United States v. Paquin
| Decision Date | 23 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | CR 21-568-MV |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. EVERETT E. PAQUIN, Defendant. |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Mr. Paquin's Amended Opposed Motion to Amend Order of Detention, filed May 26 2021. Doc. 26. The government filed a Response on June 2 2021 [Doc. 29] and Mr. Paquin's Reply was filed on June 16, 2021 [Doc. 36]. Having carefully considered the Motions relevant law, and being otherwise fully informed, the Court finds that Mr. Paquin's motion is well-taken and will be GRANTED.
Mr Paquin was allegedly involved in a physical altercation at Isleta Pueblo on December 31, 2020, during which he brandished a utility knife at Jane Doe, pushed her onto the ground, kneeled on her, and threatened her. Doc. 29 at 1. During the altercation, Mr. Paquin allegedly called his son E.P., and said, “get over here, we're going to drag this bitch all over outside and we are going to kill her.” Id. at 2. The government indicates that Jane Doe was later able to escape to a neighbor's house. Id.
On April 22, 2021, Mr. Paquin was indicted on three counts: Assault with a Dangerous Weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1153 and 113(a)(3); Witness Tampering - Hindering, Delaying, or Preventing Communication Relating to Commission of Offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(2)(C); and Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924. Doc. 1. Mr. Paquin was being held at Valencia County Detention Center when the indictment was returned; after his transfer to federal custody, he was brought before Magistrate Judge Jerry H. Ritter for a virtual initial appearance on May 20, 2021. Doc. 6.
At the initial appearance, Mr. Paquin waived a detention hearing and was ordered detained. Doc. 34 at 5-6. The government then requested that Magistrate Judge Ritter “order as a condition of detention no contact with Jane Doe or with defendant's son, directly or indirectly.” Doc. 34 at 6. Defense counsel expressed “general concerns about conditions of detention.” Id. After discussion of the rationale behind the government's request-namely, that Mr. Paquin's son E.P. was a witness to the charged conduct-Magistrate Judge Ritter ordered Mr. Paquin to (1) refrain from contacting the victim, except for investigative purposes, and (2) refrain from contacting his son, except through AFPD Hans Erickson about matters unrelated to the case. Id. at 7-10. Magistrate Judge Ritter stated that “the primary purpose of these instructions is so the detention facility knows that they're not to enable Mr. Paquin to contact the alleged victim or the son.” Id. at 10. Though these conditions were not published in any written order, both parties agree that Magistrate Judge Ritter's oral pronouncements control. Doc. 26 at 2; Doc. 29 at 3 n.2.
Mr. Paquin argues that the Bail Reform Act only permits the court to impose conditions upon a defendant when he is released. Doc. 26 at 2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a), (i)). The government agrees. Doc. 29 at 4. However, the government contends that the court has the inherent power to impose conditions of detention for the protection of victims and witnesses. Id. at 4-7. The government also argues that, in order to enforce the provision of the Crime Victims' Rights Act that gives victims a “right to be reasonably protected, ” the court “must be allowed to protect Jane Doe from communication and possible communication from Defendant.” Id. at 7 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1)). Mr. Paquin argues in his Reply that the facts of this case do not justify the use of the court's inherent powers, pointing out that he has not interfered with the proceedings in any way and has not attempted to contact either E.P or Jane Doe. Doc. 36 at 2.
Other courts have rejected arguments that no-contact conditions of detention may be imposed under the Bail Reform Act or the Crime Victims' Rights Act. The Bail Reform Act's text only explicitly allows a court to enter a pretrial no-contact order in cases where the defendant has been released. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(v). The statute is silent on whether courts may impose a similar condition during pretrial detention-or, indeed, whether courts may impose any conditions of detention at all. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1) with (e). For this reason, other courts have found that the Bail Reform Act does not sanction no-contact orders imposed during pretrial detention. See United States v. Sims, No. 21-CR-26, 2021 WL 1062548, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 18, 2021); United States v. Potter, No. 3:20-MJ-00061, 2020 WL 6081894, at *3 (D.V.I. Oct. 15, 2020); see also United States v. Streett, 437 F.Supp.3d 940, 951 (D.N.M. 2020) (Browning, J.). Similarly, the text of the Crime Victims' Rights Act “do[es] not appear, at least on [its] face, to vest the Court with any power to impose no-contact orders that may infringe on a defendant's First Amendment rights.” Sims, 2021 WL 1062548, at *3.
