United States v. Peifer
Decision Date | 17 August 1979 |
Docket Number | Crim. No. 78-202. |
Citation | 474 F. Supp. 498 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Donald L. PEIFER. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Curtis E. A. Karnow, Asst. U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Calvin Lieberman, Reading, Pa., for defendant.
Defendant operates F. R. & S. Landfill in Exeter Township, Berks County, Pennsylvania. On April 26, 1978, Deputy United States Marshal James Duross entered defendant's property with a warrant authorizing a search for samples of water and effluent suspected of being illegally discharged into the Schuylkill River.1 Defendant hailed the marshal with the words, "So this is the big Marshal". Within a few moments after service of the warrant, defendant perused its content, objected to its form, declared it invalid and pocketed it promptly. He told the marshal that he, the defendant, would not allow the samples to be taken, and that if samples were taken, the marshal and accompanying employees of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) would not be permitted to leave the property.
During the next fifty minutes the search party engaged in various negotiations with the defendant to resolve their differences. The marshal drove his car to a higher point on the landfill several times to communicate by radio with his superiors in Philadelphia. Subsequently, the search party decided to commence the search and began to drive down an unpaved road out of the landfill area enroute to an adjacent area described in the search warrant. Waving his arms, defendant ran out into the middle of the road and motioned the vehicles, including the marshal's, over to the side of the road. The search party complied with defendant's demands. At that point defendant ordered an employee, David Hart, to position a pickup truck across the exit road, thus preventing the marshal's progress. During the late morning defendant's employees moved the truck several times to permit the ingress and egress of various vehicles, including refuse trucks and on one occasion the car of a state trooper. After each movement the truck was returned to its position across the road. At one point, defendant told Peter Bronner, a DER inspector and investigator, that the purpose of blocking the vehicles was to guarantee that he, Peifer, would be able to tow them out. At 12:45 P.M., approximately two hours after the marshal had served defendant with the warrant, he arrested defendant. The pickup truck was then moved out of the way and the search party continued to contiguous areas to begin sampling and tests.
After a six-day trial a jury convicted defendant of knowingly and willfully obstructing, resisting and opposing an officer of the United States in his service and execution of judicial process of a United States magistrate in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1501. Defendant now moves for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, and in the alternative for a new trial, contending that the Court erred in denying the defendant's pre-trial motions, erred in several evidentiary rulings and alleging that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.
Prior to trial defendant moved for a bill of particulars, in which he demanded names and addresses of persons present at the place of the incident and during a conversation between the defendant and "the victim", the make and model of the vehicles placed on the road, and the "exact nature of the inquiry or investigation by the Government upon which it predicated its answers and representations". Defendant also moved for the government's witness list, "for notice by the government of the intention to use evidence"2, and to dismiss the information on the grounds of improper arraignment and venue and impermissible vagueness in the information.
Denial of the bill of particulars could not have adversely affected defendant's ability to prepare his defense adequately. He was present most of the time that the marshal stayed on the property and was obviously present when he ordered the pickup truck placed across the road. Defendant saw who was there and heard what was said. In light of the information provided under Rule 16 and gleaned from the probable cause hearing, the factual details and legal issues which arose at trial could hardly have been surprising.
Defendant also filed a pre-trial motion alleging violations of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5(a) and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) and urging dismissal of the information because of the government's "(f)ailure to obtain proper venue by taking the defendant to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, rather than to the nearest United States Magistrate in Reading." Defendant's Memo at 2. The purpose of Rule 5(a) is to guarantee that the government does not use delay between arrest and an initial appearance to subject defendants to unwarranted or coercive interrogation. Mallory v. United States, supra at 453-54, 77 S.Ct. 1356, United States v. Gaines, 555 F.2d 618, 622 (7th Cir. 1977). Where delay is not in fact used for that purpose, no prejudice results and Mallory is irrelevant. United States v. Grandi, 424 F.2d 399, 402-03 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 870, 93 S.Ct. 199, 34 L.Ed.2d 121 (1971).3
In the case at bar defendant alleges that the "additional delay in awaiting transportation to Philadelphia was calculated to deprive the defendant of his constitutional guarantees". Defendant's Memo at 2. Yet defendant does not show what prejudice resulted from the alleged delay or upon what constitutional rights this delay impinged. Defendant obtained his initial hearing before a United States magistrate a few hours after arrest. Bail was posted, and defendant was advised fully of the charges against him. Government's agents elicited no statements from defendant between the time of his arrest and initial hearing. Therefore, no prejudice resulted from selection of Philadelphia as the place to bring defendant before a magistrate.4 No relief was warranted.
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