United States v. Pender
| Decision Date | 19 September 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 7007.,7007. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Charles L. PENDER, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
John C. Lenahan, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Harold H. Titus, Jr., U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and John S. Ransom, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellant.
Before FICKLING, PAIR and HARRIS, Associate Judges.
The government appeals from the dismissal without prejudice of a one-count indictment charging appellee Charles L. Pender with manslaughter in violation of D.C.Code 1967, § 22-2405.* We affirm.
The indictment charges that:
On or about August 11, 1972, within the District of Columbia, Charles L. Pender feloniously, wantonly and with gross negligence, shot Gregory Coleman with a gun, thereby causing injuries from which the said Gregory Coleman died on or about August 11, 1972.
The trial court construed the indictment to charge only involuntary manslaughter and ordered the prosecution to proceed on that theory alone. Upon the government's refusal to go forward with its case, the indictment was dismissed without prejudice.
The issue to be resolved on appeal is whether the indictment — which alleges the accused "feloniously, wantonly and with gross negligence" shot the deceased — charged involuntary manslaughter only.
The government's basic contention is that the indictment sufficiently alleges both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Although the government concedes the words "wantonly and with gross negligence," as used in the indictment, charge the appellee with involuntary manslaughter, it argues the word "feloniously," as used in the indictment, is synonymous with "intentionally," therefore voluntary manslaughter is alleged as well.
We find the government's construction of the word "feloniously" as used in the indictment without merit. For its definition the government principally relies on United States v. Marzani, 71 F.Supp. 615, 618 (D.D.C.1947); Gambrell v. Commonwealth, 130 Ky. 513, 517, 113 S.W. 476, 480 (1908); Ball v. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 601, 605, 101 S.W. 956, 960 (1907). These cases, nevertheless, are inapposite to the case here because they do not define the word "feloniously" as used in an indictment for involuntary manslaughter. Although there are many definitions of the word "feloniously," see Black's Law Dictionary 744 (4th ed. 1968); 16 Words and Phrases pp. 669-685 (Perm. ed. 1959), it is necessary to define the word with respect to the crime charged. Furthermore, when a word in an indictment is construed, it must be looked at with regard to the indictment as a whole. Cf., e. g., McCoy v. United States, 169 F.2d 776, 779-780 (9th Cir. 1948).
The indictment here charges involuntary manslaughter and the word "felo...
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United States v. Frady
...App.D.C. 382, 385 (1905). The definition of manslaughter was never codified, but remains a matter of common law. See United States v. Pender, 309 A.2d 492 (D.C.App.1973). The significance of the various degrees of homicide under the law of the District was summarized by the Court of Appeals......
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...Thomas v. State, 522 P.2d 528 (Alaska 1974), overruled on other grounds; Evans v. State, 550 P.2d 830 (Alaska 1976); United States v. Pender, 309 A.2d 492 (D.C.App.1973); State v. Clingerman, 213 Kan. 525, 516 P.2d 1022 (1973), modified on other grounds; State v. Lucas, 221 Kan. 88, 557 P.2......
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...offenses may be included in separate counts of one indictment. Our present holding was, of course, foreshadowed by United States v. Pender, D.C.App., 309 A. 2d 492 (1973), in which a panel of this court held that the language of the indictment there in issue charged only involuntary I In a ......
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Murray v. United States
...393 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880, 85 S.Ct. 149, 13 L.Ed.2d 87 (1964). See United States v. Bradford, supra; United States v. Pender, D.C.App., 309 A.2d 492 (1973). After the government's election to proceed only on involuntary manslaughter, the trial suffered none of the associate......