United States v. Panczko, 15028.
Citation | 353 F.2d 676 |
Decision Date | 21 December 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 15028.,15028. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul W. PANCZKO, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Melvin B. Lewis, Chicago, Ill., Joseph A. Varon, Hollywood, Fla., for appellant, Julius Lucius Echeles, Chicago, Ill., of counsel.
Edward V. Hanrahan, U. S. Atty., John Peter Lulinski, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for appellee, John Powers Crowley, Asst. U. S. Atty., of counsel.
Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, and DUFFY and SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judges.
Paul W. Panczko, defendant, appeals from a judgment of the district court sentencing him to a term of 10 years and fining him $500 and costs, following his plea of not guilty of violation of § 1704, Title 18 U.S.C. as charged in an indictment. There was a jury verdict finding him guilty.
§ 1704 provides, in part:
1. A jury, consisting of eight women and four men with two alternate jurors, was selected, and sworn on December 9, 1964. Trial commenced on December 10, 1964, when the first witness was called. The case was submitted to the jury for decision on Monday, December 14, 1964, at 4:30 P.M.
At 10:30 P.M. on the same day, the court announced that he was about to permit the jurors to "go to their respective homes, with the admonition that they, of course, speak to no one about the case or read anything about it, not to discuss it with anybody until they return to discuss it with their fellow jurors in the morning * * * well they can come back here at 9:30."
Thereupon defense counsel stated that defendant objected to the jury being permitted to separate.
The court then had the jury brought before him and, by interrogation of the foreman, elicited his opinion that it did not look like a unanimous verdict would be arrived at "tonight". The court then stated that the jurors were not to read anything or listen to anything about the case or discuss it with anyone. He thereupon dismissed them until 10 o'clock the following morning.
One of the women jurors requested that someone take her to the train depot. As to another woman juror, the marshal told the court that he understood "she lives in Joliet and I think the last train has already gone". A male juror volunteered that there were some trains "between 12:15 and 1:15 that we could catch, if anybody were headed in those directions".
A woman juror stated: The court interrupted her saying "You can catch your train, I mean, you can get a train?" She answered "Yes".
The court then proceeded to question a male juror who said he would take the subway, and a woman juror said that she could "get the train".
The next woman juror answered by saying that she would take the bus "if I know where I am going". The court clerk volunteered that "The lady takes the Lake Street L".
The court said to a man who intended taking the elevated road home: .
Thereupon a bondsman in the courtroom volunteered to drive a juror to Oak Park, but this offer the court declined.
On December 15, 1964, the jury was brought into court and delivered its verdict finding the defendant guilty.
Defense counsel point out that, although the court admonished the jury not to read anything about the case, or listen to any radio or television commentaries or discuss the case with anyone except follow jurors, the court made no inquiry of the jurors upon their return the following morning as to whether any of them had read several newspaper articles which appeared, whether they had heard any broadcasts, or whether anyone, member of family or otherwise, had made any comment upon the case and prejudicial matter which defense counsel contended had appeared in two newspapers.
On February 9, 1965, in United States v. D'Antonio, 7 Cir., 342 F.2d 667, petition for rehearing en banc denied April 9, 1965, we held it was error to permit a jury to separate during its deliberations, over the defendant's objections.
In D'Antonio, at 670, we said:
Of course the district court, in the case now before us, did not have before it our decision in D'Antonio which had not yet been rendered at the time of the trial in this case. However, the principles which we recognized in D'Antonio had long existed and were binding upon the district court in the case now being reviewed. The facts in the record in the case at bar as to the separation of jurors at a late hour at night, leaving each to find the way to his or her respective home, merely further emphasizes the need for applying the established rule which we later reiterated in D'Antonio.
We hold that the failure by the court to sequester the jury overnight during its deliberations had a two-pronged effect, first, of exposing the released jurors to exposure to those who...
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State v. Atwood, 685
...The reasons for the rule are clearly enunciated in United States v. D'Antonio, 342 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1965), and United States v. Panczko, 353 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. den. 383 U.S. 935, 86 S.Ct. 1066, 15 L.Ed.2d 853, as At no time is it more essential that the jury should be immuniz......
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U.S. v. Mahone
...has testified.' A chain of custody must be proved when the condition of the object at a prior time is in issue. See United States v. Panczko, 353 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1965). In the case at hand, the only condition of the gun which was in issue was the length of the barrel. For a conviction un......
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United States v. Harris
...appellants rely heavily on two Seventh Circuit cases, United States v. D'Antonio, 7 Cir. 1965, 342 F.2d 667, and United States v. Panczko, 7 Cir. 1965, 353 F.2d 676, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935, 86 S.Ct. 1066, 15 L.Ed.2d 853. We note that D'Antonio and Panczko appear to impose more stringent......
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United States of America v. Rizzo
...testify, positively, that they were cards prepared and mailed by the defendants, or by their direction. They rely upon United States v. Panczko, 7 Cir., 353 F.2d 676. This case is in no sense parallel to Panczko, in which there was a clear break in the chain of custody of evidence. The test......
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§ 26.02 REAL EVIDENCE
...admissibility. Instead, gaps in the chain go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.").[26] E.g., United States v. Panczko, 353 F.2d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1965) ("There is no evidence as to where or from whom Lieutenant Remkus got the keys."); Novak v. District of Columbia, 160 F......
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§ 26.02 Real Evidence
...admissibility. Instead, gaps in the chain go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.").[26] E.g., United States v. Panczko, 353 F.2d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1965) ("There is no evidence as to where or from whom Lieutenant Remkus got the keys."); Novak v. District of Columbia, 160 F......