hernández, and a third man purchasing fake facial hair products that matched those used by the robbers.
When the FBI detained Hernández for questioning in December of 2014, he made a number of incriminating statements during a six-hour interview. He admitted, for example, that he had participated in surveilling the bank, that he had accompanied the appellant both to Party City and to Home Depot to purchase accouterments similar to those used in effectuating the robbers' disguises, and that he had transported a shotgun to the appellant's home in the Barrio Macún neighborhood for use in the heist.
On January 9, 2015, the FBI obtained both an arrest warrant for the appellant and a search warrant for his home. The ensuing search turned up (as relevant here) ammunition rounds, fake facial hair, and black gloves (still bearing manufacturer's tags) identical to those discovered near the abandoned Toyota.
Following the search, the appellant submitted to interviews. He described himself as a former police officer who had transitioned into construction work. He admitted that he previously had owned the Toyota used in the escape but claimed to have sold it on the morning of the robbery. He also admitted to making purchases at Party City and Home Depot during the week before the robbery, but he claimed that those purchases were made for innocent purposes.
The appellant was charged, alongside Hernández, Figueroa, Dávila, Camacho, and Torres, in a five-count indictment.1 The charges included conspiracy to commit bank robbery, see 18 U.S.C. § 371 ; armed bank robbery, see id. § 2113(a); conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, see id. § 1951(a); Hobbs Act robbery, see id. § 1951(a); and use and carriage of firearms during and in relation to crimes of violence, see id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).
Four of the defendants eventually entered guilty pleas and two of them (Dávila and Torres) agreed to become cooperating witnesses for the government. The appellant and Hernández proceeded to stand trial.
The impending trial proved fertile terrain for extensive pretrial motion practice. The district court dealt with questions concerning subjects as diverse as severance, protective orders, and the sometimes stormy relationship between the appellant and his trial counsel (Melanie Carrillo). The trial, which lasted for 14 days, was tumultuous. The appellant appeared in court on the first day, but his appearance was short-lived. He became increasingly agitated and loudly declared that the trial should not proceed. When his disruptive behavior escalated, the court had him escorted from the courtroom, and he listened to and watched most of the trial virtually from a remote cellblock. The court appointed a second lawyer to be at the appellant's side in the cellblock during trial proceedings.
On the ninth day of trial, the appellant was allowed into the courtroom after having assured the court that he would conduct himself appropriately. That assurance proved hollow: once in the courtroom, he loudly disparaged Carrillo and hurled accusations at the district court in front of the jury. The court again ordered the appellant removed from the courtroom and denied his ensuing motion for a mistrial.
At the close of the government's case, the appellant moved for judgment of acquittal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). The district court denied this motion but permitted the government to reopen its case in chief to clarify certain jurisdictional elements of the crimes (not now in issue). The jury ultimately found both the appellant and Hernández guilty on all five counts. The district court subsequently sentenced the appellant to an aggregate 228-month term of immurement (the components of which are delineated in Part X, infra ). In addition, the court ordered the appellant to make restitution to Banco Popular in the sum of $64,000.
This timely appeal ensued. Hernández also appealed, but his appeal has been separately adjudicated. See United States v. Hernández-Román, 981 F.3d 138 (1st Cir. 2020). In the pages that follow, we set forth the standards of review that variously apply to the appellant's manifold claims of error. We then discuss these claims in roughly the order in which they surfaced below. We treat them all as either preserved or deemed to be preserved, unless otherwise indicated. Other claims of error, as to which further discussion would be pleonastic, are...
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