A court might issue a pretrial no-contact order under 18 U.S.C. § 1514, which allows for the issuance of “a temporary restraining order prohibiting harassment of a victim or witness in a Federal criminal case.” 18 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(1). However, as Judge Browning noted in United States v. Streett, the text of that statute constrains courts to issuing orders only when there are “reasonable grounds to believe that harassment . . . exists.” Streett, 437 F.Supp.3d at 947.
Federal courts have “certain inherent authority to protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities.” Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 820 (1996). Specifically, a federal court has inherent authority to control admission to its bar, to mete out punishment for the disobedience of court orders, to investigate potential fraud and vacate fraudulently obtained judgments, to bar disruptive criminal defendants from the courtroom, and to sua sponte dismiss for failure to prosecute. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-44 (1991). However, “[b]ecause of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Id. at 44 (citation omitted). “A court's inherent power is limited by the necessity giving rise to its exercise.” Degen, 517 U.S. at 829. Such powers “must be exercised with circumspection, ” and “only when and to the extent justified by danger which the defendant's conduct presents or by danger of significant interference with the progress or order of the trial.” Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16 (1967). No Supreme Court decision has purported to include an exhaustive list of the courts' inherent powers; thus, the exact scope of these powers is unclear.
Several federal and state courts of appeal have upheld no-contact orders as an exercise of inherent powers in criminal cases. See Wheeler v. United States, 640 F.2d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 1981) (); Hicks v. State, 377 P.3d 976, 979 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016) (same); State v. Ayoub, No. 218-2017-CR-1636, 2018 WL 324996, at *5 (N.H. Super. Jan. 5, 2018) (); United States v. Morris, 259 F.3d 894, 901 (7th Cir. 2001) (). The Tenth Circuit has not decided a case directly on point, although one recent case involved a challenge to a no-contact order applicable after sentencing. See United States v. Grigsby, 737 Fed.Appx. 375, 377 (10th Cir. 2018). The Grigsby Court's terse decision concluded only that the no-contact order was “a civil injunction pursuant to [the district court's] ancillary jurisdiction.” Id. at 377. However, the Grigsby Court cited favorably to the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Morris-implying, but not deciding, that the post-sentencing no-contact order was justified as an exercise of the district court's inherent power to protect the administration of justice. Id.
Despite the cases justifying no-contact orders as exercises of inherent power, federal courts have been clear that not every no-contact order should be upheld under this doctrine. See, e.g., Morris, 259 F.3d at 901 (). However, only the Ninth Circuit has articulated a clear standard to assess when an order has exceeded the court's authority. See Wheeler, 640 F.2d at 1124. In Wheeler, the Ninth Circuit considered a challenge to a post-sentencing no-contact order, holding that two conditions had to be met to sustain the order on remand. Id. First, “the activity restrained [must pose] a clear and present danger or a serious and imminent threat” and second, “the restraint must be narrowly drawn and no reasonable alternatives, having a lesser impact on First Amendment freedoms, must be available.” Id. Other courts, such as the Fifth Circuit, have merely noted that the leading cases on this issue involve “credible claims of harassment that would interfere with the administration of justice” and reasoned that a no-contact condition in the absence of such harassment would “not implicate the administration ofjustice.” United States v. Darwish, 755 Fed.Appx. 359, 363 (5th Cir. 2018).
Other courts have applied the Ninth Circuit's Wheeler test to evaluate the validity of pretrial no-contact orders. See Sims, 2021 WL 1062548, at *4. In United States v. Sims, Mr. Sims was incarcerated pending trial on sex trafficking charges when ...
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