United States v. Payden

Decision Date07 June 1985
Docket NumberNo. SS 84 Cr. 566(DNE).,SS 84 Cr. 566(DNE).
Citation609 F. Supp. 1273
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Donald PAYDEN, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Rudolph W. Giuliani, U.S. Atty., S.D. N.Y., New York City, for plaintiff; John K. Carroll, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City, of counsel.

Robert M. Simels, P.C., New York City, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

EDELSTEIN, District Judge:

Defendant Donald Payden ("Payden") has moved, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 46(a), for an order releasing him on $250,000 bail. The government has cross-moved for an order of detention or, in the alternative, for an increase in Payden's bail to $1 million. Because the court finds that Payden has attempted to hire a fellow inmate for the purpose of murdering a key government witness in this case and her daughter, Payden's bail application is denied and the government's motion for an order of detention is granted.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are set forth in this court's opinion of December 3, 1984, United States v. Payden, 598 F.Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y.1984), rev'd, 759 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1985), but the court will review the facts pertinent to this motion. Payden was arrested on August 3, 1984 and brought before a Magistrate who set bail at $250,000.00. Payden was unable to post this amount and was remanded. On August 13, 1984, Payden was named in a two count indictment charging him with conspiracy to violate the federal narcotics laws, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and distribution and possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Payden was arraigned on August 23, 1984 and bail was continued. On October 10, 1984, the government filed a superseding indictment, which added a count under 21 U.S.C. § 848, charging Payden with organizing and supervising a continuing criminal enterprise. Payden was arraigned on the superseding indictment on October 17, 1984. Bail was not discussed. On October 31, 1984, the government moved for an order of detention, pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq. After a hearing and based on the record in this case, the court granted the government's motion for pre-trial detention, finding that "no condition or combination of conditions provide sufficient assurance that the defendant will not continue the conduct alleged in the indictment and appear when required." United States v. Payden, 598 F.Supp. 1388, 1399 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

On March 26, 1985, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the order of detention, holding that because the detention hearing was not held on October 17, 1984 — the date of Payden's "first appearance" before the judicial officer after the filing of the first superseding indictment — the new Bail Reform Act was incorrectly applied to Payden. The court remanded the case "for consideration in accordance with the bail laws under which the court was effectively operating at the time of Payden's arraignment on the first superseding indictment on October 17, 1984."1 United States v. Payden, 759 F.2d 202, 205 (2d Cir.1985).

On April 22, 1985, Payden moved for an order of release on the $250,000.00 bail set on August 3, 1984. The government cross-moved for an order of detention based on new information. The government alleges that sometime in February of 1985, James Turner, then an inmate at the Metropolitan Correctional Center ("MCC"), informed the superintendent of the MCC that Payden had approached him and asked for his assistance in murdering Claudine J. Jones, a government informant. The court held a hearing on the motions from May 9 through May 13, 1985. James Turner was the only government witness at the hearing. Payden elected not to present any testimony on his own behalf.

I. APPLICABILITY OF THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984

The government argues that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 should be applied to Payden. The government contends that under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, the government may seek pre-trial detention of a defendant at a time other than the defendant's "first appearance" before the judicial officer. In support of this contention, the government relies on 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c), which allows a district judge "at any time to amend his order to impose additional or different conditions of release," and 18 U.S.C. § 3148(a), which provides that an order of detention may issue as to any defendant who violates a condition of his release order. The government also refers the court to United States v. Resek, 602 F.Supp. 1126 (S.D.N.Y.1985), in which Judge Keenan held that the government may seek detention of a defendant after his first appearance, provided the government can demonstrate that there exists "dramatic new information."

The court finds the government's argument on this point persuasive; however, the mandate issued by the court of appeals in its March 26, 1985 opinion directs the court to apply the law as it existed prior to the enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The court of appeals held:

The new Bail Reform Act was incorrectly applied to defendant Payden. Rather than permit a special exception to the first appearance requirement as a result of the timing of this case, thereby potentially weakening the procedural fabric of the Act, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand for reconsideration in accordance with the bail laws under which the court was effectively operating at the time of Payden's arraignment.

