United States v. Pelletier
| Decision Date | 25 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 06-cr-00058-JAW |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL PELLETIER |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TERMINATION OF SUPERVISED RELEASE
A supervisee convicted of engaging in a conspiracy to import and distribute marijuana moves for early termination of his supervised release on the ground that he wishes to smoke marijuana to treat his medical conditions. The Court denies his motion.
On July 19, 2007, on the sixth day of trial, a federal jury found Michael Pelletier guilty of twelve separate violations of federal criminal law, including drug trafficking, money laundering, structuring, and social security fraud. Jury Verdict (ECF No. 280). The jury found that the amount of marijuana associated with Mr. Pelletier's participation in the drug importation and distribution conspiracies was more than 1000 kilograms. Id. at 2. The penalty provision applicable to drug trafficking conspiracies where the quantity of marijuana was 1000 or more kilograms was 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii). Section 841(b)(1)(A) also stated, “If any person commits a violation of this subparagraph . . . after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense have become final, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without release....” As Mr. Pelletier had previously been convicted of four state drug trafficking felonies: two in 1994 and two in 2001, Information (ECF No. 181), Mr. Pelletier was subject to a mandatory term of life imprisonment on the drug trafficking conspiracies, which is what the Court imposed. J. (ECF No. 384). Specifically, on January 22, 2008, the Court sentenced Michael Pelletier to mandatory life imprisonment concurrent with four terms of two hundred forty months and six terms of one hundred twenty months, ten years of supervised release concurrent with ten three-year terms, no fine, $83,847.55 in restitution, and a $1200 special assessment. Id.
On January 29, 2008, Mr. Pelletier filed a notice of appeal. Notice of Appeal by Michael Pelletier (ECF No. 385). On December 1, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed Mr. Pelletier's conviction and sentence. J. (ECF No. 664); United States v. Pelletier, 666 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). The Court received the mandate of the First Circuit on December 28, 2011. Mandate (ECF No. 665). On May 29, 2012, the United States Supreme Court denied Mr. Pelletier's petition for a writ of certiorari, Pelletier v. United States, 566 U.S. 1023 (2012), and on August 31, 2012, the Supreme Court denied his petition for rehearing. Pelletier v. United States, 567 U.S. 964 (2012). Mr. Pelletier filed various unsuccessful post-conviction motions and two motions for compassionate release, and as of January 22, 2021, Mr. Pelletier's second motion for compassionate release was pending. Def.'s Mot. for Compassionate Release (ECF No. 824).
On January 19, 2021, then President Donald J. Trump exercised his presidential commutation authority and commuted Mr. Pelletier's incarcerative sentence. Executive Grant of Clemency at 1 (ECF No. 858). President Trump's commutation reads:
Id. President Trump's commutation released Mr. Pelletier from his incarcerative sentence but retained his term of supervised release and the other components of his sentence. Id. Upon his release from federal prison, he was still subject to ten years of supervised release concurrent with ten three-year terms, $83,847.55 in restitution, and a $1200 special assessment. J. at 4-6.
On July 11, 2022, Mr. Pelletier filed a pro se motion to terminate his supervised release. Mot. for Early Termination of Supervised Release (ECF No. 861). Mr. Pelletier notes that he is paraplegic and has been since age eleven when he was injured in a farm accident. Id. at 2. Upon his release, he moved to his brother's home in Fort Worth, Florida, where significant renovations were necessary to accommodate his wheelchair. Id. Mr. Pelletier explains that he is subject to chronic infection due to the use of his catheter, and he states that “Doctors have also suggested the use of medical marijuana for treatment of some of his conditions.” Id. However, Mr. Pelletier acknowledges that marijuana is a Schedule I narcotic and proscribed by the terms of his supervised release. Id. Mr. Pelletier says that he receives social security disability benefits, which along with social security benefits, allow him to be selfsufficient along with assistance from his family. Id. He says that the terms of his supervised release require payment of restitution, which would take a significant portion of his income. Id. Mr. Pelletier gardens, does the laundry, and performs home maintenance within the limits of his physical capacity. Id.
Mr. Pelletier contends that he has “complied with all requirements of his supervised release.” Id. at 3. He avers that at age sixty-six, he is “statistically unlikely to commit any crimes.” Id. He points to “significant support” from his family, from The Human Solution International, and other advocacy groups, and he represents that he “will continue to comply with all social norms.” Id.
Mr. Pelletier argues that it is “beyond cavil” that “the use of marijuana would replace the use of many prescription drugs he now uses.” Id. He says that his healthcare providers recommend this treatment but acknowledges marijuana is not available to him during his period of supervised release. Id. He says that travel to undergo drug testing and to comply with other supervised release requirements is difficult for him. Id. Mr. Pelletier maintains that there is “no pen[o]logical goal” to continued supervised release and notes that the one-year period during which a court may not terminate supervised release early expired on January 21, 2022. Id. He concludes that early termination would be “fair and just.” Id.
The Government filed its opposition on July 27, 2022. Obj. to Def.'s Mot. for Early Termination of Supervised Release (ECF No. 862). In its opposition, the Government notes that the United States Probation Office has objected to early termination and the Government supports the position of the Probation Office. Id. at 1. The Government's objection is based on 1) his lengthy criminal history, 2) his past failure to respond to rehabilitation efforts, 3) his unmet restitution obligation, and 4) his request is grounded on his desire to use marijuana, and his federal drug conviction was occasioned by his importation and distribution of marijuana, the very drug he now seeks to use. Id. at 1-3.
Once a defendant has served one year of supervised release, under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), a court is authorized to terminate the remaining period of supervised release and discharge the person released "if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice." The statute states that a court “may, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7), terminate a term of supervised release ” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). These factors include the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), to “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), to “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C), the “applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant,” Id. § 3553(a)(4), the “pertinent policy statement” of the Sentencing Commission, Id. § 3553(a)(5), the “need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities,” Id. § 3553(a)(6), and the “need to provide restitution to any victims.” Id. § 3553(a)(7).
Because Mr. Pelletier failed to meet both standards, the Court does not resolve whether mere compliance with the terms of supervised release in a specific case may be enough to order early termination or whether something more is necessary. Compare United States v. Seger, No. 1:98-cr-00065-JAW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151558, at *17 (D. Me. Oct. 27, 2014); with United States v. Harris, 258 F.Supp.3d 137, 149-50 (D.D.C. 2017). Some courts require a defendant to demonstrate changed circumstances, such as exceptionally good behavior. See United States v. Hawatmeh, No. LA CR 08-00385-VBF-3, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188084, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2014). Others have not. United States v. Shaw, 445 F.Supp.3d 1160, 1166 (D. Colo. 2020) ().
It strikes the Court that a judicial decision to terminate a term of supervised release is too case-specific to draw hard rules beyond the statutory language for what is essentially a discretionary decision. Consistent with its prior rulings “in the Court's view, ‘compliance with the terms and conditions of . . . supervised release, though laudable, is generally not grounds for early termination.'” United States v. Farmer, No. 1:05-cr-00088-JAW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145925, at *6 (D. Me. Oct. 28, 2015) (qu...
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