United States v. Payden, supra, 759 F.2d at 205. Even though the Bail Reform Act of 1984 provided for immediate repeal of the Bail Reform Act of 1966, see United States v. Zannino, 761 F.2d 52, 54-57 (1st Cir.1985) (Bail Reform Act of 1984 applies to defendant released on bail under 1966 Bail Act); United States v. Angiulo, 755 F.2d 969, 970-974 (1st Cir.1985) (Bail Reform Act of 1984 applies to defendant incarcertated and seeking release on bail at the time of the passage of the new act), this court is bound by the court of appeals mandate that the old law be applied to Payden.

Under the law as it existed prior to October 12, 1984, the court has the power to revoke bail and remand the defendant if it finds that the defendant has threatened witnesses. United States v. Graewe, 689 F.2d 54, 56-57 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam); United States v. Wind, 527 F.2d 672, 675 (6th Cir.1975); United States v. Gilbert, 425 F.2d 490, 491-92 (D.C.Cir.1969); see Carbo v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 662, 668, 7 L.Ed.2d 769 (1962) (Douglas, Circuit J.); cf. United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, 1280-81 (8th Cir.1976) (detention during trial), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1174, 51 L.Ed.2d 581 & 433 U.S. 907, 97 S.Ct. 2971, 53 L.Ed.2d 1091 (1977); United States v. Cozzetti, 441 F.2d 344, 350-51 (9th Cir.1971) (same). Although this power was not expressly provided for in the Bail Reform Act of 1966, there is ample case authority for the court's extrastatutory power to revoke a defendant's bail prior to trial in order to insure the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial.2 Fernandez v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 642, 644, 5 L.Ed.2d 683 (1961) (Harlan, Circuit J.) ("District courts have authority as an incident of their inherent powers ... to revoke bail."); see United States v. Graewe, supra, 689 F.2d at 57; United States v. Wind, supra, 527 F.2d at 675; cf. Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16, 88 S.Ct. 6, 7, 19 L.Ed.2d 15 (1967) (per curiam) ("A trial judge indisputably has broad powers to ensure the orderly and expeditious progress of a trial. For this purpose, he has the power to revoke bail and to remit the defendant to custody. But this power must be exercised with circumspection. It may be invoked only when and to the extent justified by danger which the defendant's conduct presents or by danger of significant interference with the progress or order of the trial."). Thus, if the court finds substantial evidence that the defendant has threatened or interfered with government witnesses, or that his release would pose a danger to the community, it may remand the defendant without bail before and during the trial.3

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

At the hearing, James Turner ("Turner") testified in support of the government's application for detention. Evidence produced at this hearing demonstrates that Payden has attempted to interfere with government witnesses and that these actions are serious enough to warrant detention. Turner was an inmate with Payden at the MCC. Between August 1984 and January 1985 the two had periodic conversations. During these conversations, Turner told Payden that he had shot a bank guard. Tr. 61. In fact, Turner has a history of committing murder as well as other serious offenses. In 1965 Turner killed a man with a butcher knife over a dispute involving a woman. In 1978, Turner was convicted of bank robbery. In 1985, Turner was again convicted of bank robbery. Turner has admitted that during the latter bank robbery he shot an unarmed guard at the bank. Thus, aware of Turner's history and his willingness to commit murder, Payden told Turner in January of 1985 that he wanted to kill a government witness whom he then identified as "Diane Turner." On a number of occasions, Payden asked Turner to kill this witness and offered to "pay Turner good" for his services. Tr. at 62. Sometime subsequent to his initial approaches to Turner, Payden was visited by a girlfriend who, Payden told Turner, brought Payden an Indianapolis address of the target witness. When Payden communicated that address to Turner, he informed Turner that he also wanted the witness' daughter killed.

Payden gave Turner an address and telephone number where Turner could make initial arrangements for the contract murders, should Turner be released and interested in Payden's proposition. From August of 1984 until his trial on the bank robbery charges in March of 1985, Turner was convinced that he would be "getting out any time." He had made an application before the court to find him...

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  • United States v. Payden
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    ...Coleman ("Coleman") have joined in Payden's motions. The background of this case has been set forth elsewhere, see United States v. Payden, 609 F.Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd 768 F.2d 487 (2d Cir.1985); in re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Simels), 605 F.Supp. 839 ......
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    ...cause. United States v. Jenkins, 728 F.2d 396 (6th Cir.1984); United States v. Boyce, 601 F.Supp. 947 (D.Minn.1985); United States v. Payden, 609 F.Supp. 1273 (D.N.Y.1985). Whether or not Carlberg's pickup truck was lower after leaving Owen's home is not crucial to finding the magistrate ha......
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